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Every opinion, to be correctly understood, ought to be
considered with a view to the case in which it was delivered.1
-Chief Justice John Marshall
In Re Burr (1807)
It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what
the law is . . . If courts are to regard the Constitution . . . [as] superior
to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such
ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.2
-Chief Justice John Marshall
Marbury v. Madison (1803)
While Burr’s case is depending before the court, I will trouble
you, from time to time, with what occurs to me . . . the case of Marbury
v. Madison has been cited, and I think it material to stop . . . citing that
case as authority, and to have it denied to be law . . . I have long wished
for a proper occasion to have the gratuitous opinion in Marbury v.
Madison brought before the public, & denounced as not law; & I think
the present a fortunate one, because it occupies such a place in the
public attention . . . [its] reverse will be the rule of action with the
executive.3
-President Thomas Jefferson

1. In re Burr, 8 U.S. 470 (1807) (hereinafter) United States v. Burr, 25 F.
Cas. 55, 165 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 137 (1803).
3. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay (June 2, 1907), in 10 THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON IN TWELVE VOLUMES 396 (Paul Leicester Ford
ed., Federal ed. 1905).
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INTRODUCTION

The effects of Chief Justice John Marshall’s tenure on the
Supreme Court from 1801-1835 are still visible today.4 Marshall’s
written opinions instruct on American governance, history, law, and
politics. The nuances and historical context of those opinions
demonstrate that his role on the Court was far more than merely
presiding thereover. Marshall shaped modern judicial review.5 As
Chief Justice, he quintessentially brought the authority of a
political branch, the dignity of statesmanship, and the appearance
of total impartiality to the Supreme Court.6 His efforts have been
continually minimized, enlarged, and misunderstood by scholars,
and yet, there are aspects of his career still to be revealed.7
This Article focuses upon John Marshall’s judicial
statesmanship within the case of In Re Burr. Aaron Burr’s treason
trial has its notable place in history due to the political climate
during the case and the figures involved in the case both in and
outside of the courtroom.8 Chief Justice Marshall and the Court felt
immense political pressure from President Thomas Jefferson and
the public. Marshall’s diplomacy as a judicial statesman, driven by
forces facing the Judiciary in Burr, however, necessitate the
scrupulous analysis given to other cases in which the Marshall
Court averted disabling political pressure.9 At the time of Burr,
4. G. Edward White, Recovering the World of the Marshall Court, 33 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 781, 790 (2000) (noting that Chief Justice Marshall wrote
547 opinions of the Court’s total 574).
5. See Samuel R. Olken, The Ironies of Marbury v. Madison and John
Marshall’s Judicial Statesmanship, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 391, 403 (2004)
(writing that Marshall is incorrectly attributed to have created judicial review.
In reality, Marshall enhanced constitutional powers already present).
6. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES
OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 12, 15 (3d ed. 2007) (“Consequently[,] under
Marshall's guidance[,] the Court became not only an increasingly important
force in national politics but also a source of pride and inspiration to the men
appointed to its bench.”).
7. Olken, supra note 5, at 403.
8. CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE AARON BURR TREASON TRIAL 1 (2006),
www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/trials/burrtrial.pdf [perma.cc/XXU5-ALVK].
9. See Id. (“Momentous legal issues were involved, including the scope of
executive privilege and the constitutional and common law definitions of
treason. The trial’s political dimensions were equally significant: at stake was
the reach of Thomas Jefferson’s influence over the federal courts and the power
of John Marshall to limit Jefferson’s influence.”); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE
MARSHALL COURT & CULTURAL CHANGE: 1815-1835, at 232 (1991) (writing that
In Re Burr “was the cause célébre of the early Marshall Court years”); see also
Olken, supra note 5, at 403 (writing of judicial statesmanship in Marbury v.
Madison). See generally GARY SCHMITT & REBECCA BURGESS, MCCULLOCH V.
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Jefferson’s hostility towards the Judiciary was as potent as when
Marbury v. Madison initially pitted the two branches against one
another.10 It was exacerbated by that baggage.11 Many aspects of
Aaron Burr’s treason trial require a full analysis.12 This Article’s
background is purposed to aid in understanding the great variety of
issues, strategy, personalities, and sincerity (or lack thereof) that
Marshall faced when presiding. Its deliberate attention is provided
to aid in a full understanding of the forces that Marshall balanced.
Taking in a historical analysis, under the lens of constitutional
theory, it will demonstrate the tact with which Marshall guided
both country and Court through a difficult and undervalued
moment in history. One must initially view the case of Burr through
a historical analysis of several relationships and consider the forces
at play between those relationships. First, Chief Justice John
Marshall’s relationship with President Thomas Jefferson, which
was continually complicated by the soured flesh and blood that
Marshall shared with his cousin, Jefferson.13 Second, the baggageridden relationship between the Marshall’s Judiciary and
Jefferson’s Executive Branch. Third, the public’s political
relationship with the Judiciary, a decision-making body that
Marshall knew derives its supreme power from the People and

MARYLAND AT 200: DEBATING JOHN MARSHALL’S JURISPRUDENCE 135 (2020)
(featuring Adam White, John Marshall’s Judicial Statesmanship in McCulloch
v. Maryland (June 26, 2019) (unpublished manuscript)); id. (offering that
Marshall’s judicial restraint in McCulloch is an overlooked example of his
judicial statesmanship).
10. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 5 (writing that in In re Burr arose the
“fundamental question of whether the federal judiciary could issue such a
subpoena to the President without violating the constitutional principle of
separation of powers . . . follow[ing] an earlier contest between the Jefferson
administration and the Supreme Court concerning the delivery of a commission
to a justice of the peace” in Marbury v. Madison, in which “the Supreme Court
. . . rebuked the executive branch for not doing its legal duty”).
11. See Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause:
English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575,
686 (2008) (“The memory of Marshall’s lecture to Jefferson about the latter’s
assertion of a version of executive privilege in Marbury v. Madison was only
four years old.”).
12. See 2 GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF
POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-15, at 247-48, 52 (1981) (“[I]t is no easy task
concisely to place [Burr] within its political and legal setting, or to explain its
significance as one of the greatest criminal trials, and its relevant to the
development of American law and of the Supreme Court as an American
institution . . . [t]o cut through, without detailed description, the tangled web of
rumors, allegations, self-serving declarations, and the tissues of lies that beset
the path of Burr’s ambitions is an almost hopeless task.”).
13. JOEL R. PAUL, WITHOUT PRECEDENT: CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL
AND HIS TIMES 13 (2018).
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subsists on their faith therein.14 Fourth, the rivalrous relationship
between Jefferson and Aaron Burr, who faced accusations of
treason, both conceived of and fueled by Jefferson and his
administration. Fifth, and finally, Marshall’s relationship with the
Court, which found its success in a duality: the diplomacy of politics
and a keen application of shrewd legalism.15
This Article turns then to a legal analysis of Burr’s trial. It
begins with the notable and problematic Marshall Court treason
case that preceded Burr, Ex Parte Bollman, a case that no less
involved fellow conspirators in Burr’s scheme. Finally, it will
explain the pragmatic constitutional approach that the Chief
Justice utilized in deftly surmounting a potential undoing of
Marshall himself or the New Republic’s Judiciary. Marshall knew
that Burr’s trial placed the Court in a difficult position. If Burr was
acquitted, the Jeffersonians would accuse Marshall and the
Judiciary of practicing politics from the bench.16 Burr was indeed
acquitted, nevertheless, Marshall and the Judiciary surmounted
the political mires leveled by Jefferson, demonstrating the
determined mind of a consummate judicial statesman.17 Marshall’s
statesmanship and his judicial statesmanship in Marbury are wellsettled.18 However, in many respects, In Re Burr is the stronger
exemplar of Marshall’s statesmanship.19
14. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
15. See generally Olken, supra note 5, at 415 (“Marshall honed his political
instincts and later demonstrated considerable tact as a diplomatic envoy during
delicate and ultimately unsuccessful negotiations with the French over issues
of American neutrality. Modest in bearing and moderate in politics, Marshall
came to the Court with a remarkable set of skills that he employed to great
benefit during his tenure.”)
16. See interview by Rich Kelley with Charles F. Hobson, The Library of
America (January 2010), www.loa-shared.s3.amazonaws.com/static/pdf/LO
A_Hobson_on_Marshall.pdf
[perma.cc/8X43-5ECP]
[hereinafter
Hobson
Interview] (“It was essentially a ‘no win’ situation for Marshall. If Burr was
convicted, Marshall and the judiciary would be denounced for cravenly
submitting to the majority political party. If Burr was acquitted, Republicans
(as actually happened) would censure Marshall as a partisan judge, culpable of
allowing a traitor to escape the noose and of aiding his project to overturn the
government.”); see also Halliday & White, supra note 11, at 686 (“Marshall’s
approach to judging was his interest in promoting the role of the Supreme Court
as an institution that would intervene in deeply contested political issues and
resolve them through extended analysis of provisions of the Constitution . . .
proceed[ing] very cautiously in resolving issues which had acquired a strongly
partisan cast.”).
17. Hobson Interview, supra note 16, at 2.
18. See Charles F. Hobson, Defining the Office: John Marshall as Chief
Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1421, 1423 (2006) (“Already a statesman of great
renown, Marshall raised the Court’s prestige from the moment he donned the
robe.”).
19. See ALLAN BOWIE MAGRUDER, JOHN MARSHALL 227 (1885) (“The duty of
holding the scales of justice even at this trial was the most difficult that
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A. Premise
In crafting two decisions on treason in 1807, Chief Justice John
Marshall had more to consider than merely the fate of former Vice
President Aaron Burr who stood accused of betraying his country.
Moreover, Marshall had more to analyze than even the
Constitution’s Treason Clause. Consequentially, he was forced to
balance the Supreme Court’s constitutional power and posterity.20
In retrospect, Chief Justice Morrison Waite noted that
Marshall took the bench when “the nation, the Constitution, and
the laws were in their infancy.”21 Thus, the constitutional discourse
on checks and balances, judicial power, central banks, and treason
were concepts as young and rousing as American politics itself. In
Marshall’s eyes, constitutional discourse and American politics
were both at stake in order to preserve the independent Judiciary.22
Moreover, both were inseparable.23 Marshall’s influence on the
Marshall had to encounter during his incumbency on the bench. Jefferson
succeeded in importing so much personal feeling and partisanship into the
proceedings that the trial wore a very peculiar aspect . . . open antagonism
between the President of the United States and the chief justice . . . . But the
fairer judgment of posterity has given [Marshall] credit for perfect impartiality,
and for sound even-handed, and courageous administration of the law.”).
20. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962). Alexander M. Bickel noted
that the fundamental difficulty that America’s judicial system must surmount
is what he characterized as the “counter-majoritarian force.” Id. at 16.
Marshall’s belief in enforcing an advocation on behalf of “the People,” was
consistent Hamilton’s Federalist Paper #78, in which Hamilton disputed claims
of a superior Judiciary. Id. Rather, in Hamilton’s vision, within which Marshall
operated, the Judiciary stands against the will of an errant legislature or
majority populous. Id. That is to say, a Hamiltonian mindset suggests that the
Court stands among a government of, by, and for the People, functioning when
necessary against a prevailing majority of People. Id. at 16-17. The Court stands
for the People insofar as it may maintain the principles of constitutionality that
it continually enforces and do so while insulated from the accountability of polls.
Id. at 17. Likewise, it stands against the People when the majority of the People
act against the Constitution. Id. at 16-17.
21. MORRISON R. WAITE, THE ORATIONS OF CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE AND OF
WILLIAM HENRY RAWLE ON CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL 15 (1900) (Waite’s
commemorative speech on May 10, 1884).
22. HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 286 (stating that Marshall
continually “endeavor[ed] to build a rule of law that stood apart and was distinct
from the vagaries of changing politics and the expediencies of the moment”).
23. Id. at 246. Burr evinces “Marshall’s efforts to define and separate the
spheres of politics and of law, to secure more permanently the continued
existence of the rule of law.” Id.; Burr “provides further illustration [in addition
to Marbury] of the continuing personal clashes between Marshall and Jefferson”
from the positions of their authority, and reveals “‘the darker side’ of Thomas
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Court and American History is well-settled. United States Court of
Appeals Judge Richard Posner stated, historically, “influential
judges tend to be pragmatic judges” and this attribute is “a
somewhat neglected theme in the voluminous literature about”
Marshall.24 Moreover, Judge Posner explained that “an influential
judge,” such as Marshall, can “change the law or . . . make new law
where there was none before” by developing “legal formalism” when
it has reached an impasse to invoke change or innovation.25 After
Marshall’s death, the Court had demonstrated the apt capability to
address any constitutional issue with political implications.26
Because of Marshall, if the Court faced an issue involving the
Constitution, it declared its interpretation of the Constitution with
supreme authority over that provision.27 The Constitution’s Treason
Clause would be no exception.
Unfortunately, criminal and constitutional law textbooks are
devoid of discourse on treason.28 So too is instructive federal case
law, for, while the Constitution defined treason, the only way it
could find its American foundation therebeyond was via judicial
construction.29 Contemporaneously with the decision, Burr was
minimized as a partisan product with disdain by JeffersonianRepublicans and favor by Federalists who hated Jefferson.30 In
retrospect, while it has become viewed as the landmark case on
treason and a notable moment in the eyes of historians, In Re Burr
lacks the sexiness of Marshall’s other precedential counterparts.31
Jefferson and his political supporters,” something with which Marshall was
forced to contend. Id.
24. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 86 (2003).
25. Id.
26. See G. EDWARD WHITE, FROM THE COLONIAL YEARS THROUGH THE CIVIL
WAR 193 (2012) (writing that the Court had asserted its power to act as arbiter
over issues of slavery, Amerindian tribal status, taxation, piracy, admiralty,
Federalism, and the rights of public versus private colleges).
27. Id.
28. George P. Fletcher, The Case for Treason, 41 MD. L. REV. 193, 194 (1982).
29. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 2 (noting In Re Burr is the landmark
Marshall Court case on treason).
30. See Charles Hobson, Mr. Burr’s Trial, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, July
08, 2007, richmond.com/news/mr-burrs-trial/article_b28166e9-3755-5c94-bbab524ed79f5a5e.html (“To contemporaries, Burr's case was less about
constitutional law than about partisan politics. Jefferson and his Republican
Party were resolutely determined to punish Burr as a traitor. The opposition
Federalists championed Burr's cause not so much from a belief in his innocence
as from a desire to embarrass the Jefferson administration.”).
31. See generally, George P. Fletcher, Ambivalence About Treason, 82 N.C.
L. REV. 1611, 1619 (2004) (“In the literature of criminal law, treason was always
considered something of an ‘outlier.’” Id. at 1619. “Casebooks ignore the offense.
Treatise writers show little interest” and “[t]he tendency to ignore treason in
theorizing about criminal law testifies to its atavistic character.” Id. Today,
treason “is a feudal crime surviving in a post-Enlightenment criminal law based
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Marshall’s efforts are thus overlooked in comparison to his major
opinions such as McCulloch v. Maryland,32 Barron v. Baltimore,33
Gibbons v. Ogden,34 and Marbury v. Madison.35 Moreover, Burr
(following Marbury) came within an early, jeopardizing period of
crisis for the Court.36 This is not to say, however, that Burr became
shrouded in constitutional obscurity, as it remained relevant to the
subject of treason, especially in 1945. Justice Robert H. Jackson
noted the callow follow-through of America towards its principle of
treason, writing, “[i]n the century and a half of our national
existence not one execution on a federal treason conviction has
taken place.”37 Jackson highlighted that “[i]n the few cases that
have been prosecuted[,] the treason clause has had its only judicial
construction by individual Justices of this Court presiding at trials
on circuit or by district or circuit judges.”38 Nevertheless, Marshall’s
opinion on treason came only two decades after the ink of the
Constitution’s treason clause dried. In Re Burr, however, is
characterized as “the last great battle during the Jefferson
presidency between President Jefferson and Chief Justice Marshall
. . . by far, the most open and active role taken by President
Jefferson in his battles with the judiciary” with Jefferson’s
uncharacteristic conspicuous and visible involvement.39
In order to grasp fully Marshall’s role on the Court and the
foundation of American treason, one must take into account:
Marshall’s judicial statesmanship in Burr, his pragmatic approach
to the Constitution, and the forces of political factions requiring his
balance at that time in history.40 As Marshall himself stressed in
Burr, “[e]very opinion, to be correctly understood, ought to be
on liberal principles of harm, privacy of the internal sphere, and universality.”
Id.
32. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
33. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
34. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
35. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
36. See Hobson, supra note 18, at 1422 (characterizing the Marshall Court’s
“first decade [as] ‘crisis’ followed by gradual accommodation”).
37. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 24 (1945).
38. Id. at 25.
39. See RONALD CRAIG ZELLAR, A BRAVE MAN STANDS FIRM: THE HISTORIC
BATTLES BETWEEN CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL AND PRESIDENT THOMAS
JEFFERSON 6 (2011) (“In earlier battles, although President Jefferson provided
direction to supporters, his fingerprints cannot be directly identified. In
contrast, [he] publicly charged and denounced Aaron Burr as a traitor before
Burr was ever charged with a crime.”).
40. Samuel R. Olken, Chief Justice John Marshall and the Course of
American Constitutional History, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 743 (2000) (“Through
the influence of its Chief Justice the Marshall Court imbued its interpretation
of the Constitution with a measure of pragmatism”); see also Posner, supra note
23, at 85-86.
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considered with a view to the case in which it was delivered.”41 This
Article provides in-depth analysis of the historical catalyst that laid
way to Chief Justice John Marshall’s seminal opinions on the
American understanding of treason, while dually examining the
calculated judicial statesmanship that Marshall evoked in reaching
his decision. It propounds the argument that In Re Burr is as
notable to Marshall’s legacy as the likes of his other landmark
opinions McCulloch, Barron, Gibbon, and Marbury. To understand
Marshall, moreover, requires an understanding of Burr; and
likewise, to understand Burr is to grasp the power struggle between
Jefferson’s Executive and Marshall’s Judiciary.42

B. Judicial Statesmanship
1. Defined
This Article first analyzes Marshall’s judicial statesmanship.
It conceives of a functional axis of law and politics in which a jurist
acknowledges the Constitution as “both a legal and political
document” and the Supreme Court as an institution in which
constitutional adjudication must balance the public policy interests
of both law and politics.43 Additionally, socio-historical factors may
also be considered at issue.44 However, the political goals of judicial
statesmanship are most favorably accomplished when the
paramount objective is not the political endeavor itself.45 Moreover,
Marshall’s judicial statesmanship is purposefully not to be
minimized and conceived as a judge merely practicing politics from
the bench.46 Similarly, it should not be inflated, as some of the
success of judicial statesmanship benefits from the right place and
41. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 165 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
42. See generally Charles F. Hobson, The Trial of a Young Nation, 24 WM &
MARY HUMAN. 1, 1 (2003) (“Marbury can scarcely be understood without
anchoring it in the political context of Thomas Jefferson’s first
administration.”).
43. Olken, supra note 5, at 401.
44. See generally G. Edward White, Neglected Justices: Discounting for
History, 62 VAND. L. REV. 319, 347 (2019) (“[T]he more general relationship
between law and its social and historical contexts-those are issues that
[Thurgood] Marshall, [Oliver Wendell] Holmes, and [Benjamin] Cardozo had
occasion to address in the course of their careers. . . issues [that] are still with
us, still central concerns of American jurisprudence.”).
45. Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959,
1000 (2008).
46. See White, supra note 4, at 817 (“The evidence about those features may
reinforce a sense that Marshall was liked and respected by his colleagues, but
it does not aid any claim that the Marshall Court became ‘Federalist,’
‘nationalist,’ or ‘property-conscious’ because Marshall was all those things.”).
White suggests that such sweeping labels are anachronistic and inaccurate. Id.
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time.47 Just the same, some of its failures coincide with the Court’s
facing of a resurgence of fundamental flaws from the Founding,
such as slavery, a besmirching decision that it would not begin to
rectify until a century later.48
To an extent, the significance of judicial statesmanship has
been muffled as many insist that the Supreme Court was meant to
operate, and should continue to operate, separate and apart from
the arena of American politics.49 Indeed, the Court is insulated from
some political pressure by constitutional safeguards such as life
tenure and a non-decreasable salary.50 However, judicial
statesmanship suggests that the functional realities of the
Judiciary are more nuanced with layers of historical context, which
propound the reality of the Court. Thus, the Court is forced to
consider continuously the balancing factors of public policy. This
characteristic is greater in some judges and periods of the Court,
regardless of whether its reasoning is transparently communicated.
Due to the United State’s status as a young republic, the initial
Justices by necessity needed to act and think strategically like one
holding elected office.51 That need continued for the successors and
contemporaries of the Court. Thus, judicial statesmanship is
attributable to many Justices who served on the United States
Supreme Court. This Article will not attempt to serve as a canon of
47. See Hobson, supra note 18, at 1421 (“Marshall, in short, was the right
man in the right place at the right time.”).
48. Siegel, supra note 45, at 1000; see also MELVIN I. UROFSKY, THE
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 79 (2014) (noting, for
instance, Chief Justice Warren, responsible for many landmark decisions, made
deliberate choices to ensure a unanimous opinion in Brown v. Board of
Education).
49. Joseph J. Ellis, The Supreme Court Was Never Meant to Be Political,
WALL S. J. (Sept. 14, 2018), www.wsj.com/articles/stop-pretending-thesupreme-court-is-above-politics-1536852330 [perma.cc/KX48-VF6A]; see also
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Says Judges Are Above Politics. It May Hear a
Case
Testing
That
View,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
16,
2019),
www.nytimes.com/2019/09/16/us/politics/supreme-court-judgespartisanship.html [perma.cc/5J6L-6ZA4]; Jonathan R. Nash, Judges must be
politically
impartial,
period,
HILL
(Aug.
14,
2016),
www.thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-judiciary/291330-judges-have-to-bepolitically-impartial-period [perma.cc/R4NX-D6S9].
50. Kathleen Sullivan, The Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 22 NOVA
L. REV. 743, 748 (1998); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court . . .The Judges, both of
the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,
and shall . . . receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office.”).
51. See White, supra note 4, at 810 (“The difficulty is with ‘Federalist’ in the
stronger sense of an American Supreme Court Justice, in Marshall’s time,
necessarily being, thinking, and acting like an elected official, a Federalist
member of the Executive branch or Congress.” (emphasis added)).
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historical examples; rather, a relevant and more recent brief few are
provided for relative context. For instance, Chief Justice Earl
Warren, whose recognition is not surprising when one considers the
manner in which he rose to the position of Chief Justice, bore great
political acumen and lacked preceding judicial experience.52 Like
Marshall, Warren’s political power was greatly evident and
formidable to his fellow statesmen.53 In a short time at the Court’s
helm, Warren quickly became comfortable rendering revolutionary
decisions with the careful, deliberate hand of a judicial statesman
reaching those decisions.54 Most contemporarily, judicial
statesmanship has been attributed to Chief Justice John G. Roberts’
in his mission continually to render narrow unanimous decisions
that bolster the public’s faith in the Court, rather than broad
52. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND 66 (2015).
53. See JOHN C. SKIPPER, THE 1964 REPUBLICAN CONVENTION BARRY
GOLDWATER AND THE BEGINNING OF THE CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT 43 (2016)
(noting that in 1951, Earl Warren was a potential presidential candidate
against whom Nixon worked to pull delegates away from Warren to General
Dwight D. Eisenhower); see also, PAUL MOKE, EARL WARREN AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 99 (2015) (supporting a brief word about the formidable
statesman Chief Justice Earl Warren and his path to the Supreme Court and
writing that, in 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower had promised Warren
the next vacancy on the court. Id. at 99. Chief Justice Fred Vinson's death
created such a vacancy. Id. However, Eisenhower meant the next vacancy of
Associate Justice, as opposed to Chief Justice. Id. Moreover, Eisenhower wanted
Warren to nevertheless gain more experience for an Associate Justice position,
let alone the helm of the Supreme Court. Id. Nevertheless, Warren, having
declined a fourth term as Governor of California, insisted literally on
Eisenhower’s follow-through for his promise of “the next vacancy,” which — as
fortune had it — happened to be Chief Justice. Id.)
54. A. E. Dick Howard, The Changing Face of the Supreme Court, 101 VA. L.
REV. 231, 257 (2015) (Chief Justice Warren, responsible for many landmark
decisions, pursued deliberate efforts in Brown v. Board of Education “ma[king]
unanimity a prime goal. Framing the issue as a moral matter, Warren delayed
the vote until he had achieved consensus. His efforts included lobbying Justice
Jackson while the latter was hospitalized following a heart attack and
persuading Justice Reed to abandon his planned lone dissent--all, as Warren
put it, for the sake of the Court's legitimacy.” Id. at 257. Moreover, Warren's
“people skills” and judicial diplomacy “were not limited to lobbying justices
behind the scenes; he also used them effectively to guide conference.”); see also,
KLAUS P. FISCHER, AMERICA IN WHITE, BLACK, AND GRAY: A HISTORY OF THE
STORMY 1960S 159 (2006) (Warren suffered much public outcry to “Impeach Earl
Warren” as a result of that decision); and Dennis J. Hutchinson, Hail to the
Chief: Earl Warren and the Supreme Court Earl Warren: A Public Life. by G.
Edward White. New York: Oxford University Press. 1982. Pp. x, 429. $25. Super
Chief: Earl Warren and His Supreme Court-A Judicial Bio, 81 MICH. L. REV.
922, 925 (1983) (Warren’s duties to ensure unanimity was two-fold, as Brown
reappeared before the Court, addressing the timeliness of enforcing the remedy
under the first case. Id. at 925 (citing 349 U.S. 294 (1955))). For Warren,
“[h]aving been unanimous once, the justices felt that they had to be unanimous
again or risk undermining the moral force of their first decision.” Id. Thus,
“Warren again wrote [purposefully] for a unanimous Court.” Id.)
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sweeping decisions with fractured support that could undermine its
longevity.55
Judicial statesmanship is not limited to Chief Justices.
Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor is considered a judicial
statesman, which is not surprising when one considers her political
skills, having monumentally served in the Arizona State Senate as
the first ever elected female leader in the upper house of a state
legislature.56 Thus, in a manner of speaking, judicial statesmanship
may be expected to emerge from Supreme Court Justices who have
held political office regardless of whether they are Associate or
Chief.57 Writing on behalf of the Court, Justice O’Connor
acknowledged the constitutional metes and bounds of the Judiciary
are with the People and constitute national balancing factors that
the Court must consider.58 O’Connor acknowledged a premise that
Marshall knew, stating, “the Court’s legitimacy depends on making
legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their
principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the

55. See Neil S. Siegel, More Law Than Politics: The Chief, the “Mandate,”
Legality, and Statesmanship, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME
COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 208 (Nathaniel Persily, Gillan E.
Metzger, & Trevor W. Morrison eds., 2013) (noting Roberts’ judicial
statesmanship in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, in
which Roberts invoked the U.S. Constitution’s Taxation Clause as a means to
uphold the Affordable Care Act. Id. Siegel criticized Chief Justice Roberts’
reasoning of the commerce clause as well as the necessary and proper clause,
suggesting that Roberts’ statesmanship demonstrates a reason as to “why he
needlessly decided these questions.”); see also Christian Ketter, A Second
Amendment In Jeopardy Of Article V Repeal, And “AMFIT,” A Legislative
Proposal Ensuring The 2nd Amendment Into The 22nd Century: Affordable
Mandatory Firearms Insurance And Tax (AMFIT), A Solution To Maintaining
The Right To Bear Arms And Promoting The General Welfare, 64 WAYNE L. REV.
431, 473-74 [hereinafter Ketter, Second Amendment in Jeopardy]; Christian
Ketter, “Making Administrative Law Strict Again” in the Era of Trump: The
Future of the Chevron Doctrine, According to the Judicial Conference for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 19 FL. COASTAL L. REV.
201, 207 (noting that Roberts’ opinions in Sebelius and King v. Burwell were a
factional balancing act over ObamaCare that carried the Court through a
political mix of praise and criticism for the Court).
56. EVAN THOMAS, FIRST: SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR 72 (2019).
57. See Sullivan, supra note 50, at 750 (asserting that in the case of Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, Justice O’Connor a conservative-appointee who was long
anticipated to be a guaranteed vote in to overturn Roe v. Wade, declined to do
so in Casey for reasons that she believed the Court would appear as though it
was practicing politics instead of law).
58. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (“The Court’
s power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that
shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what
the Nation’s law means, and to declare what it demands.”).
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Nation.”59 That delicate balance is a consideration that heavily
pervaded the Judiciary from Marshall’s time to today, and the
common thread among judicial statesman is a fervent guard against
political faction.60
2. The Risks of Judicial Statesmanship: Marshall’s
Successor Roger B. Taney.
While judicial statesmanship is present in some of America’s
most treasured opinions, such as Marbury v. Madison or Brown v.
Board of Education, it is also present in its most disdained.61 With
59. Id.
60. Samuel R. Olken, The Business of Expression: Economic Liberty,
Political Factions and The Forgotten First Amendment Legacy of Justice George
Sutherland, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 249, 270 (2002).
61. Siegel, supra note 45, at 1000; see also HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note
12, at 256-57 (noting that Marshall was careful to note that unlike Marbury,
Bollmann and Swartwout were not seeking the Court’s original jurisdiction;
rather, this was an appellate review of an inferior court, as Marshal noted, “the
revision of a decision”). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism,
105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 356 (2006). Ironically, both Marshall and Taney
attempted to settle issues with massive implications of constitutional law. Even
more so, under a theory of judicial minimalism (or “Burkean Minimalism”)
neither should have decided the greater issue before the Court. In Marbury,
Marshall established that the Court lacked the original jurisdiction to hear the
case. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 138 (opening the opinion with a sweeping
declaration that the Court’s power to issue mandamus is “an exercise of original
jurisdiction not warranted by the constitution”). Theoretically, however,
Marshall’s rationale that there was no original jurisdiction to hear the matter
likely should have led to the conclusion that the case itself was incapable of
being ruled upon by the Court. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §2 (“In all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state
shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the
other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such
regulations as the Congress shall make.”). Without a controversy appropriate
for the Court, upon which it may render an opinion, it had no power to render
such an opinion. Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original
Understandings of Judicial Review: In Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993
SUP. CT. REV. 329, 370 (1993) (“the decision on this constitutional question
(which is to be avoided whenever possible) would have become unnecessary if
the Court had found, on the merits, that the writ of mandamus could not or
should not be issued.”); see also, Louise Weinberg, Our Marbury, 89 VA. L. REV.
1235, 1315 (2003) (“Marbury also holds that the jurisdiction in Marbury’s case
could not be appellate, either, since Marbury did not seek appellate review of a
case below.”). Likewise, Tawney’s declaration that Dred Scott was not a person
should have led to the conclusion that Scott lacked standing and therefore the
Court could not rule upon the case. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 15
L. Ed. 691 (1857), superseded (1868) (“[a] free negro of the African race, whose
ancestors were brought to this country and sold as slaves, is not a ‘citizen’ within
the meaning of the Constitution of the United States. When the Constitution
was adopted, they were not regarded in any of the States as members of the
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regard to Marshall’s immediate successor, Chief Justice Roger
Brooke Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) is
considered a negative example of judicial statesmanship.62 Chief
Justice Taney’s attempted to evoke judicial statesmanship when he
absurdly tried to settle the national issue of slavery in his own
way.63 This is not to say Taney was without any successful
statesmanship, as Chief Justice Taney previously rallied against
corporate factions in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge in
1837,64 balancing public policy and refusing to grant a charter.65
Taney fits similarly with the trend of political office among judicial

community which constituted the State, and were not numbered among its
‘people or citizens.’ Consequently, the special rights and immunities
[guaranteed] to citizens do not apply to them. And not being ‘citizens' within the
meaning of the Constitution, they are not entitled to sue in that character in a
court of the United States, and the Circuit Court has not jurisdiction in such a
suit.” (emphasis in italics)). However, in both Marbury and Dred Scott, that was
not the case. Both Chief Justices chose to evoke judicial statesmanship and
venture towards solving a looming issue. Marshall wished to solve the issue of
establishing and maintaining a check and balance among all branches of the
Court, as opposed to just the political branches. Similarly, Taney wished to
settle the issue of slavery, by using the Court as a mouthpiece of morality to
attempt to maintain the American institution of human bondage by declaring
slaves as property, not people. See Theodore Y. Blumoff, Illusions of
Constitutional Decisionmaking: Politics and the Tenure Powers in the Court, 73
IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1105 (1988) (Marshall’s “judicial review fits within the
notion of checks and balances—even though not expressly articulated in the
Constitution's text—is now commonly understood under the force of Marbury.”);
see also Paul Finkelman, Coming to Terms with Dred Scott: A Response to
Daniel A. Farber, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 49, 70 (2011) (Taney overreached in striking
down the Missouri Compromise, “[i]t was unnecessary for the decision and
surely suspect since he had already determined that the Court lacked
jurisdiction to hear the case because Dred Scott had no standing to sue.”). This
thus leads to the conclusion that an effective judicial statesman likely looks as
to how the future will perceive this action. Simply put, an effective statesman
wants to be on the right side of history. See Siegel, supra note 45, at 961–62
(“Some of America’s most important judges have embraced the thing that
Brandeis, Frankfurter, and others called judicial statesmanship . . . Justice
Frankfurter, for example, was perhaps the foremost advocate
of statesmanship on the Supreme Court, yet he tended to champion [among] the
practice . . . the need for law to keep up with the times; the responsibility to
imagine the needs of the future; the related necessity of possessing a vision of
the future and of finding ways to achieve it.”). Thus, in many respects of
hindsight, the contemporaneous comfort with modern judicial review and
inherent discomfort with slavery is what largely sets Marshall and Taney apart
as judicial statesmen.
62. Siegel, supra note 45, at 1000.
63. Id.
64. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837).
65. Samuel R. Olken, The Decline of Legal Classicism and the Evolution of
New Deal Constitutionalism, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2051, 2055-2056 (2014).
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statesman.66 Marshall’s death in July of 1835 created a vacancy in
the position of Chief Justice that President Andrew Jackson filled
in an act of gratitude for Taney’s political support.67 Proper analysis
in judicial statesmanship leads a court to the metes and bounds of
its public authority. Taney demonstrates the obloquy that may be
earned by a Court or a member thereof.68 As the Court that followed
the Marshall Court in stark contrast therefrom, the Taney Court is
a quintessential example of the repugnancy that a Court may
acquire by crossing the threshold of political balance. Neil Siegel, a
Duke University Professor of law and political science, suggested
that “[t]he Taney Court also would have been wise to contemplate
the limits on its authority to settle the slavery question,” as “courts
that do not work at maintaining their own legitimacy, at least to
some extent, are likely over the long run to possess less of it.”69
Marshall, in contrast from his successor Taney, understood the
delicate balance of law and politics, the necessary analysis that
must buttress the court opinion, and the limitations of the Court’s
power. Across a career in which Marshall surmounted many
controversial decisions,70 Burr reflects the sound continuation of
Marshall’s keen judicial-political acumen.

C. John Marshall as a Judicial Statesman
Marshall held political office prior to his tenure on the
Supreme Court. In 1782, he served on the Virginia Colony’s Council
of State and later that year on the Executive Council.71 Marshall
served in the House of Representatives when President John Adams
selected him to replace Charles Pickering as Secretary of State.72
Marshall’s place in the Adams Administration came after Adams
66. DAVID M. SILVER, LINCOLN’S SUPREME COURT 14 (1998) (stating that in
1816, Taney was elected as a Maryland Senator and advocated for bank reform
and a “just treatment of Negroes”).
67. See id. at 15 (noting that the Senate indefinitely postponed confirmation
hearings when President Andrew Jackson first nominated Taney to a vacancy
on the Supreme Court under then-living Chief Justice Marshall, allowing for
Jackson’s withdrawal and resubmittal); see also KENNETH JANDA, JEFFREY M.
BERRY, JERRY GOLDMAN, & DEBORAH DEBORAH, THE CHALLENGE OF
DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IN GLOBAL POLITICS 408 (2016)
(demonstrating a similar result to the aforementioned occurred after President
George W. Bush had nominated John G. Roberts as Associate Justice to replace
Justice O’Connor under Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist).
68. PAUL FINKELMAN, SUPREME INJUSTICE: SLAVERY IN THE NATION’S
HIGHEST COURT 34 (2018).
69. Siegel, supra note 45, at 1000.
70. Joseph H. Smith, 24 CATH. U. L. REV. 394, 394 (1975) (reviewing
LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW (1974).
71. WAITE, supra note 21, at 28.
72. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 529 (2001).
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fired Pickering and James McHenry in response to their efforts with
Alexander Hamilton to undermine the Administration.73 Adams’
suspicion was not without basis, however. Hamilton – upon learning
of the dismissal of Pickering and McHenry – advised Pickering to
rummage through the Department of State files before departing
and search for “copies of extracts of all such documents as will
enable you to explain both Jefferson and Adams,” for it was the time
for “men of real integrity” to take control of the government.74 Of
course, Hamilton’s goals would be limited by an early demise in a
duel with Aaron Burr.75 Much like Burr’s lack of popularity among
Republicans and Federalists, Marshall faced universal political
pressure.76
Chief Justice Marshall’s judicial statesmanship shaped the
modern function of the Judiciary, Article III powers, and the present
day Supreme Court.77 Marshall took the Court from a then-weak
branch of government to a co-equal branch with constitutional
power readily capable of being wielded by the Justices thereupon.78
In fact, Marshall believed that a Chief Justice was duty-bound to
serve as a statesman to his Court.79 Nevertheless, it is error to
conclude that Marshall’s power that flowed from the Court was
merely a mythological domination of personality and legal genius.80
Rather, Marshall wielded a brilliant capacity for leadership.81

73. Id. at 538-39.
74. Id at 539.
75. See 1 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE WARS OF THE EARLY AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1783-1812: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND MILITARY HISTORY: A-K 66
(2014) (featuring Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr. writing that while Burr was never
convicted, the duel effectively terminated Burr's political career, led to a
nationwide movement for dueling-bans, and deprived the Federalist Party of a
strong leader such as Hamilton).
76. See MAGRUDER, supra note 19, at 201 (“Federalists hated [Burr] for
slaying their great leader, and the Republicans could not approve the manner
of it, while they were further suspicious ad incensed against him by reason of
warm and unfair competition with Mr. Jefferson for the presidency.”).
77. WHITE, supra note 6, at 11; see also Olken, supra note 5, at 392.
78. Olken, supra note 5, at 392.
79. See Hobson, supra note 18, at 1453 (“Marshall believed that as Chief
Justice he had a broader responsibility to act as a statesman: to be the
representative, advocate, and defender of the federal judiciary.”).
80. See id. at 1421. Hobson wrote that scholarship faults in perpetuating the
“myth of a heroic Marshall . . . dominat[ing] the Supreme Court by the sheer
force of his individual genius and will.” Id. at 1421. However, “[s]uch a myth
ignores the historical reality . . .[of] interplay between his exceptional leadership
abilities and the peculiar circumstances of time and place that allowed those
abilities to flourish and have effect.” Id. at 1421.
81. See White, supra note 4, at 810 (writing that “in Marshall’s time,” a
Supreme Court Justice had to “necessarily be[], think[], and act[] like an elected
official . . . of the Executive branch or Congress”).
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Moreover, as this essay demonstrates, he did so at the continual
dismay of President Thomas Jefferson.
While Posner described Marshall’s pragmatism as neglected
scholarship, Senator Albert Jeremiah Beveridge, Marshall’s second
major biographer, stressed the significance of Marshall’s American
treason-doctrine and noted that Chief Justice Marshall “was a
greater statesman than he was a lawyer.”82 Another proponent,
historian G. Edward White, University of Virginia Professor of
constitutional law and legal history, identified Marshall’s constant
mission to strike the “balance of moderation” that lay inherently
between the potentials of tyrannical government versus the chaotic
obstreperousness of the People’s popular sovereignty.83 Of
Marshall’s handling in Burr, legal historian Dr. Charles F. Hobson
asserted that “[n]o one was more fully attuned to the awkward
[political] dilemma he faced in conducting this high profile case . . .
in the highly charged political atmosphere.”84 Professor Samuel R.
Olken of Chicago’s UIC John Marshall Law School, a scholar on the
subjects of Chief Justice Marshall’s jurisprudence, constitutional
history, and the broader related concepts of constitutional theory,
wrote that Marshall’s judicial statesmanship, once well-settled in
Marbury,
quickly
became
controversial
fodder
among
constitutionalists in the latter part of the Twentieth Century.85 At
the opposite end of scholars who undermine Marshall’s

82. See ALBERT JEREMIAH BEVERIDGE, THE STATE OF THE NATION 55, 64
(1924) (writing that Marshall’s decision in Burr “forever overthrew the brutal
and unreasonable European doctrine of constructive treason, and forever
established . . . the humane and reasonable American doctrine of personal and
actual treason”); see also James W. Ely Jr., Review, 2 THE INDEPENDENT
REVIEW 450, 450-55 1998) (reviewing CHARLES HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF
JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW (1996); JEAN EDWARD SMITH,
JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION (1996). Ely also notes that Albert J.
Beveridge’s biography [of Marshall] suffers from accusation of inaccuracy and
“undue partisanship.”
83. See WHITE, supra note 6, at 18. White asserted that Marshall’s strength
was insofar as the Chief Justice saw the extremity of “orderly government led
to tyranny, oppression, and a frozen status,” while “popular sovereignty” at its
extreme “led to violence, chaos, and mob rule.” Id. at 18. For Marshall, a Chief
Justice’s “ultimate search of statecraft was therefore a search for balance and
moderation.”) Id.
84. HOBSON, supra note 8, at 20; see also Hobson, supra note 42, at 1 (writing
“to read [Marbury v. Madison] solely in the light of the raging party battles of
the day, or to read it only as a landmark that established the doctrine of judicial
review, is to miss its full significance.”).
85. Olken, supra note 5, at 395-97; see also Miller McDonald, John Marshall
Law School Professor Samuel Olken has been named The Edward T. and Noble
W. Lee Chair in Constitutional Law for the 2016-2017 academic year., GLOBE
NEWSWIRE (Oct. 10, 2016), www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2016/10/10/
878312/10165541/en/Professor-Samuel-Olken-Named-2016-2017-LeeChair.html [perma.cc/FB9Y-GKBH].
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constitutional reasoning are those who obsess in error that Marbury
is an opinion in which Marshall singlehandedly created judicial
review via judicial politics.86 Like Marbury, Burr is misunderstood
by historians.87 The realities of Marshall’s jurisprudence overall,
rather, are a more complex and more interesting combination
thereof. Despite such scrutiny, Marbury is ironically overlooked for
its true exemplification of judicial statesmanship.88 Similarly, Burr
exemplifies Marshall’s pragmatic statesmanship in the same vein,
but for reasons that run even deeper as a direct result of Marbury.89
As an academic landmark of jurisprudence, Burr is however largely
overlooked for its juridical statesmanship. Still, Marshall’s treason
cases nevertheless interrupted a resultantly successful period of
moderation between the Jeffersonian-era’s political branches and
the Judiciary post-Marbury.90 However, in Burr, more was at stake
for Marshall than in his other decisions and his statesmanship was
severely tested.91
Marshall’s first major biographer, Senator Albert J. Beveridge,
noted Marshall’s immense persuasiveness was a product of sound
judgement and an engaging “strange power of personality,” which
continually “determine[ed] an influence on the destiny of the
country.”92 Marshall had the blended skills of a consummate
politician with the logical honed skills of the finest common

86. Olken, supra note 5, at 397.
87. See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 260. Haskins argues that
historians are haphazard in asserting that Marshall reversed Bollman in Burr
and did so merely “to spite Jefferson.” Id. at 260. Such short sightedness
disregards Marshall’s subtle but powerful judicial statesmanship and his
preeminent jurisprudence “overlook[ing] the careful way in which Marshall was
attempting (aside from the unfortunate dictum) to define treason so that the
rights of individuals would be secured by the rule of law, and not be at the mercy
of the passions of men . . . in an ex post facto fashion to fit” certain actions) Id.
at 260.
88. Olken, supra note 5, at 399.
89. See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note, 12, at 247 (writing that Burr
“reaffirms the long-held conviction that Marshall was more than a great judicial
statesman; he was an exceedingly able and perceptive judge of enormous
understanding, competence, and learning, who set for himself the task of
removing the judiciary from politics, so far as feasible, and of building a general
‘rule of law’”).
90. CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND
THE RULE OF LAW 156 (1996).
91. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 20 (“Burr’s case, troublesome in itself for
raising perplexing questions concerning the law of treason, was the more
vexatious to Marshall for reopening the quarrel between the Jefferson
administration and the federal judiciary, as played out earlier in the
controversy over Marbury v. Madison in 1803.”).
92. ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL: VOLUME ONE 203,
208-09 (2005).
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practitioner of the law, tools he used to implement his visions of the
Judiciary and constitutional law.93 Chief Justice Waite noted that
Marshall “kept himself at the front on all questions of constitutional
law” with “his master hand seen in every case [involving] that
subject.”94 Waite elaborated that Marshall utilized “irresistible
logic” and “developed the hidden treasures of the Constitution,
demonstrated its capacities, and showed beyond all possibility of
doubt, that a government rightfully administered under its
authority could protect itself against itself[,] and against the
world.”95 However, the Court needed more than Marshall’s
charisma and logic to weather the storm that laid ahead. It needed
an anchor as free as possible from all charges political.
G. Edward White noted that Marshall strove to remove the
Court and its Justices from the visible mires of politics and preserve
the sanctity of the Court through seeking unanimous opinions.96 As
this Article demonstrates, while the political roots of Marshall’s
jurisprudence ran deep, they were deeply trenched out of sight from
the branch of government that was the Judiciary.97 Moreover,
Professor White asserted that Marshall's leadership as a judicial
statesman was a “distinctive blend of independence, sensitivity to
political currents, and appearance of impartiality that has since
constituted the challenge of excellence in appellate judging in
America.”98 Thus, it makes sense that among Marshall’s
endowments was showmanship within statesmanship. Professor
Joel Richard Paul of University of California Hastings Law School
wrote that Marshall “was a master actor” with a “gift for illusion,”
one that allowed him to transform himself, to the Constitution, to
the country.99 As a regular attendee of the theater, Marshall studied
stage acting and bore rather strong opinions on an actor’s craft.100
A gifted actor has the ability to communicate an intended
perception to an audience, for an actor understands that perception
becomes reality.101 That which is perceived by the audience is the
reality created by the actor.102 Marshall’s understanding of this

93. Olken, supra note 5, at 401.
94. WAITE, supra note 21, at 16.
95. Id. at 15-16.
96. WHITE, supra note 6, at 11.
97. See generally D. A. Jeremy Telman, Originalism and Second-Order Ipse
Dixit Reasoning in Chisholm V. Georgia, 67 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 559 (2019)
(arguing a subtlety in which Marshall’s constitutional “approach . . . was
grounded in political commitments and assumptions about the nature of the
Constitution that were [often] asserted rather than reasoned”).
98. WHITE, supra note 6, at 11-12.
99. PAUL, supra note 13, at 2.
100. Id. at 2.
101. JONOTHAN NEELANDS, BEGINNING DRAMA 11-14, 26 (2d ed. 2013).
102. Id. at 26.
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aided greatly in his masterful persuasiveness. Marshall’s political
acumen gave him a keen awareness of public relations and the
public’s perception, in part why Marshall defended his decision in
McCulloch v. Maryland via an essay that he published under the
pseudonym, “A Friend of the Constitution.”103 Professor White
remarked that there were indeed “a number of practices,
conventions, and professional conceptions . . . that were subscribed
to, and sometimes initiated, by Marshall and his fellow Justices, but
which are no longer considered appropriate dimensions of Supreme
Court judging.”104 Professor Randy Barnett argued to understand
the public relations concerns of Marshall’s judicial statesmanship
in a contemporary-sense, “[i]magine if former Chief Justice
Rehnquist had been so vilified for a judicial opinion he had written
that he published anonymous op-eds in the Wall Street Journal
defending the opinion . . . that is exactly what John Marshall did.”105
For the burgeoning republic that was the United States of America
with an even younger Constitution, the optics of the Judiciary were
significant.
The Marshall Court’s jurisprudence finds its meaningful
genesis at the same time as that of the Jeffersonian-era. Marshall
and those Justices who became known as the “Marshall Court”
understood opportunity, knowing that political conflict breeds
constitutional issues and that the Court could tactfully enforce
constitutional law while simultaneously enhancing the Court’s
prestige and its purpose in the history of a growing nation.106 The
parallels between Marbury and Burr are notable and highlighted
throughout this essay. In both cases Marshall downplayed his role
and the consequential reasons that the cases appeared before the
Court. In Marbury, it was Secretary of State Marshall’s duty to
deliver the Adams Administration appointment.107 In Burr,
Marshall dazzled and stunned those who expected the previous
Bollman opinion to govern, offering instead a treatise on the
English-American doctrine of treason and culminating with a
careful explanation of his position. Redirection was essential.

II. BACKGROUND
Legal historian, Professor George Lee Haskins, aptly described
the forces that Marshall faced as a “tangled web of rumors,
103. ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 269 (Steven G.
Calabresi, ed., 2007).
104. White, supra note 4, at 783-84.
105. ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE, supra note 105, at 269.
106. Olken, supra note 5, at 401.
107. Id. at 399.

2020]

A Pragmatic Political Balancing

809

allegations, self-serving declarations, and . . . tissues of lies that
beset the path of Burr’s ambitions.”108 To uncover Marshall’s
pragmatic judicial statesmanship in Burr, one must understand
these factors.

A. Relationships at play in In Re Burr
1. Thomas Jefferson vs. John Marshall: Bitter Cousins and
American Rivals
Jefferson’s relationship with Marshall, when viewed
pejoratively through the sole lens of Marshall’s experiences, is that
of a villain to protagonist.109 This is especially true in Burr.
However, Jefferson’s relationship is layered with multiple factors in
nature both political and personal.110 Their feud was a combination
of bad blood, political battle, and constitutional belligerence.111
On a personal level, their mutual contempt grew from family
strife.112 Jefferson and Marshall’s mothers were first cousins,
making their sons second cousins to one another.113 Jefferson’s
father acquainted himself into a family fortune meant in-part for
Marshall.114Marshall and Jefferson’s financial situations remained
108. See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 247-48, 252 (“[I]t is no easy
task concisely to place [Burr] within its political and legal setting, or to explain
its significance as one of the greatest criminal trials, and its relevant to the
development of American law and of the Supreme Court as an American
institution . . . [t]o cut through, without detailed description, the tangled web of
rumors, allegations, self-serving declarations, and the tissues of lies that beset
the path of Burr’s ambitions is an almost hopeless task.”).
109. Smith, supra note 70, at 402.
110.See ALF J. MAPP, JR., THOMAS JEFFERSON: PASSIONATE PILGRIM 139
(1991) (noting that, to the President’s chagrin, Burr’s trial would be presided
over by Jefferson’s cousin and arch rival, [who was then] already locked with
him in a struggle between the judicial and executive branches of the
government.”).
111. See DAVID M. KENNEDY, LIZABETH COHEN, MEL PIEHL, THE BRIEF
AMERICAN PAGEANT: A HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC 153 (Eighth ed. 2012)
(writing that while the Federalist party, which made John Marshall Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, died out, Marshall lived on, writing decisions in
which “the wily Marshall snatched [a constitutional] victory from the jaws of . .
. judicial defeat” in Marbury, “greatly magni[fying] the authority of the Court–
and slapp[ing] at the Jeffersonians.”).
112. PAUL, supra note 13, at 13.
113. See JOHN EDWARD OSTER, THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DOCTRINES
OF JOHN MARSHALL 17 (1914) (featuring a detailed family tree that indicates
Mary Marshall (née Randolph Keith) and Jane Jefferson (née Randolph) were
first cousins, with respective offspring John Marshall and Thomas Jefferson,
rendering the two offspring second cousins to one another).
114. See NEW AGE MAGAZINE, VOL. 7, SUPREME COUNCIL, 31 (Ancient and
Accepted Scottish rite of Freemasonry, Southern jurisdiction, U.S. A., 1907)
(containing Catherine Frances Cavanagh, The Youth of Jefferson) (“One of the
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disparate even as late as Valley Forge. 115 Marshall lacked fortune,
while Jefferson had the luxury of wealth that Professor Paul
suggests should have belonged, at least in part, to Marshall by right
of birth; instead, he “gr[ew] up bearing the shame of an ancestor”
with the “knowledge that [his] family’s wealth was irrevocably in
the hands of a distant cousin.”116 Marshall, however, grew from
these experiences. He developed an uncanny ability to lead others
with charismatic “inoffensiveness . . . informality and lack of
pretention,” as well as an amiable nonconforming disposition with
self-aware “unpretentiousness” that allowed him shrewdly to climb
society’s ladder.117 Nevertheless, while Marshall reportedly did not
resent Jefferson for the family estate dispute, Marshall, as a former
member of the Continental Army, did develop a resentment towards
Jefferson as a leader. 118 In 1718, Jefferson suffered disrepute as
Virginia’s Governor for colossal preoccupation with designing
Washington D.C. as the new federal capital.119 As the British
dear friends of young Peter Jefferson was William Randolph." Id. Once Thomas
was born, the Jeffersons moved into William Randolph’s estate, at which time
a dying Randolph entrusted the Jefferson’s to care for his son. Id. at 35.); see
also, SUSAN KERN, THE JEFFERSONS AT SHADWELL 161(Yale University Press,
2010) (Peter Jefferson, having married Jane Randolph, “appeared in other
Randolph family wills, too.”); see also PAUL, supra note 13, at 13. Peter
Jefferson, Thomas’ father, advantageously acquainted himself with a nonrelative William Randolph, Marshall’s great-uncle. Id. at 13. In 1746, Randolph
died, leaving Peter Jefferson his estate, not any relative, explicitly disinheriting
Marshall’s mother and his sister, Marshall’s grandmother. Id. Consequently, an
estate that might have passed to Marshall’s family by blood became a Jefferson
family asset by association. Id. Jefferson aptly grew up and grew rich with an
estate entailing five hundred slaves, while Marshall, the eldest of fifteen
children, grew up on the frontier tending to a small family farm. Id. at 13, 15,
and 436.
115. BEVERIDGE, supra note 92, at 127.
116. See PAUL, supra note 13 at 13 (Marshall “gr[ew] up bearing the shame
of an ancestor” with the “knowledge that [his] family’s wealth was irrevocably
in the hands of a distant cousin.”) at 13; see also, BEVERIDGE, supra note 92, at
127 (While Marshall lacked fortune, “Jefferson was rich” and proudly so).
117. See WHITE, supra note 6, at 12, 15; see also PAUL, supra note 13, at 24
(“Marshall responded to these circumstances without resentment,”
experiencing an “upbringing [that allowed him to identify with the common man
and . . . the aplomb to associate with his social superiors,” moving with “fluid[ity]
between classes.”).
118. See THOMAS JEFFERSON MEMORIAL FOUNDATION, THOMAS JEFFERSON:
AN OUTLINE OF HIS LIFE AND SERVICE, WITH THE STORY OF MONTICELLO, THE
HOME HE REARED AND LOVED 8 (Thomas Jefferson Memorial Foundation 1924)
(“When [Jefferson] saw the British in sight . . . sprang to his horse and rode to
safety,” and was subsequently “attacked by his enemies as an incapable and
weak coward,” but as Governor “made a dignified defense before the legislature
which won from them a unanimous vote of confidence in his ‘ability, rectitude,
and integrity as [governor]”); see also Paul, supra note 13, at 24.
119. See THOMAS JEFFERSON MEMORIAL FOUNDATION, THOMAS JEFFERSON:
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approached the State, Jefferson failed to prepare for military
defense.120 Then-Governor Jefferson put aside Virginia’s
undeveloped military plans and fled Virginia, but not before he
secured the safety of his family and slaves, as well as his horses,
personal papers, and silver stored at his property Monticello.121
Beveridge wrote that Jefferson “was not a man of arms[; he] dreaded
the duties of a soldier, [and] had no stomach for physical combat,”
as “[h]e was a philosopher, not a warrior.”122 By contrast, Marshall
was a Revolutionary War veteran who happened to have a keen
legal mind and a great capacity for leadership.123 Long after
Marshall had served in the Continental Army, Jefferson learned
that Alexander Hamilton (another rival) made strong
recommendations to Marshall that he run for United States
Congress in 1792, something that Jefferson feared.124 At that time,
Jefferson was Secretary of State under President George
Washington.125 Even though Jefferson held administrative office
while Marshall merely had a law practice, Jefferson nevertheless
feared Marshall as an eventual rival, due to Marshall’s acclaim as

AN OUTLINE OF HIS LIFE AND SERVICE 8 (1924) (“When [Jefferson] saw the
British in sight . . . sprang to his horse and rode to safety,” and was subsequently
“attacked by his enemies as an incapable and weak coward,” but as Governor
“made a dignified defense before the legislature which won from them a
unanimous vote of confidence in his ‘ability, rectitude, and integrity as
[governor]”); see also PAUL, supra note 13, at 24. (charging that as British forces
raged through Virginia, “Jefferson procrastinated. Jefferson was too distracted,
perhaps still sketching plans for his classical new capital, to worry about a
foreign invasion . . . When the British reached the undefended provisional
capital, Jefferson took off.” Id. at 24. As a result, “Jefferson’s reputation was
badly damaged by neglecting the defense of the commonwealth.” Id.
Accordingly, “Jefferson never again sought state office.” Id.).
120. PAUL, supra note 13, at 24.
121. Id. (noting that Jefferson did not seek state-level office after this
incident).
122. BEVERIDGE, supra note 92, at 129.
123. See Hobson, supra note 18, at 1422 “The war also marked [Marshall]
for life as a member of the special fraternity of Revolutionary veterans, to which
many of his fellow Justices also belonged.” Id. at 1422. “The camaraderie of a
‘band of brothers’ formed no small part of the bond uniting the Chief Justice and
his associate.” Id.
124. See letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (June 29, 1792),
www.founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-24-02-0134
[perma.cc/T9UD-EAYG] (“I learn that [Hamilton] has expressed the strongest
desire that Marshall should come into Congress from Richmond, declaring there
is no man in Virginia whom he wishes so much to see there, and I am told that
Marshall has expressed half a mind to come. Hence I conclude that Hamilton
has played him well with flattery and solicitation, and I think nothing better
could be done than to make him a judge.”).
125. JOHN FERLING, JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON: THE RIVALRY THAT
FORGED A NATION 243 (2013).
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a lawyer and his general popularity.126 Marshall, who had a
reputation for purposeful friendliness, even with adverse colleagues
and opponents, not only disliked Jefferson but distrusted him as
well.127 Jefferson confessed to James Madison, “I think nothing
better could be done than to make [Marshall] a judge,” a
presumptive removal from politics.128 At least, so thought Jefferson.
However, once Adams made Marshall a federal judge, Jefferson
conspired ferociously with fellow Republicans to impeach the newly
appointed Chief Justice, whose law license, in irony, then-Governor
Jefferson had previously signed.129
For Jefferson, wherever he had been, Marshall followed not far
behind. For instance, Marshall acquired Jefferson’s former law
practice from Edmund Randolph to whom Jefferson had sold it.130
Curiously, Randolph would go on to represent Burr in In Re Burr.131
From Jefferson’s perspective, Marshall’s success had unfairly risen
up to his level.132 Such was the case when Marshall wedded Polly
Ambler, the daughter of Jefferson’s first sweetheart.133 In other
competitive ways, at the Constitutional Convention, Marshall
campaigned alongside James Madison for the Constitution’s
passage.134 What Marshall took from watching Virginia suffer
126. PAUL, supra note 13, at 45.
127. See Ely, supra note 82, at 454 (“The convivial Marshall usually
maintained friendly ties even with political opponents, but he disliked and
distrusted Jefferson . . . animosity [that] was certainly mutual.”).
128. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 129.
129. VIRGINIA LAW BOOKS: ESSAYS AND BIBLIOGRAPHIES 327 (2000); see also
PAUL, supra note 13, at 3, 23.
130. PAUL, supra note 13, at 27.
131. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55.
132. See interview by Heather Stephenson with Joel Richard Paul, A
Champion of Pragmatic Compromise, Tufts Now (Feb. 20, 2018)
www.now.tufts.edu/articles/champion-pragmatic-compromise [perma.cc/PKK2PF9C] (Paul stated, “Jefferson was deeply jealous of Marshall. He felt that
Marshall was undeserving, that he had risen too far too fast, that he wasn’t
really one of the elite. Jefferson was also somewhat paranoid, secretive, and
conspiratorial.”)
133. See FAWN MCKAY BRODIE, THOMAS JEFFERSON: AN INTIMATE HISTORY
64-66 (1974). Jefferson met Rebecca Burwell in 1762 at nineteen when Burwell,
an orphan, was sixteen. Id. at 64. Jefferson named his sailboat “Rebecca” and
suffered much anguish and an admitted “violent head ache” upon learning of
Rebecca’s marriage to Jacquelin Ambler. Id. at 65-66. “Jefferson was by nature
so thin-skinned that the merest hint of [Rebecca] . . . would have brought
mortification and withdrawal.” Id. at 66. See ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, LAUGHING
AT THE GODS: GREAT JUDGES AND HOW THEY MADE THE COMMON LAW 57 (2012)
(noting twenty-seven-year-old Marshall “because the very hurricane of a lover”
during his courtship with sixteen-year-old Polly Amber and developed into “an
attentive and concern[ed] partner” while caring her when she often became ill).
134. See GEORGE HENRY WILLIAMS & HORACE GARVIN PLATT, EULOGIES ON
JOHN MARSHALL 12 (1901) (“To Marshall more than to any other man is due the
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under Governor Jefferson’s lack of military preparedness was that
the independent sovereignty of thirteen states would not effectively
defend and preserve a union; rather, its survival necessitated a
unified federal government.135 And so, while Marshall secured an
acclaimed place in constitutional history advocating to adopt the
Constitution in place of the Articles of Confederation, Jefferson
vacillated between claims that he bore no opinion on America’s need
for a Constitution and that he would have pledged his support
should it have merely borne a Bill of Rights from the start.136 Their
politics were different outcomes of similar influence. Both Jefferson
and Marshall spent diplomatically formative time in France.137
However, the results of the Virginians’ experiences differed. In fact,
decision to hold a convention to determine whether or not she would accept the
Constitution . . . John Marshall, James Madison[,] and Edmund Randolph were
the leaders of those who favored its ratification.”); see also Hobson, supra note
18, at 1422 (noting his “indelible mark” at the 1788 Virginia Ratification).
135. PAUL, supra note 13, at 24.
136. See id. at 39, 44 (stating “[i]f Marshall had quit public life” after the
Constitutional Convention and done nothing more, “he would still deserve to be
remembered as a champion of the federal Constitution.” With regard to the lack
of a Bill of Rights upon passage, Marshall and Madison feared that demand for
specific amendments could defeat the chance to pass the Constitution
altogether. Rather, the best course was ensuring its passage in whatever form
possible and amend it later).
137. JEFF BROADWATER, JAMES MADISON: A SON OF VIRGINIA AND A
FOUNDER OF THE NATION 106 (2012) (After the Washington Administration’s
controversial Jay Treaty, (negotiated by Chief Justice Thomas Jay), angered
France, President John Adams dispatched John Marshall to France on a
diplomatic mission with Charles Pinckney and Elbridge Gerry. Id. The
diplomatic group met unsuccessfully with French foreign minister Charles
Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord. Talleyrand demanded a bribe of $250,000. Id.
While bribes were not uncommon in European diplomacy, the cost was too high
for America. Id.); see also, CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN, THE LONG AFFAIR THOMAS
JEFFERSON AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, 1785-1800 36 (University of Chicago
Press, 1998) (“The fact that Thomas Jefferson could spend more than five years
in France –August 1784 to October 1789– without learning to speak French is
in itself not least of the oddities affecting his relationship with France . . . If
Thomas Jefferson had wanted to speak French, he would have learned to speak
it . . . One has to conclude that . . . he wanted to stay American. More precisely
. . . Virginian.” Id. Jefferson wanted to see France evolve in an “American model”
of liberty, thus, he was conscious of a looming “fear of anything that would
undermine French military and naval strength, . . . and so make Britain a far
more formidable potential threat to the young United States.” Id. at 38. That
“fear ma[de] Jefferson” see the French Monarchy as “essential to the
maintenance of [France’s] military strength.” Id.); SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, JAY’S
TREATY: A STUDY IN COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY 267 (1923), Jay’s Treaty “was
helpful to England and harmful to France, [an American] ally, who could with
some show of reason” have accused the United States “of being in collusion with
the hostile purposes of her enemy.” Id. Jay’s Treaty was described by an earlyTwentieth Century French scholar as “so injurious” to France, it could be
described as “almost equivalent to a treaty of alliance” between Britain and the
United States).
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French relations polarized many American politicians.138 For
instance, as a result of his experiences, Marshall felt a strong
central federal government was essential for the young United
States to be a viable national power.139 By contrast, Jeffersonian
advocacy for states’ rights, produced partisan contempt for
Marshall’s federally centered Constitutionalism.140
Eventually, Jefferson’s fear of Marshall grew to bitter
resentment. In 1795, Marshall was victorious over Jefferson’s
inheritance in an estate battle on behalf of Richard Randolph.141
Evidenced by Jefferson’s personal letters, his bitterness towards
Marshall stemmed specifically from Marshall’s capitalized
opportunities to minimize Jefferson’s role in history. Jefferson and
Adams eventually corresponded regarding John Marshall’s
biography of President George Washington, entitled, Life of George
Washington.142 As was typical, Adams would give his opinions to
Jefferson on whatever he was reading at the time.143 Adams chided
that at five-volumes, “Marshall’s [biography] is a Mausolæum, 100
feet square at the base . . . 200 feet high,” and merely “written to
make money; and fashioned and finished to sell high in the London
market.”144 In contrast, the work actually was a financial and
critical disaster for Marshall.145 In spite of its critical failure,
Jefferson was nevertheless greatly irked at how Marshall had
minimized his historical presence in that grand “mausolæum.”146
138. See NORMAN K. RISJORD, JEFFERSON’S AMERICA, 1760–1815 at 267
(2010). Risjord wrote that, generally, Americans were initially sympathetic with
“the French Revolution as a step toward constitutional government.” Id. Most
Federalists, however, became alienated. Id. Jefferson feared that, if France fell
to the coalition of monarchs, the American republic would also be in danger. Id.
“Thus[,] the ideological conflict between monarchy and republicanism in Europe
provided the symbols that polarized American public opinion as well.” See also
PAUL, supra note 13, at 55. (“To understand how Marshall became the lion of
the Supreme Court, it is necessary to understand how the French Revolution
polarized the United States and defined our political parties . . . also set[ing]
Marshall on a collision course with his cousin Jefferson.”).
139. Smith, supra note 70, at 402.
140. See DAVID M. KENNEDY, LIZABETH COHEN, & MEL PIEHL, THE BRIEF
AMERICAN PAGEANT: A HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC 161 (Cengage Learning
Ninth Ed., 2017) (characterizing Marshall “[a]s a lifelong Federalist and a
fervant advocate of a powerful central government, Marshall was virgorously
condemned by the states' rights Jeffersonians.”).
141. PAUL, supra note 13, at 52-53.
142. THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 30001(1905).
143. GORDON S. WOOD, FRIENDS DIVIDED: JOHN ADAMS AND THOMAS
JEFFERSON 366 (2017).
144. JEFFERSON, supra note 147, at 366-67.
145. Smith, supra note 70, at 403.
146. WOOD, supra note 148, at 391.
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Marshall reduced Jefferson’s writing of the Declaration of
Independence into a mere footnote, which stated fleetingly that “the
draft reported by the committee has been generally attributed to
Mr. Jefferson.”147 Historian Gordon S. Wood characterized this as
“a remarkable playing down of Jefferson’s actual contribution.”148
Nevertheless, by consequence of this massive publication, what
Jefferson may have astutely feared was the authority with which
Marshall began to speak as a historian, specifically on the subject
of Founder’s intent.149 After all, Marshall had a unique ability
among only few Justices to say that he was at the ratification.150
Moreover, Ratifiers’ intent overtime has achieved a prickly
synonymity with Founders’ Intent.151 Still, Jefferson was ear to
conduct that could leave one skeptical of Marshall’s veracity on the
bench.152 Thus, Jefferson’s fears of Marshall as an authority of
politics, history and constitutional power were realized when
Marshall spoke authoritatively on treason, a subject that was
obscured by the President’s political animus towards Burr.153
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Smith, supra note 70, at 403 (noting it reportedly was a partial
purpose for Marshall’s undertaking).
150. See 1 JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787: A
COMPREHENSIVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING 393 (2005) (noting
that preceding Supreme Court Justice James Wilson had been there also).
151. See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. LAW REV.
353, 375 (1981) (footnote 130) (Boston University Law Professor Henry P.
Monaghan, an originalist, noted the discrete provenances of constitutional
intent and the inherent difficulty of distinguishing therebetween, writing that
“the intention of the ratifiers, not the Framers, is in principle decisive, the
difficulties of ascertaining the intent of the ratifiers leaves little choice but to
accept the intent of the Framers as a fair reflection of it.” Id. at 353, 375); see
also THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 19 (2011) (citing CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE USES OF HISTORY 157-88 (1969); WILLIAM E. NELSON & JOHN PHILLIP
REID, THE LITERATURE OF AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 146-47 (1985) (analyzing
constitutional analysis of intent and noting the naïveté that nonlawyers use on
occasion in analyzing the historical aspects of the Constitution, “Charles A.
Miller . . . who is not a lawyer, shows the occasional signs of legal naivete . . .
eschew[ing] the [legal] jargon . . . in discussing constitutional and legislative
construction”). The Challenge of Originalism notes that a variation of original
intent emphasizes “the understandings or intentions of the ratifies…who
attended the ratifying conventions and voted in favor of ratification.” Id. Still,
“all of the problems that attended the equation of constitutional meaning with
Framer’s intent seem to attach to ratifiers’ intent.” Id.
152. See WHITE, supra note 26, at 224 (stating that Jefferson corresponded
with Marshall Court Justice William Johnson, who wrote that Marshall's
delivery of various Court opinions was at times contrary to the opinions he
expressed to the other Justices over cases upon which he sat and ruled alongside
Marshall).
153. See generally HASKINS & JOHNSON supra note 12, at 266 (“[Jefferson’s]
letters make unpleasant reading for those who are offended by the assertion
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2. Judiciary vs. Executive
In Bollman, the case preceding Burr, Marshall noted the
unique position in which the Court found itself in facing a case of
treason and a potential political tirade with Jefferson, writing, “[i]f
this court possessed no powers but those given by statute, it could
not protect itself from insult and outrage,” nor could it “enforce
obedience to its immediate orders.”154 The Court’s “powers are not
given by the constitution, nor by statute, but flow from the common
law.”155 Marshall had previously considered, and acknowledged in
Marbury v. Madison, the lack of formal enforcement powers.156 In
Burr, he noted the compounded position the Court faced, writing,
“[t]hat this court dares not usurp power is most true. That this court
dares not shrink from its duty is not less true. No man is desirous
of placing himself in a disagreeable situation;” however, the Court
“has no choice in the case” with “no alternative presented . . . but a
dereliction of duty, or the opprobrium of those who are denominated
the world, he merits the contempt as well as the indignation of his
country, who can hesitate which to embrace.”157 Due to procedural
technicalities, Burr did not reach the Supreme Court. Rather, it
came before the district court, over which Marshall presided, and it
came before him bearing the full weight of his own flawed Bollman
opinion.158 While not a Supreme Court case, the Court’s posterity
hinged with Burr.
Although Marshall did not favor Aaron Burr, Bollman and
Burr remain significant in Marshall’s career.159 Bollman’s
that Jefferson’s personal antagonisms could or did become [his] public policies .
. . there is much truth in the charge against the President that, with regard to
[Burr] . . . his view of the legal doctrine was obscured by what may be called his
political purposes.”).
154. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 93 (1807).
155. Id.
156. See Marbury 5 U.S. at 162, 180. The Court asserts that President
Jefferson’s administration’s denial of Marbury’s appointment was wrong, but
nevertheless left a thinly veiled reality in which it was the inevitable
prerogative of the Executive to choose to bind itself when the Court says the law
is. Id. at 162. “It is therefore decidedly the opinion of the court, that when a
commission has been signed by the President, the appointment is made; and
that the commission is complete, when the seal of the United States has been
affixed to it by the secretary of state . . . Thus, the particular phraseology of the
constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle . . . that
a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument.” Id. at 162, 180 (emphasis added).
157. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 179.
158. HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 246
159. RICHARD BROOKHISER, JOHN MARSHALL: THE MAN WHO MADE THE
SUPREME COURT 119 (2018).
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prominence stems from being the first United States Supreme
Court case to address treason.160 Moreover, Bollman expounded
authoritatively upon the jurisprudence of writs of habeas corpus.161
Burr, however, reflects Marshall’s judicial statesmanship, as
exercised deftly to safeguard constitutional powers against
Jefferson’s attempt to circumvent law to Burr’s detriment.162
Jefferson and the Republicans resented Marshall and the
Federalists for their entrenched power in the Judiciary.163 In late
1801, after defeating Federalist John Adams for the presidency,
Jefferson wrote about the Federalists acquiring power in the
Judiciary, characterizing it as a “stronghold” that would eradicate
the Republican Party.164 The outgoing Adams administration had
notoriously made a last-ditch effort to maintain Federalist
principles by drafting appointments in the last-hours before the
office was turned over to Jefferson, an act that was coined as “the

160. R. KENT NEWMYER, THE TREASON TRIAL OF AARON BURR: LAW,
POLITICS, AND THE CHARACTER WARS OF THE NEW NATION 107 (2012); see also
R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF
THE OLD REPUBLIC 201 (2004) (writing that if one draws a parallel between the
impeached Justice Samuel Chase and John Marshall, “if [Marshall] intervened
at all, [in Burr,] [he] did so against the force of the state mobilized by a president
bent on conviction”).
161. Halliday & White, supra note 11, at 683 (“Bollman is significant . . .
because of some categorical language by Marshall that has been understood by
some commentators to mean that the source of the habeas privilege in America
is exclusively statutory.”).
162. BROOKHISER, supra note 164, at 119.
163. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS
107 (1987).
164. See id. (“On their part, they have retired into the judiciary as a
stronghold. There the remains of Federalism are to be preserved and fed from
the Treasury . . . [meanwhile] all the works of republicanism are to be beaten
down and erased.”).
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Midnight Judges Act.”165 Adams, a lame-duck president,166 filled
vacancies with Federalists, passing legislation to create six new
circuit courts and sixteen judicial appointments.167 These actions
became the basis of the issues in Marbury. Among those vacancies
filled was Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.168
Adams appointed his own Secretary of State, John Marshall, to

165. See id.; see also, KERMIT L. HALL, JAMES W. ELY, JR., & JOEL B.
GROSSMAN, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 546 (Oxford University Press, Second Ed. 2005) (Unsuccessful in his
1800 pursuit of a second term, lame-duck President John Adams worked quickly
with the Federalist party to increase the effects of the Federalist party on the
young nation before Jefferson and the Republicans took office in 1801. Id. The
Federalist-controlled Congress passed the 1801 Judiciary Act prior to Adams’
departure. Id. That Act sought to quell Federalist party desires to increase the
power of a centralized national government. Id. Moreover, it changed the
Judiciary’s construction by reducing the size of the Supreme Court over which
Jefferson would have control from six Justices to five. Id. Most importantly, it
created six new U.S. Circuits, across which the departing Adams
Administration would appoint sixteen judges. Id. This partisan court-packing
scheme to increase federal power became known as the “Midnight Judges Act.”);
see CLIFF SLOAN & DAVID MCKEAN, THE GREAT DECISION: JEFFERSON, ADAMS,
MARSHALL, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE SUPREME COURT 91-92 (Public Affairs,
2009) (noting that Jefferson’s Republican desire for State’s Rights
fundamentally contrasted the Federalist-minded powerful central government.
Id. at 91. In light of the Midnight Judges Act, Jefferson quickly began to gather
evidence to press Congress to amend the Act, arguing that the lighter workload
of the additional judges likely demonstrated a lack of need for these
appointments. Id. at 91-92.
166. Ed Quillen, The origin of “lame duck”, THE DENVER POST (Jan, 01,
2009),
www.denverpost.com/2009/01/01/the-origin-of-lame-duck
[perma.cc/2GTQ-9AC2] (citing Brewer’s Dictionary of Phrase and Fable). The
political idiom “lame-duck,” which dates back to the Eighteenth Century, in fact
did not find its genesis in politics. Id. Instead, it was a phrase from the finance
sector, referring to “a stock-jobber or dealer who will not, or cannot, pay his
losses,” thus forced to “waddle out of the alley like a lame duck.” Id. The
American political advent of lame-duck came in 1863, when President Calvin
Coolidge came to be called a lame duck after losing a second term election to
Herbert Hoover and forced to face the proverbial waddle out of the White House.
Id.; see also, JORDAN ALMOND, DICTIONARY OF WORD ORIGINS: A HISTORY OF
THE WORDS, EXPRESSIONS AND CLICHES WE USE, 148 (Citadel Press 1995) (The
political idiom is derived from the phrase: “Wild ducks in flight fly together- their
heads out-stretched in front, their legs outstretched behind. A ‘lame duck’ can’t
keep up with the flock.” Id. (emphasis added in italics) It is from there that the
concept of the lame duck is attributed to politicians who fail at seeking
reelection and cannot maintain step with the change of political office. Id.) For
this reason, there is a lack of accuracy in characterizing two-term Presidents in
the autumn of their administration as lame-ducks.
167. WOOD, supra note 148, at 323.
168. Id.; see also HOWARD A. DEWITT, ALAN M. KIRSHNER, IN THE COURSE
OF HUMAN EVENTS: AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 62 (1983, Kendall/Hunt
Publishing Company) (“Jefferson was angered by the packing of the judiciary.”)
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preside over the Court, angering Jefferson.169
Long after Burr’s trial, Jefferson wrote on September 6, 1819,
to fellow Republican Spencer Roane, a judge whom some believe
Jefferson was deprived of appointing as Chief Justice when Adams
appointed Marshall.170 In that letter to Roane, Jefferson reflected,
“we find the judiciary on every occasion, still driving us into
consolidation” as a nation, not of states, but a strong federally
centered nation.171 Roughly sixteen years after Marbury, Marshall’s
judici-political victory still irked Jefferson.172 Curiously, Roane
experienced his own conflict with Marshall, which stemmed from
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, a landmark Marshall Court case from
which the Chief Justice recused himself.173 Jefferson complained to
169. WOOD, supra note 148, at 323; see also JOHN ARTHUR GARRATY, THE
AMERICAN NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: VOLUME 1 219 (Harper
& Row, 1971) (Adams had “appointed John Marshall of Virginia, whom
Jefferson particularly disliked.”); see JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS:
THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 208 (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group,
2003) (Jefferson confided that he found Adams’ actions to be “personally
unkind.” Id. Ellis notes that Jefferson and Marshall’s utter hatred for one
another was mutual. Id.).
170. Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sep. 06, 1819), www.presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_18s16.html
[perma.cc/N64MY9YQ]; see JOHN V. DENSON, REASSESSING THE PRESIDENCY: THE RISE OF THE
EXECUTIVE STATE AND THE DECLINE OF FREEDOM 73 (2001); see also Hobson
Interview, supra note 16, at 8 (“There is a persistent myth that Jefferson, given
the opportunity, would have nominated Spencer Roane, a member of the
Virginia Court of Appeals, as Chief Justice. Although he later praised Roane for
his attacks on Marshall’s opinions in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) and Cohens
v. Virginia (1821), there is no evidence that Jefferson had more than a passing
acquaintance with Roane in 1801.”).
171. Id.
172. See id. (“In the case of Marbury and Madison, the federal judges
declared that commissions, signed and sealed by the President, were valid,
although not delivered. I deemed delivery essential to complete a deed, which,
as long as it remains in the hands of the party, is as yet no deed.”).
173. F. Thornton Miller, John Marshall versus Spencer Roane: A
Reevaluation of Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 96 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 297,
297-314 (1988). The litigation in Martin pitted the Court against republicanism
and advocates of states’ rights. Id. at 298. At the appellate level, Roane ruled
against the Marshall family interests at stake. Id. The Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals volleyed the case back and forth arguing a proper decisional
means. Id. On behalf of the Court, Justice Story wrote in response to Judge
Roane that constitutionally the Supremacy Clause necessitated that appellate
jurisdiction bring about uniformity via one ultimate appellate court. Id. at 207.
Without uniformity of the Judiciary, there would be no supreme law of the land,
as every state could independently interpret the Constitution, federal law and
treaties in their own self-serving manner. Id. at 311. Declaring the final
authority of the Supreme Court in Martin deprived the Court of Appeal from a
further opportunity to volley the case and gave the Supreme Court the final
word. Id. It functioned much in the same way that Marbury prevented the Court
from facing its lack of enforcement power. Id. at 312. The Marshall Court’s
lineage of cases advanced a constitutional theory that the Court enforced the
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Roane of a disruption of constitutional power dynamics that, by will
of the People, the Constitution granted political power to the
political branches, not the unelected Judiciary.174 Jefferson
continued his criticism of the Court, stating that the Constitution
established three branches, “co-ordinate and independent, that they
might check and balance one another, it has given, according to this
opinion, to one of them alone, the right to prescribe rules for the
government of the others, and to that one too, which is unelected by,
and independent of the nation.”175 He further believed that the
Judiciary “usurp[ed]” the right “of exclusively explaining the
constitution . . . If this opinion be sound, then indeed is our
constitution a complete felo de se.”176
Jefferson feared big-government, which Marshall’s opinions
helped to facilitate.177 He viewed it as a violation of the Constitution
and a deprivation of self-government.178 In Jefferson’s mind, each
state had the “exclusive right” and the constitutional prerogative
thereof to regulate rights such as slavery.179 Because of Marshall’s
constitutionalism, Jefferson alleged that the Constitution had
become “a mere thing of wax in the hands of the judiciary, which
they may twist, and shape into any form they please.”180 Jefferson
wrote, “[m]y construction of the constitution is very different” from
the Court’s self-announced authority to say what the law is.181 In
contrast to Marbury, Jefferson’s conceptualized “that each
department is truly independent of the others, and has an equal
right to decide for itself what is the meaning of the constitution in
the cases submitted to its action; and especially, where it is to act
ultimately and without appeal.”182 Thus, Marshall’s reservation of

uniform law of the land, from Marbury to McCulloch v. Maryland, Cohens v.
Virginia, Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, and Burr collectively served to continually
reignite a battle for state’s rights. Id.
174. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 175 (“The nation declared its
will by dismissing functionaries of one principle, and electing those of another,
in the two branches, executive and legislative, submitted to their election. Over
the judiciary department, the constitution had deprived them of their control.”).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. WOOD, supra note 148, at 416-17 (noting that although, Jefferson hated
slavery, in a larger sense, he distrusted the federal government’s growing power
and the potential northern use of such power to restrict the States’ right of the
people to own slaves).
178. Id.
179. Id.; see also Ely, supra note 82, at 452 (noting that John Marshall’s
concerns for public policy were such that the Marshall Court carefully avoided
the dangerous question of slavery, deferring to the legislature).
180. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 175.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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the last word for the Court violated Jefferson’s views for
government. Marshall’s Federalist opinions bolstering the federal
power disrupted that mission, from Marbury and McCulloch to
Bollman and Burr. Moreover, the battle of branches was strongest
between Marshall and Jefferson in Burr, the sole Supreme Case in
which Jefferson took the greatest interest during his two-term
presidency. Jefferson, to his son-in-law John W. Eppes, wrote about
Burr’s trial that “[t]he favor of the marshal and the judge promises
Burr all which can depend on them.”183 Jefferson’s disdain for the
Judiciary went deeper than Marbury, it was with the Constitution’s
Article III, writing, “this [case] will show the original error of
establishing a judiciary independent of the nation, and which, from
the citadel of the law can turn its guns on those they were meant to
defend, and control and fashion their proceedings to its own will.”184
To act as if Marbury was Marshall’s final word on the Court’s power
or even the greatest dispute with Jefferson is to miss the stature of
the Marshall Court, the statesmanship of the Chief Justice, and the
continual political pressure under which Marshall presided.
Jeffersonian pressure, however, had an opposite effect of uniting the
Justices.185 This pressure continued through Bollman, to Burr, and
onward, jeopardizing public faith in the Court.

B. Judiciary and the People
John Marshall took the Supreme Court from an uncouth
circuit-riding group on horseback, in what was then the perceivably
lowest branch of government to a robed ensemble with the
preeminent power to “to say what the law is.”186 It was a branch
formerly perceived as undignified and without any real authority.187
In the evolving period of the judiciary, the existing laws required
that Supreme Court justices report to various respective geographic
locations, sitting there as trial judges.188 Marshall instilled that the
Supreme Court would not deliver its opinions seriatim, the oldEnglish manner of each judge delivering his individual opinion
orally.189 To Framers like Marshall, this appeared as “an act of
183. Thomas Jefferson, To John W. Eppes May 1807, in JEFFERSONIAN
CYCLOPEDIA 116, 116 (1900).
184. Id.
185. See Newmyer, R. Kent, Getting Right with the Great Chief Justice, 8
MASS. LEGAL HIST. 49, 59-60 (2002) (writing of the “unyielding hostility of the
Jeffersonians to the Court which Marshall used to unite his colleagues”).
186. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 137.
187. PAUL, supra note 13, at 3.
188. REHNQUIST, supra note 168, at 107.
189. John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States
Supreme Court 1790-1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137, 140 (1999) (There was an
antiquated method of “delivering opinions seriatim,” a “practice . . . patterned
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audacity.”190 Rather, as a result of Marshall, the Court would speak
through the written word of one Justice, who would speak on behalf
thereof, another choice of Marshall with which Jefferson took great
exception and wished undone.191
In Marbury, Marshall wrote that the Constitution’s Treason
Clause “is addressed especially to the courts. It prescribes, directly
for them, a rule of evidence not to be departed from. If the
legislature should change that rule, and declare one witness, or a
confession out of court, sufficient for conviction, must the
constitutional principle yield to the legislative act?”192 However, the
after that of the English common-law courts. In the seriatim style, each Justice
prepared and read his own opinion.” Id. at 140. Kelsh noted that “the preMarshall Court used the per curiam and seriatim styles most frequently.” Id. at
141. The seriatim cases that followed Marshall’s tenure on the Court
“demonstrate the importance of Marshall himself to the development of the
practice whereby an individual Justice spoke for the whole Court. The other
Justices clearly preferred the seriatim system and employed it when [Marshall]
was not present.” Id. at 144. Marshall’s persistence on this new element of
American jurisprudence became a fixture by 1808, at which time Marshall’s
fellow Justices “began to abandon the practice of delivering opinions seriatim.”
Id.)
190. Id. at 120.
191. WHITE, supra note 6, at 10 (noting the power that Marshall’s judicial
statesmanship brought to the Court was largely a large product of sensing a
need to eradicate the scattered confusion of Court Justices who ruled in
separate opinions with confusion as to how much power the Court had over
Congress and the Constitution; see also, letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Thomas
Ritchie
(Dec.
25,
1820),
www.founders.archives.gov/docu
ments/Jefferson/98-01-02-1702 [perma.cc/EW6L-PWRL] (“[The] pen should go
on, lay bare these wounds of our constitution, expose these decisions [in a
method] seriatim, and [arouse], as it is able, the attention of the nation to these
bold speculators on [its] patience. having found from experience that
[impeachment] is an impracticable thing, a mere scare-crow, they consider
themselves secure for life; they sculk from responsibility to public opinion the
only remaining hold on them, under a practice, first introduced into England.”
Id. Otherwise, Jefferson warned that as Chief Justice, Marshall had an
advantage over the lazier associates, writing that the Court’s “opinion is
huddled up in Conclave, perhaps by a majority of one, delivered as a craft, Chief
judge, as if unanimous, and, with the silent acquiescence of lazy or timid
associates, he sophisticates the law to his mind by the turn of his own
reasoning.”); and letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (Oct. 27,
1822),
www.founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-3118
[perma.cc/65TK-9W3R] (“I understand from others it is now the habit of the
court, & I suppose it true from the cases sometimes reported in the newspapers,
and others which I casually see, wherein I observe that the opinions were
uniformly prepared in private.” Id. Furthermore, “some of these cases too have
been of such importance . . . [and] so grating to a portion of the public, as to have
merited the fullest explanation from every judge seriatim, of the reasons which
had produced such convictions on his mind.”).
192. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 179.
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Judiciary unintentionally affected the Treason Clause by giving
way to constructive treason in Bollman. Thus, the Judiciary’s power
was unmistakable when acting intentionally or even accidentally.
Once sold to the public as “the least dangerous branch,” the Framers
conceived of the Judiciary existing within a system of genuine
checks and balances in which the Judiciary could parry the
oversteps of the Executive and Legislative Branches.193 Without the
control of military, nor the power of taxation or the likes thereof,
the Judiciary’s lack of formal enforcement powers remained.194
Nevertheless, from his inception on the Court, to Marbury, Burr,
and onward, Marshall sought to preserve the role of the Court in
the New Republic against Jefferson’s attempts to obstruct. The
same way that George Washington defined the presidency,
Marshall molded the Court.195
1. Jefferson vs. Burr
Similar to the political undercurrent that pitted Chief Justice

193. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Whoever attentively
considers the different departments of power must perceive that, in a
government in which [the departments] are separated from each other, the
judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to
the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to
annoy or injure them.” Id. In contrast from its sister branches,“[t]he judiciary .
. . has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the
strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution
whatever.” Id. Rather, its power is derived from the people, as “[i]t may truly be
said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment; and must
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its
judgments.”).
194. Id.
195. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION THE
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 307-32 (2012) (“Of all the textual
uncertainties confronting America’s first president, none loomed larger than the
indeterminacy shrouding his own role in the new constitutional order.”). While
the text made clear some of the President’s powers, it failed to specify the limits
of those powers and, according to Amar, his practices demonstrated a “lived”
approach that served to provide rules for constitutional governance. Id. at 310,
132; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Chief Justices and Chief Executives: Some
Thoughts on Jim Simon’s Books, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 435, 436 (2012-2013)
(“In contrast to the presidential term of four or eight years, the Constitution
establishes life tenure for the Chief Justice of the United States. Before John
Marshall, this tradition was not entirely obvious. Several early Justices stepped
down after relatively short stints on the bench. John Jay left to become governor
of New York . . . So before Marshall came along, the modern pattern was not so
apparent, but, in retrospect, the typical pattern is that Presidents leave after
four or eight years, while most Justices stay on for much longer. This simple
fact creates an interesting structural tension.”). Thus, while Marshall was not
the first Chief Justice, his lived effect on the Branch of government and role on
the Court mirror respective Washingtonian levels.
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John Marshall against his distant cousin President Thomas
Jefferson, this case involved Aaron Burr, whom Jefferson strongly
disliked, due to Burr’s rivalry in the 1800 presidential election.196
Burr, once a close ally to Jefferson, became an opponent after only
narrowly losing the Presidency to Jefferson.197 Burr’s political
causticity was such that Jeffersonian-rival Alexander Hamilton
vitally supported Jefferson over Burr.198 Burr’s loss started a career
downfall that ended at forty-eight years old with his killing
Hamilton in a duel.199 Still, Jefferson feared that Burr would find a
renaissance before the next election and defeat his political protégé,
James Madison.200 That fear was largely unfounded, however, as
Burr had left Washington after the ugliness of politics proved too
much for him.201 In fact, at the substance of his treason case, Burr
headed to America’s Western Frontier, in order to start anew by
capturing Spanish-held territory and settle in an area with
resources of great fertility and silver mining.202 Nevertheless,
Jefferson distrusted Burr’s exit from the frontline of politics,
viewing it with great suspicion.203 Burr merely wanted to reinvent
himself after his political decline.204 Burr’s plan involved coconspirator, General James Wilkinson, the Governor of Louisiana
and a purported spy to Spain.205 Wilkinson ultimately sacrificed
Burr and concealed his own role in the plan to save face and perhaps

196. Olken, supra note 40, at 755-56; see also PAUL, supra note 13, at 282283.
197. See MAGRUDER, supra note 19, at 200 (writing that Burr came “within
one electoral vote of being chosen” as President over Jefferson); see also 1
MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY 222 (3d ed.
2011); BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS:
JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 43-45
(2005).
198. FERLING, supra note 130, at 326. Ferling writes that, in spite of
Hamilton’s quarrels with Jefferson and the contempt that flowed therefrom,
Hamilton eventually threw his political support behind Jefferson over Burr,
viewing Jefferson as a “lesser of two evils.” Id. Hamilton believed that Burr was
“unprincipled . . . voluptuary” with “extreme & irregular ambition” to enact a
“system . . . sufficient to serve his own ends.” Likewise, Burr viewed Hamilton
as the “most dangerous man of the [American] Community.” Id.
199. UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 203, at 222.
200. PAUL, supra note 13, at 282-283.
201. UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 203, at 222.
202. Id.; BROOKHISER, supra note 164, at 111.
203. BROOKHISER, supra note 164, at 110.
204. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 2 (“Aaron Burr clearly believed the West
offered him a second chance after his fall from grace.”).
205. UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 203, at 222; see HASKINS &
JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 249-50 (noting that Wilkinson’s intent to betray the
United States is debated, but Wilkinson’s pension from the Spanish government
and his self-interest to protect the publication of this information).
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earn his place in history as a war-hero, neither of which
manifested.206 Wilkinson and Burr had served together with
prestige in the Revolutionary War and had maintained a close
friendship.207 The plan also included Samuel Swartwout and Dr.
Erick Bollmann (note that Bollmann’s name was misspelled by the
Court in Bollman).208 Jefferson wanted to eradicate any risk of
Burr’s revival and thus strongly wanted him hanged, a punishment
appropriate under treason.209 Some scholars believe that Burr
wished to make a comeback by conquering Mexico amid the
provoked war under Jefferson’s presidency.210 The treason cases
before the Marshall Court were borne out a political battle that had
entangled Jefferson, Burr, and Marshall, one that left the President
of the United States and the Chief Justice of its Supreme Court to
battle for the helm.
2. The Chief Justice and the Marshall Court
Marshall knew the public pressure under which the Court
found itself, something that he explicitly acknowledged in Ex Parte
Bollman.211 Prior to addressing the issues in In Re Burr, Marshall
had previously written the Bollman majority opinion, in which he
wrote that “our property, our lives, and our reputations depend [and
rest] solely on the decisions of courts.”212 He elaborated upon the
significance of stare decisis, one of the Court’s most “favourite and
most fundamental maxims,” a maxim moreover that is “wise and
salutary.”213 Marshall, however, went on that year in Burr to
206. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 27 (“Wilkinson hoped to protect himself
while winning glory as a national hero. Instead, he emerged from the Burr trial
with his dubious reputation badly if not irretrievably damaged. Wilkinson,
indeed, proved to be a disappointment to the prosecution, his credibility
tarnished by suspicion that in revealing Burr’s plot he was merely trying to save
his own neck. His testimony before the grand jury was undermined by
indications that he had altered the famous cipher letter in ways to conceal his
own relationship with Burr.).
207. MAGRUDER, supra note 19 at 204; see also HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra
note 12, at 248 (noting that Burr’s efforts in the Revolutionary War established
his place in history as a war-hero and a brilliant military strategist).
208. PAUL, supra note 13, at 283-285.
209. BROOKHISER, supra note 164, at 118.
210. See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 249 (the plausibility of such
designs is supported by the Hero’s welcome that Burr received in 1805. Id. The
greeting was led by Andrew Jackson, a great admirer of Burr. Id. In the
alternative of Burr’s purported desires for a heroic comeback, another goal may
have been that Burr merely wished to settle west of the Mississippi and become
a land tycoon. Id.).
211. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 79 (1807) (noting that, in this publicized
case, the Court “could not protect itself from insult and outrage”).
212. Id. at 87.
213. Id.
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overrule part of this very opinion.
Marshall indeed acknowledged that Ex Parte Bollman
“certainly adopt[ed] the doctrine of constructive treason” but feared
the extent to which the doctrine reached.214 Most telling, Marshall
wrote to fellow Justice William Cushing, asking, “[o]ught the
expressions in that opinion be revised?”215 The Justices’ respective
responses to Marshall did not survive, but in a fashion of
statesmanship, Smith surmised that Marshall took their opinions
into account in crafting his Burr opinion, seeking essential
unanimity.216 Thus, Marshall knew what lay ahead for the Court.
Moreover, he knew that the opinion must be unanimous or risk
disdain because contradictory opinions in the case could undermine
the Court amid controversy.217
Curiously, Henry Brockholst Livingston, a fixture of the
Marshall Court who had been appointed by Jefferson saw three
things in common with Burr. In 1798, Livingston, a fellow
Republican, killed a notable Federalist in a duel.218 Nevertheless,
Livingston succumbed to Marshall’s charisma and disappointed
Jefferson who, reeling from the deprival of appointing a Chief
Justice, hoped to establish a Republican-minded majority.219
Additionally, Thomas Todd sat on the Court.220 Todd was also a
214. JOHN MARSHALL, To William Cushing, in THE PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL: CORRESPONDENCE, PAPERS, AND SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS,
APRIL 1807-DECEMBER 1813, AT 60, 60 (Herbert A. Johnson et al. eds., 1974)
(“How far does that case carry this doctrine?”).
215. Id.
216. JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL DEFINER OF A NATION 640
n.108 (1996).
217. See 2 DAVID G. SAVAGE & JOAN BISKUPIC, GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT 856 (4th ed. 2004), (Marshall's “aspiration toward unanimity became the
norm.”); see also HOBSON, supra note 90, at 116 (“In all the great cases affirming
a nationalist interpretation of the Constitution, [Marshall] had the unanimous
or nearly unanimous concurrence of his brethren.”); WHITE, supra note 6, at 10
(noting Marshall sensed a need to eradicate the scattered confusion of Court
Justices who ruled in separate opinions with confusion as to how much power
the Court had over Congress and the Constitution).
218. JOANNE B. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR: NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE
NEW REPUBLIC 329 n.38 (2001) (noting that Federalists charged Brockholst
Livingston for killing James Jones, a Federalist, in a duel); see also SMITH,
supra note 222, at 350 (Noting, however, that Livingston was said to have acted
honorably, while Burr faced murder charges for shooting Alexander Hamilton).
219. JOHN V. DENSON, REASSESSING THE PRESIDENCY: THE RISE OF THE
EXECUTIVE STATE AND THE DECLINE OF FREEDOM 73 (2001). Denson writes that
Livingston greatly disappointed Jefferson by falling under Marshall’s influence
and characterizing Livingston as “a non-entity, a mere rubber stamp for
Marshall and [Joseph] Story.” Id. He also states that Jefferson had reportedly
planned to appoint Spencer Roane as Chief Justice before Adams appointed
Marshall. Id.
220. NEWMYER, supra note 165, at 79.
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Jefferson appointee, the former Chief Justice of the Kentucky
Supreme Court and a dedicated Republican that Jefferson hoped
would change the Marshall Court.221 However, Todd’s kindred spirit
with Marshall proved to be a disappointment for Jefferson.222 A
later Marshall Court member, Justice (then Judge) Joseph Story
wrote in Todd’s obituary notice, “though bread in a different
political school from that of [Marshall], [Todd] never failed to
sustain those great principles of constitutional law on which the
security of the Union depends. He never gave up to party what he
thought belonged to the country.”223
As Chief Justice, Marshall knew the power that a communal
bottle of wine could play in corralling his fellow Justices towards a
particular outcome.224 He knew too, the benefit that drawing upon
the intellect of fellow Justices in a genuine manner aided in
reaching a learned decision and the fellowship of the Justices.225
The potent energy of Marshall and Livingston made the Court “a
band of brothers.”226 Livingston did not participate in the decision
221. See TIMOTHY L. HALL, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY 60-61 (2001) (noting that when Jefferson sought the advice of
Congress for as to whom he should appoint to the Supreme Court, Todd's name
was suggested prominently for his expertise. Hall describes Todd’s role on the
Court as importantly aiding Marshall’s strengthening of power for the
Judiciary).
222. See NEWMYER, supra note 165, at 79 (writing that Jefferson hoped to
“undo the stranglehold that Marshall was reputed to have on his colleagues”).
But see id. (“Todd, as it turned out, was neither equipped nor inclined to
challenge the chief justice and became instead . . . a steadfast supporter of”
Marshall's constitutionalism).
223. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
301 (1926).
224. Samuel R. Olken, Chief Justice John Marshall in Historical Perspective,
31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 137, 157 (1997); see also Herbert A. Johnson, Bushrod
Washington, 62 VANDERBILT L. REV. 447, 448 (2019) (exhibiting a letter from
William Johnson to Thomas Jefferson that Justice William “Cushing was
incompetent, [Samuel] Chase could not be got to think or write, [William]
Paterson was a slow man and willingly declined [to be] trouble[d with writing
opinions]”); id. (“[T]he other two judges,” referring to John Marshall and
Bushrod Washington, “are commonly estimated as one judge.”).
225. Hobson, supra note 18, at 1422. Marshall “earned their trust and
respect not by flattery or cajolery but by a genuine desire to draw on their
particular expertise. Id. at 1424. “This had the desired effect of making each
associate feel as if his views mattered, as if he were an integral part of a common
enterprise.” Id. at 1424 Hobson also stated that “we can reasonably speculate
that Marshall acted somewhat like a committee chair who collected the views
of his associates and fashioned a report that reflected the sense of the whole.”
Id. at 1447.
226. See SMITH, supra note 222, at 350-51 (noting Livingston’s role in this
fellowship); see also Hobson, supra note 18, at 1422 (“The war also marked him
for life as a member of the special fraternity of Revolutionary veterans, to which
many of his fellow Justices also belonged. The camaraderie of a ‘band of
brothers’ formed no small part of the bond uniting the Chief Justice and his
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of Bollman, the Marshall Court, or “band of brothers,” as it were,
together faced the treason cases with the Revolution in their
experiences.227 As a statesman, Marshall’s goals for a respected
judiciary and unanimous decisions often meant stifling his personal
opinions and remaining open to the opinions of his colleagues.228
Nevertheless, well-known and problematic to Jefferson was
Marshall’s reputation for dominating his fellow Justices with
charismatic influence.229

C. Bollman/Burr Cases
1. The Incident: Treason?
Burr’s schemed to justify invading Mexico by first provoking
war with Spain.230 Burr had purchased four hundred thousand
acres along the Wichita River banks in Texas.231 The government
alleged a scheme by Burr that paralleled America’s eventual Civil
War, plans that Burr would create a separate confederate
sovereign, consisting of Western states and territories.232 Most of
the evidence brought against Burr at his trial was first revealed to
the Court during Ex Parte Bollman. For instance, General William
Eaton characterized the plan as “[an organized] secret expedition
against the Spanish provinces on our south-western borders” that
was specifically led by Burr.233 Nevertheless, this plan was not
novel. Jefferson had previously explored provoking war with Spain
as a political tactic to destabilize when he served as Secretary of
State to George Washington.234 This scheme proved to be a
recurring, “ardent desire of the Americans to drive Spain from all
associate.”).
227. WARREN, supra note 229, at 306.
228. See Hobson Interview, supra note 16, at 9 (“Marshall was more than
willing to subordinate his private opinions and preferences in order to gain
consensus.”).
229. See White, supra note 4, at 815 (“Marshall's contemporaries, most
notably Jefferson, repeatedly suggested that Marshall was a dominating, even
irresistible, influence among his fellow Justices.”).
230. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. at 93; see also PAUL, supra note 13, at 283-85.
231. MAGRUDER, supra note 19, at 204.
232. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 2 (explaining that Western separation
“from the union was a real possibility in the early nineteenth century, when
many doubted whether a republican form of government centered on the
Atlantic coast could effectively extend its jurisdiction” westward); id. (Eager
westerners’ “settlement into territories still belonging to Spain, caus[ed] endless
friction that threatened to embroil the United States in a war with that nation.”
Thus, “[t]he West remained a highly unstable region.”).
233. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. at 93.
234. PAUL, supra note 13, at 285.
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foothold on this continent, and to get possession of the rich and
attractive provinces of Mexico.”235 Historians Dr. Paul Finkelman
and Melvin I. Urofsky characterized Swartwout (a twenty-two year
old) and Bollmann as “minor cogs in the alleged conspiracy” to
provoke war.236 Swartwout and Bollmann served as couriers to
Burr, in what historian Richard Brookhiser regarded as “the
greatest conspiracy in American history since Benedict Arnold’s.”237
When crafting the treason clause, fresh in the Framers’ minds was
General Benedict Arnold’s defection after conspiring with the
British to give them the fortress at West Point.238 Moreover,
treasonous acts are unlike atrocities from foreign actors, due to
what has been called the “element of personal betrayal” by one
citizen upon his own country.239 Jefferson tactically structured his
rallying against Burr to excite such feelings.
Wilkinson, a coconspirator, notified Jefferson of Burr’s pattern
of using ciphered letters.240 However, Wilkinson destroyed the
originals, thus limiting his exposure and maintaining his ability to
manipulate the narrative to minimize his role therein.241
Nevertheless, Wilkinson had sent a letter via messenger to Burr, in
which he reportedly acknowledged his own cooperation.242 However,
Wilkinson is believed to have tracked down the messenger with the
inculpatory letter, overtaken him, and destroyed the intercepted
letter.243 The letters that were introduced at Bollmann’s trial
revealed that Wilkinson’s role in the scheme was one “second to
Burr only.”244 Wilkinson, angered by the letter, reportedly became
bitter about his subsidiary role.245 Historian Charles Hobson
characterized Wilkinson’s turn to Jefferson as an act of “cold feet.”246
In Wilkinson’s affidavit produced during Bollman, he claimed that
Swartwout “slipt into my hand a letter of formal introduction from

235. MAGRUDER, supra note 19, at 202.
236. UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 203, at 224; see HASKINS &
JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 250-52 (noting that Burr had a grander vision in
which he attempted to finance his plans by pitting the French and English
against one another but was unsuccessful in pursuit of such underwriting).
237. BROOKHISER, supra note 165, at 109-12.
238. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 72, at 250.
239. Fletcher, supra note 28, at 195.
240. PAUL, supra note 13, at 285.
241. Id.
242. MAGRUDER, supra note 19, at 205.
243. Id.
244. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. at 93.
245. See MAGRUDER, supra note 19, at 205 (“Wilkinson was greatly agitated
by this letter, and seemed at first to hesitate as to his line of conduct.”); see also
HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 251 (noting that Wilkinson wanted to
lead the expedition).
246. HOBSON, supra note 8, at 3.
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colonel Burr.”247 Moreover, Wilkinson insisted that the version he
provided was “a correct copy,” in spite of the odd shifts between
identifying Burr via first-person and third-person.248 At trial, it
actually became evident Wilkinson had altered some of Burr’s
writings that he forwarded to Jefferson, showing that Wilkinson
magnified Burr’s role and concealed his own role in the scheme.249
Wilkinson admitted to striking the first sentence regarding his
conduct.250 Moreover, the writings reflected more of Wilkinson’s
ostentatious writing, rather than Burr’s reputation for a terse
approach, erring on oral transmissions only.251 This was not
surprising to Jefferson, however, who knew Wilkinson to be a
traitor, spying for Spain.252 Knowing that all, Jefferson had
nevertheless promoted Wilkinson as commander of the army,
Governor to the Louisiana Territory, and Indian Affairs
Commissioner.253 Marshall believed, however, that government
could be used to assert tyranny and oppression.254 Treason was no
exception. Jefferson defended Wilkinson while accusing Burr in
January 1807 of treason before Congress, an accusation that carried
a penalty of hanging.255
As Burr sought to execute his scheme, his excited militiamen
set forth from Blennerhassett Island in the Ohio River toward New
Orleans.256 Burr’s ensemble had largely abandoned course, but the
assembly prior thereto served a significant part in the accusation of
247. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. at 93.
248. Id.
249. UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 203, at 225; see HASKINS &
JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 252 (noting that the letter was the prosecution’s
chief piece of evidence and Wilkinson’s edits were detrimental to the case).
250. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 40 (“To historians, the cipher letter
presents a documentary puzzle that will likely never be fully resolved. Although
the letter was long thought to have been written by Burr, no copy exists in his
hand. . . . The best informed scholarly opinion now holds that [former Speaker
of the House Jonathan] Dayton wrote the cipher letter that Wilkinson received,
substituting it for one that Burr had written.”).
251. See BROOKHISER, supra note 164, at 110,115 (writing that Burr,
reputably an excellent trial lawyer, instructed his law clerks of his personal
practice to not put anything in writing, cautioning that “[t]hings written . . .
remain”).
252. PAUL, supra note 13, at 285.
253. Id.
254. WHITE, supra note 6, at 18.
255. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 1 (“Jefferson responded by issuing a
proclamation of conspiracy.”); see also PAUL, supra note 13, at 286.
256. See RUPERT SARGENT HOLLAND, HISTORIC ADVENTURES: TALES FROM
AMERICAN HISTORY 62-63, 67 (1913) (noting Andrew Jackson greeted Burr with
a hero’s welcome along Burr’s journey); see also, HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra
note 12, at 251 (noting that Burr corralled support from young men by
promising land tracts in exchange for their participation).
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treason.257 Unbeknownst to Burr, Jefferson and Wilkinson ordered
that Burr be caught and brought to justice.258 Wilkinson had
notified Jefferson of Burr’s intent to invade with seven thousand
men; however, Burr was arrested with a mere sixty, after having
previously surrendered on January 17, 1807.259 Burr, while acting
intentionally, albeit likely did not intend to act treasonously against
the United States.260 Wilkinson wrote again to Jefferson in
confidence to distance himself from accusations of spying for Spain
and conspiring with Burr, a letter that would become the substance
of Burr’s subpoena at trial.261
At the Jefferson Administration’s behest, General Wilkinson
arrested Samuel Swartwout and Dr. Justus Erick Bollmann for
treason, conveniently timed to conceal Wilkinson’s role in Burr’s
scheme.262 Jefferson ordered that Bollmann and Swartwout be
prevented from access to an attorney.263 Consistently with
Jefferson’s desire, to prevent this, two Republican judges on the
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia ruled as such.264 Jefferson
and his political apprentice, Secretary of State James Madison,
together interrogated Bollmann in a marine barracks at which he
was held.265 Ironically, the Treason Clause resulted in part from
James Madison’s careful structure of language to prevent tyranny
by perverse application of treason prosecution.266 Madison initially
expressed concern that the definition was too narrow.267 Here,
however, Jefferson wanted Bollmann to implicate Burr as levying
war, and flipping Bollmann was essential.268 Bollmann provided

257. PAUL, supra note 13, at 286.
258. JAMES PARTON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF AARON BURR 438 (1858).
259. BROOKHISER, supra note 164, at 115; see HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra
note 12, at 263-64 (noting that Burr had previously surrendered and allowed
authorities to search his boats). After his arrest, Burr voluntarily went to court.
Id. Wilkinson executed Burr’s arrest, using men who worked in disguises. Id.
260. Halliday & White, supra note 11, at 683 (“Burr probably had no
treasonous intent.”).
261. HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 253-54.
262. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 1 (“Wilkinson himself took action in New
Orleans, declaring martial law and rounding up suspects and potential
witnesses. . . . Erick Bollman and Samuel Swartwout, [among others] who had
carried messages, including the cipher letter, from Burr . . . [sending] them
under military guard to Washington, where they were held in custody.”); see
also PAUL, supra note 12, at 283-85.
263. Halliday & White, supra note 11, at 684 (“Burr probably had no
treasonous intent.”).
264. UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 203, at 223.
265. PAUL, supra note 13, at 287.
266. Historical Concept of Treason: English, American, 35 IND. L. J. 70, 78
(1959).
267. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 22 (1945).
268. PAUL, supra note 13, at 287.
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that Burr’s intent was merely to liberate Mexico.269 However, on the
secret promise that no one would see it if Bollmann testified,
Jefferson procured a written account from Bollmann detailing his
version of the events.270 Jefferson, however, broke the promise by
nevertheless seeing to its introduction later at Burr’s treason
trial.271 Probable cause had been found to support the charge that
Swartwout and Bollmann had committed treason, based in part on
the testimony of Wilkinson himself.272
In one of several of relations to Marbury v. Madison, Charles
Lee, a friend of John Marshall and former attorney to William
Marbury, intervened to appeal to the United States Supreme Court
on behalf of the two defendants.273 Lee represented the two along
with attorneys Robert Goodloe Harper and Francis Scott Key.274 In
Re Bollman took way as Burr coursed down the Mississippi River
with sixty men assembled among nine riverboats, unaware of the
charges brought upon his couriers, their trial, and Bollman’s
Supreme Court decision.275 The impending case of Bollman was
significant with major political implications.276
2. Ex Parte Bollman: Marshall’s first step
In anticipation of Ex Parte Bollman, Marshall wanted to
minimize the politicization facing the Court.277 Taking on Bollman,
Marshall noted that “[t]he whole subject will be taken up de
novo.”278 President Jefferson had widely publicized his opinion on
January 22, 1807, that the chief conspirator Burr was guilty of
treason.279 Jefferson named Burr as the “prime mover” and stated
269. Id.
270. WILLIAM R. NESTER, THE JEFFERSONIAN VISION, 1801-1815 THE ART
OF AMERICAN POWER DURING THE EARLY REPUBLIC 19 (2013).
271. Id.
272. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. at 76 n.2.
273. PAUL, supra note 13, at 287.
274. Id.; see also Christian Ketter, The NFL Player, the Schoolchild, and the
Entertainer: When the Term “Free Speech” Is Too Freely Spoken, Exactly “Who’s
on First?”, 68 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 421, 478 (2020) (noting that Key is best known
for composing the Star-Spangled Banner).
275. BROOKHISER, supra note 164, at 113.
276. Halliday & White, supra note 11, at 686 (“To say that the case of
Bollman’s and Swartwout’s incarceration and prospective trial for treason was
a controversial matter of early nineteenth-century national politics would be to
understate matters significantly.”).
277. UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 203, at 223.
278. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. at 75 n.1.
279. PAUL, supra note 13, at 291; see HOBSON, supra note 8, at 21. A tunnelvisioned Jefferson “believed Burr was guilty of treason.” Id. Jefferson’s
determination to try Burr for treason instead of the “lesser offense of provoking
a war with Spain,” however, “has led critics to attribute personal and partisan

2020]

A Pragmatic Political Balancing

833

his “guilt is placed beyond question.”280 Jefferson sent prosecutorial
directives and pre-signed presidential pardons to be offered for
incentivizing testimony against Burr.281 Marshall stated that “there
is no crime which can more excite and agitate the passions of men
than treason.”282 However, Marshall’s effort to downplay
politicization would prove futile because he had publicly criticized
the Jefferson administration for its attack on Burr.283 Marshall
complicated his predicament after the preliminary hearing,
however, by inadvertently attending an event honoring Burr, which
was hosted by Burr’s counsel, John Wickham, an old friend of
Marshall.284 Marshall apologized to the lead prosecutor George Hay
after the Chief Justice publicly stated that the government simply
“expected” a guilty verdict for Burr.285 Well-settled procedural
requirements prohibit a tribunal’s prejudgments of cases.286 Albeit
somewhat accordingly, Jefferson accused Marshall of coddling
treasonists.287 Nevertheless, Marshall tried to focus narrowly on
two issues: first, whether the Court could issue a writ of habeas
corpus, and second – relevant to this essay – what was meant in the
Constitution’s definition of “treason.”288
On behalf of the Court, the Chief Justice wrote, “[t]o constitute
a levying of war,” under the definition of treason, “there must be an
assemblage of persons for the purpose of effecting by force a
treasonable purpose.”289 He noted that “conspir[ing] to levy war, and
actually [levying] war, are distinct offences.”290 Thus, the question
of what constituted “levying war” was a delicate and specific
analysis that the Court needed to undertake.
In Bollman, Marshall established that overt acts of treason in
which war is levied may consist of “warlike array,” but such array
animus to the prosecution of Burr.” Id. Jefferson’s numerous, lengthy letters to
U.S. Attorney Hays reflects his “nearly obsessive interest in the case. Id.; see
also HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 254 (noting that Jefferson had
issued a November 27, 1806, proclamation among news sources in which he
strongly indicated Burr without naming him).
280. HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 254; see also BRODIE, supra note
138, at 406 (quoting John Adams’ immediate acknowledgment of Jefferson's
error to Benjamin Rush with, “if [Burr’s] guilt is as clear as the Noon day Sun,
[Jefferson] . . . ought not to have pronounced it so before a Jury had tryed him”).
281. PAUL, supra note 12, at 291.
282. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. at 125.
283. UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 203, at 223; HOBSON, supra note 8,
at 30.
284. UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 203, at 223; HOBSON, supra note 8,
at 30.
285. BROOKHISER, supra note 164, at 117.
286. Id.
287. UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 203, at 223.
288. Id.
289. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. at 126.
290. Id.
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is not an essential circumstance.291 An act of war levied in treason
is committed with a treasonable intent and is executed with
armament or equipment.292 The Court stated that the requirement
remained, “war must be actually levied.”293 Marshall explained that
a levying of war included any acts purposed to “revolutionize[] by
force.”294 Moreover, treason included also “[a]ny thing which
amounts to setting on foot a military expedition, with intent to levy
war against the United States.”295 Marshall noted, however, that
treason is not a crime in which an individual among a group of
actors is limited in guilt as to the level in which he participates;
rather, “[i]n treason, all are principals.”296 Here, however, “[t]he
mere enlisting of men,” is not treason “without assembling them” in
the constitutional sense of levying war. According to the Court,
neither Swartwout nor Bollmann could have the crime
“consummate[d] . . . to him,” as there was not enough “evidence
prov[ing] Col. Burr . . . advanced so far in levying an army as
actually to have assembled them . . . . Therefore, there is no evidence
to support a charge of [t]reason.”297 Balancing the decision,
Marshall left it possible for the government to prosecute Bollmann
and Swartwout before a military tribunal.298 He seemingly hoped
that this opinion would settle the whole matter from Bollmann and
Swartwout to Burr, but the Court would have to review the incident
in Burr because of Marshall’s surplusage that follows italicized
below.
Marshall attempted to limit the purview of Bollman, stating
that “[i]t is not the intention of the court to say that no individual
can be guilty of this crime who has not appeared in arms against his
country.”299 By contrast, when war is “actually levied,” by “a body of
men be actually assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a
treasonable purpose, all those who perform any part, however
minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are
actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as
traitors,” so long as there is “an actual assembling of men for the
treasonable purpose, to constitute a levying of war.”300 And so,
Marshall inadvertently conceived a decidedly unamerican concept
of constructive treason, “however remote from the scene of
291. Id. at 118-19
292. Id. at 118.
293. Id. at 126.
294. Id. at 133.
295. Id. at 119.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 133-35.
298. Halliday & White, supra note 11, at 688.
299. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. at 126.
300. Id. (emphasis added).
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action.”301 Moreover, he erred conspicuously, after noting that “the
framers of our constitution . . . defined and limited” treason “with
jealous circumspection” in order “to protect [continually] their
limitation [of treason] by providing that no person should be
convicted of it, unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same
overt act, or on confession in open court.”302 The Framers, he wrote,
intended for the constitutional principle “that the crime of treason
should not be extended by construction to doubtful cases” and
“crimes not clearly within the constitutional definition.”303 Still, in
spite of Marshall’s disclaimer, Bollman created an impression that
such minute remoteness could constructively place Burr at the
scene. Marshall had successfully dismissed Bollman on grounds
that no indictable offense had been committed in the jurisdiction of
Washington D.C.304 Unwisely, however, Marshall felt that he had
bested Jefferson and used the opinion as an opportunity to chide the
Administration, instructing it to try again and “institute fresh
proceedings against” the conspirators.305 Jefferson did just that, but
this time, against Burr.306 Marshall’s venomous surplusages had
thus endangered himself and the Court.
3. Burr’s Treason Trial
Jefferson saw that Burr was prosecuted and threatened that if
Burr went free, the whole of the Supreme Court should face
impeachment.307 In light of Bollman, Republicans pursued an
301. Id. at 127.
302. Id. at 127.
303. Id.
304. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT & CULTURAL CHANGE: 18151835, at 233 (1991).
305. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. at 127 (“[T]hose who have been charged with
treason to be proper objects for punishment, they will, when possessed of less
exceptionable testimony, and when able to say at what place the offence has
been [committed], institute fresh proceedings against them.”); see also G.
EDWARD WHITE, supra note 310, at 233.
306. See ISAAC JENKINSON, AARON BURR: HIS PERSONAL AND POLITICAL
RELATIONS WITH THOMAS JEFFERSON AND ALEXANDER HAMILTON 266 (1902)
(addressing the “charges upon which Burr was brought to trial” by the Jefferson
Administration, in spite of “hundreds of other charges, . . . rumors, and surmises
floating through the land”); id. (“[I]t was upon these wild and reckless rumors
that Burr was condemned by the public voice.”) However, “in spite of all this
prejudice, when the government came to prosecute Burr, the only charge they
then were able to make was the ridiculous one that he with sixty unarmed
followers was about to capture a city of nine thousand people, protected by an
armed fleet of vessels and one thousand trained soldiers. And this absurdity has
been believed for nearly a hundred years and may still be cherished a hundred
years hence.” Id.
307. UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 203, at 223 (noting that federal
circuit courts had original jurisdiction over treason cases at that time in
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amendment to excise criminal cases from the Court’s federal
jurisdiction.308 The Jefferson administration, conscious of the flaws
in attempting to prosecute Burr under treason, nevertheless
proceeded in attempt.309 By default, this placed great political
pressure on John Marshall as both Chief Justice and a presiding
circuit judge for Burr’s Virginia Trial.310 In a forum shopping of
sorts, Jefferson saw to Burr’s trial being held in Richmond, Virginia,
seeking the goal of a sympathetic jury.311 This forum was
procedurally justified because Burr’s conduct tacitly took place on
the Virginia side of the Ohio River, upon which Burr’s armada set
forth.312 To Jefferson’s dismay, and coincidentally to the Supreme
Court justices riding circuit, Chief Justice John Marshall presided
over Burr’s trial.313 Thus, Marshall, “Jefferson’s [Federalist]
archival in Virginia[,] [sat] in judgment on Jefferson’s archrival in
the Republican Party.”314 Visitors from across the country flooded
the Richmond courtroom and surroundings with public attention.315
Marshall presided over the trial alongside Judge Cyrus Griffin for
the District Court of Virginia.316 Burr’s defense team consisted of:
John Baker, Benjamin Botts, Luther Martin, Edmund Randolph,
and John Wickham, as well as Burr who intended to serve upon and
direct his defense.317 The Prosecution consisted of District Attorney
George Hay, William Wirt, and Alexander MacRae.318 Jefferson
expressly instructed prosecutor Hay to cite Marshall’s Marbury
history).
308. See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 256-57 (noting the desire to
impeach every Justice on the Supreme Court).
309. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 1 (“The government was fully aware of
the difficulty of securing a conviction for treason.”).
310. UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 203, at 223.
311. PAUL, supra note 13, at 287; see HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 12,
at 261-62 (noting that Senator John Randolph of Virginia was quick to criticize
Jefferson’s actions for the hypocritical irony of including selective transport for
remote trials among the tyrannical grievances that Jefferson included in the
Declaration of Independence).
312. BROOKHISER, supra note 164, at 113.
313. See generally Olken, supra note 230, at 154 (noting that Marshall was
“the circuit court justice presiding over the 1807 treason trial of Aaron Burr”);
id. at 152 n.71 (noting also the requirement that Supreme Court justices ride
on circuit).
314. PAUL, supra note 13, at 287.
315. See MAGRUDER, supra note 19, at 208-09 (“Richmond, then a town of
six thousand inhabitants, was crowded with visitors” and “[t]hrongs of citizens,
not only from Virginia, but from other States, . . . drawn thither by the celebrity
of the occasion . . . of the most noteworthy trial which had yet marked the history
of the republic.”).
316. MAGRUDER, supra note 19, at 209
317. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 55; see also HOBSON, supra note 8, at 24.
318. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 55.
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opinion and immediately “denounce it ‘as not law.’”319 Nevertheless,
by this time, and due in part to the impact of Marbury, Marshall’s
role on the Supreme Court and the constitutional significance of
that Court were well-secured. Thus, In Re Burr came before the
court with celebrities, a vast audience, and a great deal at stake for
the posterity of the Court going forth.
a. The Grand Jury is Sworn: May 22, 1807
On May 22, 1807, the grand jury was sworn in.320 Burr
requested “the court instruct the grand jury on certain leading
points, as to the admissibility of certain evidence” that he
anticipated the prosecution might present.321 Hay “objected to
[Burr’s] proposition as unprecedented.”322 Political pressure was
increasing upon the Court from all sides.323 So too did it mount on
the parties in play. For instance, Hay, who was mourning the loss
of his wife on the night before the prosecution commenced, was
directed by the President of the paramount priority that this
prosecution was to him.324 Consequently, Marshall’s strictly
adhered to procedure, with regard to whether Major Scot, the
marshal, could excuse certain grand jurors, stating, “it was not in
the power of the marshal to summon more than twenty-four, as the
act of assembly authorized only that number.”325 Marshall gave an
unpublished oration on the testimony needed to prove treason
effectively.326 Marshall, perhaps sensitive to previous allegations of
prejudice, addressed the issue of prejudgment and advised the jury,
“if any gentleman has made up and declared his mind it would be
best to withdraw.”327 Marshall advised the jury that it was proper
to “dwel[l] upon the nature of treason, and the testimony requisite
to prove it.”328 Marshall stated that the court was unprepared to say
319. UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 203, at 225.
320. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 145.
321. Id. at 59.
322. Id. at 7
323. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 5 (“Burr’s case by now had become deeply
embroiled in politics, with Republicans supporting President Jefferson’s
measures to bring the accused traitor to justice and Federalists rallying to
defend Burr against the charges.”).
324. Id. at 31.
325. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 56; see HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 266
(writing also that Marshall’s “legal exactitude” is greatly evidence and
“[t]hroughout the opinion Marshall paid scrupulous to appropriate procedures
often reiterating the grounds for his reasoning, and bolstering those grounds
with quotations from the [Bollman] opinion, lest local prejudices be more
inflamed than they were”).
326. HOBSON, supra note 8, at 5.
327. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 57.
328. Id. at 59.
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at that time, “whether the same evidence was necessary before the
grand jury as before the petit jury; whether two witnesses to an
overt act were required to satisfy a grand jury.”329 Rather, it “was a
point he would have to consider” later because Marshall was
undecided as to “the evidence of facts said to be done in different
districts.”330 Marshall’s “present impression was, that facts done
without the district may be brought in to prove the material fact
said to be done within the district, when that fact was charged.”331
Marshall knew the problematic nature of Bollman, and a proper
ruling on admissibility evidence to prove the facts as charged would
likely require careful deliberation.332 The issue was postponed “for
further discussion,” so long as Hay pledged “no evidence should be
laid before the grand jury without notice being first given to Mr.
Burr and his counsel.”333
On Saturday, May 23, Marshall informed the grand jury of
General Wilkinson’s absence as a witness and the uncertainty as to
when Wilkinson would ever arrive.334 Forced to proceed without
Wilkinson, Marshall excused the grand jury until the following
Monday.335 On Monday, May 25, 1807, Hay motioned that Burr
should be committed to government custody on treason, as Burr’s

329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Isaac J. Colunga, Ex Parte Bollman: Revisiting A Federalist’s
Commitment to Civil Liberty, 23 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 429, 439 (2006)
(“Marshall’s decision in Bollman infuriated Burr’s accusers. Bollman left
prosecutors with little to work with, and they knew their evidence was now
weak, if not frivolous. Even worse, Burr’s prosecutors were well aware that
Marshall’s decision in Bollman forecasted the eventual decision in the pending
Burr trial.”); see Colin William Masters, On Proper Role of Federal Habeas
Corpus in the War on Terrorism: An Argument from History, 34 J. LEGIS. 190,
199 (2008) (“Chief Justice Marshall [wrote] that ‘[i]t is unnecessary to state the
reasoning on which this opinion is founded, because it has been repeatedly given
by this court[.]’ As many scholars have noted, however, the assertion that the
Court had ever explained why the outcome in Bollman was necessary is simply
false.”); see also Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970
DUKE L.J. 605, 628 (1970) (“The other problems presented in Bollman were,
with a single exception, disposed of [by Marshall] in the same unargued,
assertive, and summary fashion. Evidence of the haste with which” Marshall
prepared the opinion “is everywhere. . . . Marshall curtly rejoined that there
was a distinction between courts originating in the common law and courts
created by statute, and that ‘as the reasoning has been repeatedly given by this
court,’ the matter would not be pursued further. Where this reasoning had been
given Marshall was not able to say, not because he had no time to collect the
citations, but because there were none to collect.”).
333. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 59.
334. Id.
335. Id.
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custody was premised on previous misdemeanor charges.336 On
Wednesday, May 27, 1807, Defense counsel Wickham demanded
that the prosecution “prove by strict legal evidence” that Burr had
even committed an overt act of treason and called for an alternative
order of the prosecution’s witnesses.337 Prosecutor Hay retorted that
it was not a defendant’s right to dictate prosecutorial strategy, nor
was it feasible to demand delineating the evidence to the defense’s
demands.338 After more debate on the issue, Marshall settled that
“it would certainly be better, if the evidence was produced to prove
the fact first, and” then “show their coloring afterwards; for no
evidence certainly has any bearing on the present case unless an
overt act be proved,” yet Marshall addressed the defense’s demand
for witness sequencing, stating, “if the attorney for the United
States thinks the chronological order the best, he may pursue his
own course; but the court trusts to him, that he will produce nothing
which does not bear upon the case.”339
Hay attempted to produce General Wilkinson’s affidavit, to
which defense counsel Botts objected, on the grounds that the
evidence lacked competence.340 Botts asserted that the Supreme
Court was divided on the issue of competency of an ex parte
affidavit.341 Marshall stated, however, that the Court “had already
decided, that the affidavit might be admitted under certain
circumstances” and determined that “Wilkinson’s affidavit did not
contain any proof of [Burr’s] overt act.”342 Marshall acknowledged
that, even though he dissented from the Court’s opinion on this
matter, he was still judicially bound by it.343 Nevertheless Marshall
asked, “[i]f there [is] no other evidence to prove the overt act,
General Wilkinson’s affidavit goes for nothing, for so the supreme
court have already decided . . . Why, then, introduce this
affidavit?”344 Ultimately, he stated, “unless there was a fact to be
proved . . . no testimony ought to be produced” because “[t]he
question before the court was not whether there had been a
treasonable intent, but an overt act.”345 Ultimately, Marshall
acknowledged the Court’s power and its desire to exercise such
power were very different.346
336. Id.
337. Id. at 60.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 60-61.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 61.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 25 (A “remedy . . . is not to be obtained by
suppressing motions which either party may have a legal right to make.”).
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From Friday, May 29 until June 3, Wilkinson did not arrive,
forcing the court to adjourn each day.347 As late as Tuesday June 9,
Wilkinson remained unavailable.348 Hay sought leave to inform the
grand jury that it was fatigue preventing Wilkinson from
appearing, but he promised Wilkinson could be expected for the
following Monday.349 Burr motioned for supplemental charge to the
grand jury, citing several authorities.350 Marshall had drawn up a
supplemental charge, having provided it to the prosecution.351 Hay
declared, on behalf of the prosecution, that he had not reviewed it
because it “he had been too much occupied to inspect the charge
with attention, and deliver it to” the defense; however, “another
reason was, that there was one point in the charge [of] which he did
not fully approve.”352 On this day, Dr. Erick Bollmann also appeared
before the court.353 Before Bollmann was sworn in, however, Hay
announced, “I must inform the court of a particular, and not an
immaterial circumstance. [Dr. Bollmann] . . . has made a full
communication to the government of the plans, the designs, and
views of Aaron Burr.”354 The court transcript provided that Hay
acknowledged Bollmann’s fear that “these communications might
criminate [him] before the grand jury, [but] the president . . . has
communicated to me this pardon (holding it in his hands) which I
have already offered to Dr. Bollman[n].”355 President Jefferson’s
“pardon will completely exonerate [Bollmann] from all the penalties
of the law. I believe [Bollmann’s] evidence to be extremely material.
In the presence of this court I offer this pardon to him, and if he
refuses, I shall deposit it with the clerk for his use.”356 It was at this
moment that Jefferson broke his promise that no one would see
Bollmann’s written account.357 Before the presence of the court, Hay
asked Bollmann if he accepted Jefferson’s pardon.358 Bollmann
formally refused.359 Hay stated, “My own opinion is that Dr.
Bollmann, under these circumstances, cannot possibly criminate
himself.”360 Defense counsel Luther Martin expressed his belief that

347. Id. at 63.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 64.
350. Id. at 63.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. PAUL, supra note 13, at 287.
358. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 63.
359. Id.
360. Id.
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the pardon could not ultimately act as a prophylactic measure to a
grand jury indictment unless Bollmann pled “in open court” to that
indictment.361 Marshall suggested that the issue of pardon validity
should be best settled prior to Bollmann’s appearance before the
grand jury.362 Martin declared “Bollman[n] is not pardoned, and no
man is bound to criminate himself,” an assertion for which Marshall
demanded authorities in support thereof.363 Marshall declared,
“[t]here can be no question but Dr. Bollman[n] can go up to the jury;
but the question is, whether he is pardoned or not? If the executive
should refuse to pardon him, he is certainly not pardoned.”364
Martin decried that if Bollmann refuses Jefferson’s “pardon . . . he
stands in the same situation with every other witness, who cannot
be forced to criminate himself.”365 Marshall again refused to rule on
the validity of the pardon, indicating that the court would deliberate
on the issue.366 Hay pressed Bollmann who again categorically
refused.367
b. The District Court vs. The Executive
Defense counsel strategically pursued papers in the
government’s possession.368 On June 9, Burr filed a motion “for a
subpoena duces tecum directed to the president of the United
States,” seeking specific documents from the Jefferson
Administration that they declared essential to Burr’s defense.369
The team argued that a subpoena and court order would not be
necessary if Hay would simply tender the documents.370 Hay, who
did not anticipate the defense’s tactic, offered to tender accordingly,
“if the court thinks them material.”371 Marshall declared that the
court actually could not ascertain relevancy without seeing the
documents, nevertheless, suggesting that the prosecution and
defense resolve this matter amongst themselves.372 In heated oral
arguments lasting over two days, the defense team heavily
criticized the Jefferson Administration for prejudging Burr and
then depriving him of the very evidence that could exonerate him.373
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 64.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 63.
369. Id.
370. SMITH, supra note 222, at 362.
371. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 63; see also SMITH, supra note 222, at 362.
372. SMITH, supra note 222, at 362.
373. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 63-64
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Bitter exchanges at the bench between the two sides made it clear
that the opposing parties would not agree.374 The defense contended
that if the papers are admitted, it allows Wilkinson to exonerate
himself of the conduct while securing Burr’s conviction for the same
conduct.375 Accordingly, Marshall stated that the court would issue
a subpoena, provided that Hay acknowledge on behalf of the
government that the court had such authority to do so.376 At that
point, Hay, knew well of Jefferson’s strong feelings against
Marbury, and Jefferson’s desires to “have it denied to be law”
because of the controversial place it “occupie[d] . . . in the public
attention.”377 Thus, Hay could not concede powers of the Court.
Accordingly, Hay refused to concede authority, and Marshall
ordered an oral argument held to resolve this issue.378 Assistant
Prosecutor Alexander MacRae, however, conceded the court’s
authority against the president but advocated even so that
executive confidentiality was paramount.379 Luther Martin, counsel
to Burr, fueled the political charges, levying accusations at the
Executive Branch, arguing that President Jefferson “has
undertaken to prejudge my client by [Jefferson’s] declaring that . . .
‘there can be no doubt’” about Burr’s guilt.380 Jefferson did not want
to make a personal appearance to defend these actions before a jury
and the press.381 Martin’s attack on Jefferson timely coincided with
a critical stage of the trial.382 Martin asked why Jefferson, who “has
let slip the dogs of war [and] the hell hounds of persecution, to hunt
down my friend” had “raised all this absurd clamor,” but
nevertheless “pretend[ed] to keep back the papers which are wanted
for this trial, where life itself is at stake?”383 Jefferson, paranoid by
Martin’s words, wrote again to Hay, “Burr was engaged in some
criminal enterprise . . . [and] Luther Martin knew all about it . . .
374. SMITH, supra note 222, at 362.
375. NEWMYER, supra note 165, at 103.
376. SMITH, at 362.
377. Jefferson, supra note 3.
378. SMITH, supra note 222, at 362.
379. Id.at 363.
380. See WALTER FLAVIUS MCCALEB, THE AARON BURR CONSPIRACY: A
HISTORY LARGELY FROM ORIGINAL AND HITHERTO UNUSED SOURCES 234 (1903)
(quoting Luther Martin, who said, “All that we want is the copies of some papers
. . . and the original of another . . . . The President has undertaken to prejudge
my client by declaring that ‘of his guilt there can be no doubt.’ . . . [Jefferson]
has let slip the dogs of war, the hell hounds of persecution, to hunt down my
friend.”).
381. NEWMYER, supra note 165, at 104.
382. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 5 (“[Luther] Martin’s outburst came in
the midst of the most important argument at this stage of the proceedings,
prompted by Burr’s motion for a subpoena duces tecum to President Jefferson.”).
383. McCaleb, supra note 386, at 324.
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Shall we move to commit [him], as particeps criminis with Burr?”384
Jefferson elaborated that an appropriate prosecution would “put
down this unprincipled [and] impudent federal bull-dog, and add
another proof that the most clamorous defenders of Burr are all his
accomplices.”385 Jefferson assured Hay that Martin’s criminal
participation helped to “explain why [Martin] flew so hastily to the
aid of his ‘honorable friend,’ abandoning his clients [and] their
property during” active cases in Maryland courts, to the “ruin of his
clients.”386 Hay beseeched Jefferson privately in writing to tender
the documents.387 Evidently, Hay sensed the public attention
focused upon the Court’s power, for which Jefferson held disdain
and the risk that it could be leveraged against the executive.388
On Saturday June 13, after the lengthy days of argument, on
behalf of the court, Marshall ruled reluctantly upon Burr’s motion
under Case No. 14,692d.389 He knew the antagonizing effect this
would have and chose to pick his battles with the Jefferson
administration.390 Marshall’s reluctance stemmed from the fear
that this would reopen the power battles with Jefferson that had
manifested in Marbury and continued through Bollman.391
Marshall ruled that one in Burr’s position “should be entitled to the
process of the court to procure the attendance of his witnesses.”392
Thus, similar to Marbury, Marshall established that the President
is not above the law, but this time, at the district court level.393 He
wrote that when “summoned to . . . testify, the law does not
discriminate between the president and a private citizen.”394
Marshall declared that there was no foundation for an opinion that
the political character or medium of testimony somehow changed
384. Jefferson, supra note 3 ; LEWIS HOCHHEIMER, THE LAW OF CRIMES AND
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 16 (1897)(A particeps criminis is one who takes part in a
criminal act; or, put otherwise, an accomplice); see also HOBSON, supra note 8,
at 5 (“Jefferson had unwittingly and unwisely made himself vulnerable to such
censure by publicly declaring that Burr’s guilt was ‘beyond question.’”).
385. Jefferson, supra note 3.
386. Id.
387. SMITH, supra note 222, at 362.
388. Id.
389. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 63; see also HOBSON, supra note 8, at 42 (“Marshall
had hoped in vain that the parties would come to an agreement to produce the
requested documents without the necessity of issuing a subpoena.”).
390. See James W. Ely Jr., Review, 2 INDEP. REV. 450-55 (1998) (“Marshall
was careful to steer clear of needless confrontations with the incoming Jefferson
administration[.]”).
391. See NEWMYER, supra note 165, at 96 (“Jefferson no doubt read
[Marshall's] words as a challenge (and a reprise of Bollman and Marbury), but
Marshall avoided a direct confrontation by recognizing Hay's right to make his
motion.”).
392. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 32.
393. Id. at 34.
394. Id.
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the power of the court.395 He exclaimed, that “[t]he propriety of
introducing any paper into a case, as testimony, must depend on the
character of the paper, not on the character of the person who holds
it.”396 Marshall reasoned with careful attention to the Sixth
Amendment underlying the court’s power, writing that “[t]he genius
and character of our laws and usages are friendly, not to
condemnation at all events, but to a fair and impartial trial; and
they consequently allow to the accused the right of preparing the
means to secure such a trial.”397
Marshall addressed the issue of the competing executive and
judicial branches, establishing that the posterity of the court in
adjudicating the case fairly outweighed the concerns of presidential
respect. He wrote, “[m]uch has been said about the disrespect to the
chief magistrate . . . and by such a decision of it as the law is believed
to require.”398 Marshall stated that what the district court offered
was “a respect for the chief magistrate of the Union as is compatible
with its official duties.”399 He cautioned deftly, however, “[t]o go
beyond” that level of respect “would exhibit a conduct which would
deserve some other appellation than the term respect. It is not for
the court to anticipate the event of the present prosecution.”400
Marshall, intending to preserve the sanctity of both court and
Constitution, wrote that a guilty verdict could not fairly result if
Burr was deprived of the purportedly vital documents from
Jefferson. Marshall stated, “I will not say, that this circumstance
would, in any degree, tarnish the reputation of the government; but
I will say, that it would justly tarnish the reputation of the court
which had given its sanction to its being withheld.”401 Marshall’s
granting of Burr’s subpoena indicates a willingness to challenge and
embarrass Jefferson.402 For Jefferson to get his way, he would have
to concede to Marshall and the Court.
Marshall acknowledged the position in which the Court found
itself by consequence of Burr’s request and Jefferson’s refusal. He
wrote, if he was “permitted to utter one sentiment, with respect to
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 32, 33.
398. Id. at 37.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. See R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE
SUPREME COURT 195 (2001) (“Homing in on the Wilkinson letter was brilliant
strategy . . . [the subpoena] put Marshall on the hot seat [and] [t]he fact he
actually issued the subpoena seems to confirm that he was out to embarrass
Jefferson. The president and his supporters saw it that way, and some
historians have as well.”).
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myself, it would be to deplore, most earnestly, the occasion which
should compel me to look back on any part of my official conduct . .
. could I declare, on the information now possessed, that the accused
is not entitled to the letter in question, if it should be really
important to him.”403 Marshall presented the Court as an apolitical
branch of government.
With this district court opinion, Marshall had begun a
categorical redirect of Jefferson’s political energy. Jefferson’s
attempt to eradicate Burr from America became a discourse on
executive power and the judiciary’s oversight thereof.404 Marshall
seized the opportunity to deflect Jefferson’s executive ferocity into
the ability for the court to once again say what the law is.405
Temporarily, that district court decision stalled the negative press
against John Marshall.406 Jefferson felt that Marshall’s order was
nothing more than an unnecessary political power tactic, due to
both his willingness to supply the papers and due to the fact that he
had in fact provided the papers without a subpoena.407
On August 7, Jefferson drafted a letter that presently the
Library of Congress and Jeffersonian-editor Paul Leicester Ford are
uncertain if Hay ever received.408 In that letter, Jefferson expressed
his feelings to Hay regarding Burr’s trial, charging “[t]hat Burr
[and] his counsel should wish to . . . divert the public attention from
him to this battle of giants . . . [and] convert his Trial into a contest
between the judiciary & [Executive] Authorities was to be
expected.”409 Jefferson admitted to Hay that he did not predict “the
403. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 37.
404. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 22-23 (“Privately irritated with the Chief
Justice for playing along with Burr’s obvious attempt to embarrass the
administration and provoke a contest between the executive branch and
judiciary, Jefferson substantially complied . . . on his own terms . . . defending
the executive’s prerogative to refuse personal attendance and to decide which
papers could be made public.”).
405. See generally Marbury, 5 U.S. at 137 (“It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the
rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If
two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of
each.”).
406. SMITH, supra note 222, at 365.
407 See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 1 (“Whether or not the papers sought by
Burr were material to his defense, the . . . subpoena did provide an opportunity
for his lawyers to score points against the administration.”).
408. Jefferson, supra note 3. The Library of Congress and editor Paul
Leicester Ford are uncertain if this letter was actually sent by Jefferson, or if
he merely sent, “[t]he most interesting of this series, however, is a mere draft of
a letter to Hay, which may never have been sent, but which is of the utmost
importance.” Id. at 13.
409. Id. (“That Burr & his counsel should wish to [struck out “divert the
public attention from him to this battle of giants was to be”] convert his Trial
into a contest between the judiciary & Exve Authorities was to be expected.”).
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[Chief] Justice should lend himself to it and take the first step to
bring it on . . . Nor can it be now believed that his prudence or good
sense will permit him to press it.”410 Indeed, for Jefferson, the
embers of Marbury had again become aglow, and he wanted
advance warning from Hay if Marshall compelled his presence.411
Jefferson wrote, “I must desire you to give me instant notice, [and]
by express if you find that can be quicker done than by post.”412
On Monday, June 15, as expected, Wilkinson finally appeared
before the grand jury.413 Wilkinson came in a full, elaborate military
uniform that he purportedly designed himself.414 Later, defense
counsel, John Wickham, reminded the court of Hay’s pledge not to
produce evidence without prior tendering to Burr.415 In response to
much debate that ensued on this issue, Marshall finally settled the
issue, declaring, the court “was not satisfied that a court ought to
inspect the papers which form a part of a witness’s testimony before
he is sent to the grand jury.”416 Marshall wrote instructions for the
jury “not to inspect any papers, but such as formed a part of the
narrative of the witness, and proved to be the papers of the person
against whom an indictment was exhibited.”417
On Tuesday, June 16, Hay read to the court a letter from
Jefferson dated June 12.418 Jefferson wrote to Hay, stating that it
was the “necessary right of the President . . . to decide,
independently of all other authority, what papers, coming to him as
President, the public interests permit to be communicated,” a public
“to whom, I assure you of my readiness under that restriction,
voluntarily to furnish on all occasions, whatever the purposes of
justice may require.”419 Jefferson explained, “the [Wilkinson] letter
. . . of Oct 21, requested for the defence of Colonel Burr, with every
other paper relating to the charges against him, which were in my
possession . . . [were] delivered to him.”420 Nevertheless Jefferson
There were signs of an attempt to strike that language, but it was nevertheless
significantly legible.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 64; see HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 270
(noting that the government had largely refused to proceed without Wilkinson,
its star witness).
414. See NEWMYER, supra note 165, at 100 (“The general made his grand
entrance . . . dressed to the nines in an ornate uniform, reputedly of his own
design.”).
415. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 59, 64.
416. Id. at 64.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 65.
419. Jefferson, supra note 3; see also Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 65.
420. Jefferson, supra note 3.
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wrote, “I have always taken for granted he left the whole with
you.”421 Jefferson gainsaid, “[b]ut, as I do not recollect the whole
contents of that letter, I must beg leave to devolve on you the
exercise of that discretion which it would be my right [and] duty to
exercise.”422 Jefferson had asked Hay to “withhold[] the
communication of any parts of the letter, which are not directly
material for the purposes of justice.”423 Jefferson passed along
communication through Hay that he was not even sure which
papers Burr actually wanted.424 Nevertheless, Jefferson cautioned
that a request such as Burr’s, if honored, “would amount to the
laying open the whole executive books.”425
Following this, Hay again pressed the court for Bollmann’s
testimony, insisting that Bollmann’s pardon was effectual and
therefore Bollmann should “communicate all he knew to the grand
jury.”426 Marshall attempted to mitigate the ensuing debate, asking
if there was any objection to Bollmann merely deciphering the
German letter.427 While defense counsel Martin suggested that the
letter could be discussed at a later date, MacRae and the
prosecution asserted that the ciphered letter “could not be criminal
if” it was not understood.428 The prosecution wanted “the part which
is written in German now to be explained, to show . . . there is
nothing criminal in it.”429 Marshall carefully reframed the issue,
stating that he “would prefer to proceed with the other point;” that
is, “how far a witness may refuse to answer a question which [that
witness] thinks would criminate himself.”430
On Wednesday, June 17, Hay addressed allegations from the
defense that the ciphered letter had been stolen from the post office,
“evidently done to affect the character of Gen. Wilkinson.”431
Marshall inquired how this incident affected testimony and how the
defense intended to introduce the testimony.432 Burr asserted that
a post-office’s plundering resulted in the prosecution possessing
fraudfully obtained of letters, and a felonious scheme that involved:
General Wilkinson; Congressman John G. Jackson; and Mississippi
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 65.
425. Jefferson, supra note 3.
426. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 66.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id.; see generally HOBSON, supra note 8, at 28 (“Burr’s lawyers put
Wilkinson on the defensive, forcing him to make damaging admissions that
revealed his attempt to conceal his relationship with Burr. By then the
exasperated U.S. attorney had lost all confidence in Wilkinson.”).
432. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 66.

848

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:705

Territory Judge Harry Toulmin, a Jefferson-appointee.433 Marshall
terminated debate on the issue, stating that it may be true, but
under the procedural limits of judicial notice, “this court cannot take
cognizance of any act which has not been committed within this
district. That mark is not necessarily a post mark. The court can
only know the fact, in a case to which it applies, except to commit
and send for trial.”434 Hay claimed that this stunt was nothing more
than “calculated to interrupt the course of the prosecution, and . . .
[target] General Wilkinson alone.”435 Defense counsel Wickham
retorted that “Wilkinson had brought witnesses with him from New
Orleans by military force” and “[took] their depositions entirely ex
parte at the point of the bayonet, for the purpose of keeping their
testimony straight.”436 Thus, these witnesses are “bound hand and
foot, thus tongue-tied, because their depositions had been
[previously] taken” and effectively fixed in medium.437 Burr’s
counsel, however, declared that this proceeding against the
acquisition of such testimony was essential for the court to rule
upon “to prevent the repetition of such practices during the progress
of the trial.”438 Marshall said that the prosecution has “no objection
to hearing the motion.”439 However, he furthered, it was a different
question entirely “whether there were any ground for it or not, and
that the court would not say that a motion relating to the justice of
the case ought not to be heard.”440
Jefferson claimed through the mouthpiece of Hay that his
administration “substantially fulfilled the object of a subpœna from
the District Court of Richmond.”441 In Jefferson’s less formal letter
to Hay, which the Library of Congress remains unsure of Hay’s
receipt, Jefferson expressed on August 7 that he understood the
forces Marshall balanced.442 Jefferson wrote that his executive
compliance was “in a spirit of conciliation [and] with the desire to
avoid conflicts of authority between the high branches of the
[government] which would discredit it equally at home [and]
abroad.”443 Jefferson was surprised at Marshall’s accommodation of
Burr’s arguments, but he sought Hay’s opinion as to whether
433. Id.; see also JAMES DANIEL LYNCH, THE BENCH AND BAR OF MISSISSIPPI
21 (1881) (noting the appointment was in 1805).
434. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 66.
435. Id. at 67.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 67, 68.
440. Id.
441. Jefferson, supra note 3.
442. Id.
443. Id.

2020]

A Pragmatic Political Balancing

849

“associate judge [Griffin] assume[d] to divide his court and procure
a truce at least in so critical a conjuncture.”444 Still, Jefferson feared
more pressure from the Judiciary, writing to Hay, “I learn by the
newspapers that I am to have another subpœna duces tecum for
Eaton’s declaration.”445 Jefferson wrote that ideally “[t]he powers
given to the [Executive] by the [Constitution] are sufficient to
protect the other branches from judiciary usurpation of
preeminence, [and] every individual also from judiciary vengeance,
and the marshal may be assured of [its] effective exercise to cover
him.”446 Nevertheless, wrote Jefferson, “I hope [that Marshall] . . .
will suffer this question to lie over for the present, and at the
ensuing session of the legislature he may have means provided for
giving to individuals the benefit of the testimony of the [Executive]
functionaries in proper cases, without breaking up the
government.”447
On Thursday, June 18, 1807, the issue of the ciphered letter
resurfaced. Mr. Willie, Burr’s former secretary, initially refused to
answer Hay’s questions.448 Marshall declared that it was not
enough simply to refuse, Willie must answer upon oath if he thought
answering the question might incriminate him; if he does so he
cannot then be compelled.449 Willie’s counsel noted that as alleged,
the ciphered letter “was first written by Colonel Burr, and
afterwards copied.” Nevertheless, the current ciphered letter was
merely a copy.450 Prosecutor Hay stated broadly that, if “Burr wrote
the ciphered part, he will be considered the author of the whole.”451
Marshall declared that the court “had in some measure anticipated
this question, and had reflected upon it; his opinion was, that [for]
a paper to go before the grand or petit jury must be relevant to the
case, even if its materiality were not proved.”452 Marshall evaluated
the issue, “[w]hy send this paper before the grand jury, if it cannot
be deciphered? If it can be deciphered before the grand jury, why
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38, 38 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
449. Id. at 40-41 ( “The gentlemen of the bar will understand the rule laid
down by the court to be this: It is the province of the court to judge whether any
direct answer to the question which may be proposed will furnish evidence
against the witness. If such answer may disclose a fact which forms a necessary
and essential link in the chain of testimony, which would be sufficient to convict
him of any crime, he is not bound to answer it so as to furnish matter for that
conviction. In such a case the witness must himself judge what his answer will
be; and if he say on oath that he cannot answer without accusing himself, he
cannot be compelled to answer.”).
450. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 68.
451. Id.
452. Id.
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not before the court? Let it, then, be deciphered, and its relevancy
may at once be established.”453
On Saturday June 20, Hay read a letter from Jefferson, dated
June 17, in which Jefferson wrote to him regarding two letters from
the Secretary of War that were tendered to Burr. “The receipt of
these papers has, I presume . . . substantially fulfilled the object of
a subpoena from the district court . . . requiring that those officers
and myself should attend . . . with the letter of General Wilkinson”
and all related material.454 Notably, through Hay’s mouthpiece,
Jefferson attempted to flex constitutional superiority over the court,
a superiority with which Marshall would be forced to contend if it
fully manifested. Jefferson, attempting an appeal to Marshall’s
notions of federal security, stated that “comply[ing] with such calls
would leave the nation without an executive branch.”455 Similarly,
Jefferson felt that compulsion gave the Judiciary inappropriate
supremacy over the Executive.456 Moreover, according to Jefferson,
the Executive is understood to be so constantly necessary that it is
the sole branch which the constitution requires to be always in
function. It could not, then, intend that it should be withdrawn from
its station by any co-ordinate authority.”457 Thus, Jefferson stated,
the court ought to be “sensible that paramount duties to the nation
at large,” duties that are chiefly the role of the Executive.458 Finally,
asserting executive privilege, Jefferson wrote, “[w]ith respect to
papers, there is certainly a public and private side to our offices . . .
All nations have found it necessary that, for the advantageous
conduct of their affairs, some of these proceedings, at least, should
remain known to their executive functionary only.”459 Hay then read
453. Id.
454. Id. at 69; see also Jefferson, supra note 3, at 7 (“No answer to Genl
Wilkinson's letter, other than a mere acknowledgment of it’s receipt, [sic] in a
letter written for a different purpose, was ever written by myself or any other.”).
455. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 18 (“The prosecution argued for a broad
definition of ‘levying war.’ Hay urged common sense and considerations of
national security in contending that an overt act of treason did not require the
actual commission of hostilities or even that a body of men should appear in
military ‘array’ (referring to attire and orderly arrangement)[.]”); see also Burr
25 F. Cas. at 69; Jefferson, supra note 3.
456. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 43 (“Jefferson was perfectly willing to
cooperate in seeing that the defendant obtain the information and testimony
necessary for his defense. He would even testify, though by deposition rather
than personal appearance . . . [but] his participation would be voluntary. To be
compelled to answer legal process, he said, would admit the judiciary’s right to
interfere with executive matters–in effect making a coordinate department
supreme over another.”).
457. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 69; see also Jefferson, supra note 3.
458. Id. at 69; see also Jefferson, supra note 3.
459. Id.; see also Jefferson, supra note 3; This argument would manifest
under future Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Donald J. Trump, see United
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into the record a letter from Secretary of the Navy, Robert Smith,
dated December 20, 1806, in which Smith outlined details of Burr’s
military expedition.460
c.

The Grand Jury Indicted Burr

On Wednesday, June 24, the forty-eight-member grand jury
announced its intent to indict Burr for treason, an indictment to
which Burr pled not guilty.461 It was likely at this moment Marshall
knew his Bollman opinion would prove problematic.462
Furthermore, he likely knew that the grand jury’s indictment may
have been under the mistaken influence of Marshall’s problematic
definition of levying war in Bollman.463 With that, the jury indicted
Burr for his constructive presence on Blennerhassett’s Island.464 In
light of this, Hay sought that Burr be held without bail.465 The
prosecution asserted that the issue of bail was not necessarily a
discretionary prerogative of the court.466 Marshall examined the
bounds of his powers, and asked of Luther Martin if the defense
intended to dispute the assertion that treason was non-bailable:
Mr. Martin, have you any precedents where a court has bailed for
treason, after the finding of a grand jury, on either of these grounds;
that the testimony laid before the grand jury had been impeached for
perjury, or that other testimony had been laid before the court, which
had not been in possession of the grand jury?467

Martin admitted that he had “not anticipated” such a question
“and had not, therefore, prepared . . . authorities; but . . . had no
doubt that such existed.”468 Marshall, treating each issue carefully,
stressed that whether Burr’s offenses were bailable demanded “the
necessity of producing adjudged cases to prove that the court could
bail a party against whom [such] an indictment had been found.”469
Burr obliged the court of his “willing[ness] to be committed, but
hoped that the court had not forestalled its opinion” on the issue of

States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 702 (1974) and Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412,
2423, 207 L. Ed. 2d 907 (2020).
460. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 69-70.
461. Id. at 70.
462. SMITH, supra note 222, at 366.
463. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 4 (“The Bollman opinion, however, might
have encouraged the President and his legal advisers that they could make a
case against Burr.”); see also SMITH, supra note 222, at 639 n.107.
464. SMITH, supra note 222, at 366.
465. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 70.
466. Id.
467. Id. (emphasis added).
468. Id.
469. Id. at 71.
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bail.470 Marshall clarified, “I have only stated my present
impression. This subject is open for argument hereafter.”471 At this
point, Marshall ordered that Burr be taken into custody.472
On Thursday, June 25, the grand jury convened and requested
that Burr tender to it a letter from Wilkinson dated May 13.473
Nevertheless, the grand jury acknowledged that it had “no right to
demand any evidence from [Burr] under prosecution which may
tend to criminate.”474 Burr asked for the court’s opinion on this
request, to which Marshall responded, “the grand jury were
perfectly right in the opinion, that no man can be forced to furnish
evidence against himself.”475 Marshall qualified, however, his
presumption “that the grand jury wished also to know whether the
person under prosecution could be examined on other questions not
criminating himself.”476 Ultimately, Burr stated that “it would be
impossible . . . to expose any letter which had been communicated .
. . confidentially;” as such, “this letter will not be produced.”477 Burr
elaborated why the letter was not in his possession, “I did
voluntarily, and in the presence of a witness, put the letter out of
my hands, with the express view that it should not be used
improperly against any one.”478 He stated to Marshall, “I wished,
sir, to disable any person, even myself, from laying it before the
grand jury. General Wilkinson knows this fact.”479 Burr
immediately qualified his statement, “[l]et it be understood, that I
did not put this letter out of my possession because I expected the
grand jury would take up this subject but from a supposition that
they might do so.”480
On Friday, June 26, Burr’s counsel moved to have him
transferred from jail confinement to more hospitable conditions and
“depicted, in very strong terms, the miserable state of the prison
where [Burr] was then confined.”481 Counsel expressed concerned
that the dangers might be detrimental to Burr’s health and the
conditions functionally deprived him of assistance from counsel.482
After what the court transcript described as “a long and desultory
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id. at 72.
479. Id.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id.
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argument by Mr. Burr’s counsel,” the court ruled that Burr “should
be removed to his former lodgings near the capitol, provided they
could be made sufficiently strong for his safe keeping.”483 The court
did so based on its belief that Congressional Act authorized his
removal to alternative conditions.484 The court ordered the
requirements of an inspection report that had been generated by
Benjamin H. Latrobe, Surveyor of the Public Buildings to Thomas
Jefferson.485 Latrobe’s survey necessitated that the house in which
Luther Martin resided (where Burr was to stay) must be fortified
for Burr’s safe confinement in its dining room, “securing the
shutters to the windows of the said room by bars, and the door by a
strong bar or padlock.”486 Based on this report, the court further
required that Burr “employ a guard of seven men to be placed on
the floor of the adjoining unfinished house . . . there to be by him
safely kept.”487
The court’s clerk announced the indictment for treason,
specifying Blennerhassett’s Island as the location of the overt act
occurring on December 10, 1806.488 Burr pled not guilty.489 The
parties addressed the next issue, the number of jurors. Hay
announced his doubts whether “the judicial act, was still in force,
which required twelve jurors, at least, to be summoned from the
county where the offence was committed,” otherwise, “it would be
necessary to summon twelve petit jurors from the county of Wood,
which would render it impossible to have the trial at an early
day.”490 Marshall stated there was “no doubt the law was still in
force,” and ordered forty-eight jurors, no less than twelve of whom
were to be summoned from Wood County.491
d. Bollman versus Burr: A problem in precedent
On Saturday, June 27, the court ordered the trial postponed
until August 3.492 Marshall’s loquaciousness in Bollman proved
problematic, and he knew it.493 On June 29, Marshall wrote to his
fellow Supreme Court justices seeking their counsel as to what to

483. Id.
484. Id.
485. BENJAMIN H. LATROBE, REPORT, REPORT ON BUILDING OF CAPITOL
(1803), www.loc.gov/item/mtjbib026189/ [perma.cc/NFK6-WTAJ].
486. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 72-73.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 73.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id.
493. UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 203, at 224.
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do about the definitions he set forth in Ex Parte Bollman.494 He
wrote to each separately, of which only his letter to Justice William
Cushing survived.495 Marshall wrote, “[m]any points of difficulty
will arise before the petit jury which cannot be foreseen and on
which I must decide according to the best lights I possess.”496
Moreover, Marshall acknowledged to Cushing the factors that he
and the Court would be forced to balance, writing, “[i]t has been my
fate to be engaged in the trial of a person whose case presents many
real intrinsic difficulties which are infinitely multiplied by extrinsic
circumstances.”497 Beyond those intrinsic difficulties, Marshall’s
judicial statesmanship would be tested by what he characterized as
“[t]he ‘extrinsic circumstances,’ if anything, [which] were more
daunting than the legal ones, and not the least of these was the fact
that the trial had turned into a public spectacle.”498 Marshall
acknowledged he knew judges could not state their opinions on
cases that are not before the court and asserted that he would not
solicit their advice if Burr’s case should proceed to the Supreme
Court.499 Coyly, however, Marshall expressed concern. “[T]here are
some [difficulties] which will certainly occur, respecting which
considerable doubts may be entertained, and on which I most
anxiously desire the aid of all the Judges.”500 Marshall, concerned
about his inadvertent creation of constructive treason and the grand
jury’s reliance thereupon, wrote “[h]ow far is this doctrine to be
494. Id.; see also SMITH, supra note 222, at 366, 640 n.108 (citing Marshall
to Cushing on June 27, 1807).
495. See SMITH, supra note 222, at 366, 640 n.108 (citing Marshall to
Cushing on June 27, 1807).
496. Id.
497. See NEWMYER, supra note 411, at 190 (noting that Marshall found the
intrinsic difficulties to be centered on the Constitution’s meaning behind
treason).
498. See id. at 190-91 (noting the pressure from the uncertainty of
constructive treason that Marshall gave way to in Bollman was amplified by
Burr’s politicization and the press that came with a case involving former Vice
President Burr, a celebrity in his own right; the Jefferson Administration; and,
the great lawyers of that age).
499. JOHN MARSHALL, To William Cushing, in THE PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL: CORRESPONDENCE, PAPERS, AND SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS,
APRIL 1807-DECEMBER 1813, at 60, 62 (Herbert A. Johnson et al. eds., 1974)
“Could this case be readily carried into the supreme court I would not ask an
opinion in its present stage. But these questions must be decided by the Judges
separately on their respective circuits, & I am sure there would be a strong &
general repugnance to giving contradictory decisions on the same points.”).
500. See THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL: CORRESPONDENCE, PAPERS, AND
SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS, APRIL 1807-DECEMBER 1813, supra note 220, at
62 ) (hinting at his decision and writing “I am aware of the unwillingness with
which a Judge will commit himself by an opinion on a case not before him & on
which he has heard no argument”).
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carried in the United States? If a body of men assemble for a
treasonable purpose, does this [assemblage] implicate all of those
who are concerned in the conspiracy whether acquainted with the
assemblage or not?”501 Marshall had no need to address that issue
in Bollman.502 Rather, he wished to chide the administration and
establish that Bollmann and Swartwout likely conspired to commit
treason but without war levied did not commit treason.503
From June 29 to June 30, the prosecution reopened the issue
of Burr’s custody, to which Marshall replied that he “had given the
order for [Burr’s] removal from the gaol to [Burr’s] own lodgings, . .
. under an expectation that the trial would be prosecuted
immediately, and that the intercourse between the prisoner and his
counsel would be necessarily incessant.”504 However, due to the
trial’s August postponement, Marshall directed that Burr be
removed “to the penitentiary” with Burr’s counsel “to have free and
uninterrupted access to him” leading up to August.505
e.

Burr’s Trial: Public and Political Pressure

The court resumed on Monday, August 3, Burr’s trial was a
spectacle and had been widely publicized, forcing it to be held in the
chamber of the Virginia House of Delegates in order to
accommodate the crowds.506 However, even that location ultimately
proved insufficient, as the trial transcript reported that “[a]n
immense concourse of citizens attended to witness the proceedings
of this important trial.”507 News outlets covered the celebrity of the
trial and its players. On April 14, 1807, the Virginia Argus of
Richmond had published an issue in which it chastised Marshall for
attending Wickham’s party honoring Burr and “not perceiv[ing] the
extreme indelicacy and impropriety of such respect being paid him
by the Judge, who is to sit hereafter on his trial.”508 The Richmond
Enquirer publicized Marshall's “grossly indecent” attendance as “a
treason rejoicing dinner.”509 Still, the Virginia Gazette’s editor,
501. Id. at 60.
502. UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 203, at 224.
503. Id.
504. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 74.
505. Id.
506. SMITH, supra note 222, at 367; see also Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 74 (discussing
how the court record noted that “[a]n immense concourse of citizens attended to
witness the proceedings of this important trial.”).
507. Id.
508. OHIO STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION HELD AT PUT-IN-BAY ON THE 11TH AND 12TH OF
JULY, 1888 at 273 (1888).
509. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS:
JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 227
(2009).
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Augustine Davis, defended Marshall’s presence at the Burr event,
stating that the disparagement was unwarranted, Marshall’s
conduct was gentlemanly and one could not expect him to have
“kicked Col. Burr out of doors, nor ran away himself; but sat and ate
his dinner as deliberately, and to all appearance with as little
concern as though perfectly unconscious that the presence of Col.
Burr.”510 Thus, in a time when few Supreme Court cases became
circulated among the press, those across the nation had their eyes
on Burr who faced penalty for the highest crime of all, and by
consequence had John Marshall and the court in their line of
vision.511
Shortly therein, Hay stated that the government could not
proceed until he ensured that all of the prosecution’s summoned
witnesses “more than one hundred in number . . . were present.”512
Hay requested that each name be called aloud; and indeed, each
witness was called.513 Hay sought leave for more time to gather
witnesses, as there were many witnesses of whom the prosecution
lacked contact information.514 Nevertheless, the prosecution’s star
witnesses had been in Richmond, Virginia since mid-June in
anticipation of Burr’s August trial.515 Among those witnesses were
General William Eaton and Commodore Thomas Truxtun,
commander of the U.S.S. Constellation, neither of whom had direct
knowledge of a treasonable design.516 Accordingly, Marshall asked
Hay as to when would be a proper date by which the prosecution
would have its witnesses.517 Hay replied, that he “could not possibly
state by what day he should be able to prepare his lists.”518 Burr
offered to waive his privilege to a prefurnishment of the witness list

510. HOBSON, supra note 8, at 35.
511. See SMITH, supra note 222, at 367 (“if the government pursued the issue
[of Bollman], the question of constructive treason would come forward in the
various circuits,” which Marshall felt would be “disreputable to the Judges,” and
reflect poorly upon the greater American judicial system); HOBSON, supra, note
8, at 20 (“In ordinary circumstances, newspaper coverage of the early federal
courts, even the Supreme Court, was infrequent . . . [but] [n]ewspaper
publishers immediately recognized an opportunity to boost circulation. They
eagerly tried to gratify the public’s interest by filling their columns with every
known fact or rumor relating to Burr’s enterprise and with detailed accounts of
the ensuing legal proceedings.”); see also HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 12,
at 253 (noting that several news sources had issued publications about Burr’s
western efforts).
512. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 74.
513. Id.
514. Id.
515. SMITH, supra note 222, at 365.
516. Id. at 369.
517. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 74.
518. Id.
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in order to limit the existing delay.519 The prosecution then moved
to have all the jurors names read, out of forty-eight, only two of
whom were absent.520
Burr tactically renewed his previous motion at this time and
“reminded the court of the motion which he had made, on a former
occasion, for a subpoena duces tecum, addressed to the president of
the United States,” which had only “been partly complied with.”521
Burr wanted Marshall to rule “whether it were not a matter of right
for [Burr] to obtain a subpoena duces tecum. If it were not, he
[would] then lay a specific motion before the court.”522 Marshall
stated that it was not a renewal, so much as it was Burr’s first
formal request, insofar as Marshall “did not believe it to be the
practice in Virginia to obtain such a subpoena upon a mere
application to the clerk.”523 Rather, Marshall instructed that Burr’s
subpoena upon Jefferson “must be brought before the court
itself.”524 In response to Hay’s assurance that the prosecution would
tender what it possessed, Burr replied, “I wish not . . . to derange
the affairs of the government, or to demand the presence of the
executive officers at this place. All that I want are certain
papers.”525 Hay explained that “he could not consent to it . . . rather
. . . a regular application should be made for [Jefferson’s papers] to
the court.”526
On Wednesday, August 5, the court called for the prosecution’s
witnesses, many of whom were still absent.527 Hay stated that the
government could not proceed due to the lack of witnesses and he
“presumed all of the witnesses would be present in a few days.”528
Hay then proposed to Marshall “an arrangement . . . of conducting
the trial, in respect to the order in which counsel should speak.”529
Marshall replied with a logical procedure, “the best mode appeared
to . . . be this: that the case should be opened fully by one of the
gentlemen on the part of the United States; then opened fully by
one of the counsel on the other side.”530 Next, “the evidence should
be” presented, “and the whole commented upon by another of the
519. Id.
520. Id.
521. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 20 (“Burr and his team of lawyers adhered
to a strategy of attacking the [Administration’s] motives and good faith of the
government prosecuting him and particularly those of the government’s chief
witness, General James Wilkinson.”); see also Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 74-75.
522. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 74-75.
523. Id. at 75.
524. Id.
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. Id.
528. Id.
529. Id.
530. Id.
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gentlemen employed by the United States, who should be answered
by the rest of the counsel for Colonel Burr; and one only of the
counsel for the United States should conclude the argument.”531
Court resumed on Friday, August 7, when the prosecution’s
witnesses were recognized in attendance but quickly discharged
because “[t]he counsel for the United States . . . [was] not . . . as well
prepared to go into the trial as they expected to be . . . with many of
their witnesses being still absent.”532 On Monday, August 10 until
the next day, the court examined the venire.533 Burr sought to
uncover preconceptions and prejudgment against him.534 Some
members had made previous statements that Burr should be
hanged based on rumors.535 Others believed Burr was simply guilty
based on what they had heard to date.536 Accordingly, several jurors
were excused for cause.537 Marshall declared that “a trial of a man
for life” requires a juryman bear “perfect freedom from previous
impressions.”538 According to Marshall, such a freedom, is “clearly
the duty of the court to obtain, if possible, [jurymen] free from such
bias.”539 If such freedom not be guaranteed “from the very
circumstances of the case -- if rumors . . . reached and prepossessed
[a juror’s] judgments . . . the court [must still] obtain as large a
portion of impartiality as possible.”540 The predisposition of the jury
was evident.541 As Burr sought to exclude other jurors, Hay
bemoaned, “I most seriously apprehend that we shall have no jury
at all,” for even as a prosecutor, “I myself could do justice to the
accused,” as could “any man can who is blessed with a sound
judgment and integrity. We might as well enter at once a nolle
prosequi, if any more witnesses are “to be rejected.”542

531. Id.
532. Id.
533. Id. at 76.
534. Id.
535. Id. a 77-78.
536. Id. at 78.
537. Id. at 76.
538. Id. at 77.
539. Id.
540. Id.
541. See NEWMYER, supra note 165, at 106 (Most “jurors thought [Burr] was
guilty as charged.”).
542. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 78; see generally § 46:1. 11A Cyc. of Federal Proc. §
46:1 (3d ed.) (The latin term nolle prosequi, often referred in a shortened version
as "nolle,” pertains to a concept of “legal notice that a [case] has been abandoned
or a docket entry showing that the plaintiff or the prosecutor has abandoned the
action.” Id. When utilizing the doctrine of nolle prosequi, criminal “prosecutors
have the power to decide whether to proceed with the prosecution of a charged
defendant, and absent a controlling statute or rule to the contrary, this power
resides solely in the prosecutor's hands until” a jury is paneled and sworn. Id.).
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Tuesday, August 11, prosecutor MacRae suggested that it
would save the court time if the defense consolidated its “objections
to all the jurors, and then [held] one general argument as to all,
instead of having an argument on each particular case as it might
occur.”543 In the interest of judicial economy, MacRae saw no point
in “holding twelve arguments instead of one, where the cases were
precisely similar” and “supposed that one argument would suffice
for all the cases.”544 Marshall agreed.545 Martin complained, “I have
been repeatedly interrupted by the [prosecution] . . . They talk, sir
of economy of time . . . I know what kind of economy they wish. They
wish us to be silent. They would, if they could, deprive Colonel
Burr’s counsel of an opportunity of defending him, that they may
hang him up as soon as possible, to gratify themselves and the
government.”546
Hay responded, “[w]e wish . . . to proceed without hearing
ourselves grossly insulted” and “without . . . accusations against us
that are malicious and groundless. We said nothing that could give
offence to the feelings of any gentleman. The charge is unjust.”547
He elaborated, “I wish him to have a fair trial, and justice to be done
. . . but I feel myself hurt, and grossly insulted, when the [defense]
charges me with feelings that are disgraceful to humanity. I trust,
therefore, that the arguments will no longer be conducted with such
indecorum.”548 Marshall took control of the dissolving situation and
expressed “[hope] that no such allusions would have been made,”
affirming “that the government ought to be treated with respect,
and that there was a delicacy to be observed on that subject from
which he hoped there would be no departure hereafter.”549
Saturday, August 15, Marshall inquired as to whom of the jury
had preconceived notions for or against Burr, as those prejudging
should be rejected.550 Burr challenged Marshall for removing jurors
who presumed innocence insofar as “the law presumes every man
to be innocent until he have been proved to be guilty . . . It is no
disqualification, then, for a man to come forward and declare that
he believes me to be innocent.”551 Marshall retorted to Burr, “[t]he
law certainly presumes every man to be innocent till the contrary
be proved; but if a juryman give an opinion in favor of the prisoner
he must be rejected.”552 After finalizing the jury, Marshall ordered
543. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 84.
544. Id.
545. Id.
546. Id.
547. Id.
548. Id.
549. Id.
550. Id. at 86.
551. Id.
552. Id. (emphasis added)
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that the jurymen have “no communication on this subject with any
person.”553 Before the close of day, Burr returned to the issue of
Jefferson’s subpoena. Burr apologized if he seemed “importunate,”
but he sought the letter dated October 21, requesting notice
whether the prosecution had located it, “or whether [Hay] could
point to any other means of obtaining it.”554 Burr specifically
conceived of this tactic to seek the motion over the Executive.555 Hay
explained that he could not find the letter, but he had “a copy of the
original letter.”556 It should be noted that Burr did not seek the
alleged original, nor did he seek to establish the authorship, as both
of these would have been inculpatory.557 Burr inquired as to who
generated the copy.558 Hay responded that Wilkinson had done so.559
In response, Burr argued that Wilkinson’s copy of the letter to
Jefferson was insufficient and inquired if the prosecution cannot
“find this letter by Monday, will he consent that I obtain a subpoena
duces tecum?”560 Hay did not object and Marshall accordingly
advised Burr that such “an order may be made to issue a subpoena
duces tecum addressed to the attorney general of the United States,
in case the letter be not found” by Monday.561
Monday, August 17 came, and the trial finally began. Hay
opened the government’s case before the jury.562 Hay cited
Marshall’s own words and invoked “the Cases of Bollman and
Swartwout,” quoting Marshall:
It is not the intention of the court to say that no individual can be
guilty of this crime who has not appeared in arms against his country.
On the contrary, if war be actually levied, that is, if a body of men be
actually assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable
purpose, all those who perform any part, however minute, or however
remote from the scene of action, are to be considered as traitors; but
there must be an actual assembling of men to constitute a levying of
war.563

Hay elaborated that “this was the principle settled by the
supreme court” in Bollman, under which “[a]ctual force is not
553. Id. at 87.
554. Id.
555. HOBSON, supra note 8, at 6, 24 (noting that it may have been
strategically more purposed to “score points against the [Jefferson]
administration” than actually to seek material evidence).
556. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 87.
557. NEWMYER, supra note 165, at 99.
558. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 87.
559. Id.
560. Id.
561. Id.
562. Id. at 89.
563. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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necessary” for treason in which “[a]n assemblage of men [may
convene] for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable design .
. . the persons engaged in it are traitors.”564 Hay explained that the
U.S. Supreme Court, “in giving a definition of treason, had not said
a single word about the necessity of arms,” and if he had “read the
decision right,” instead “said that arms were not necessary.”565 He
stated that Judge Samuel Chase, used some expressions in the 1799
treason trial of John “Fries from which it might be inferred force
was necessary to make the treason.”566 Hay rallied that “the subject
was not distinctly before the court, and therefore [Chase’s] opinion
was extra-judicial.”567 This may have planted the idea in Marshall’s
mind that problematic language in Bollman could be surmounted
using the prosecution’s own logic to characterize the problems as
extra-judicial obitur dictum. Still, Marshall could not explicitly
overrule the Supreme Court’s Bollman opinion, due to the fact that
in Burr, he found himself sitting on the inferior the Circuit Court of
Richmond.568
Following a consuming argument on the order of witness
examination, the court returned to the issue of copied notes arose
again.569 General William Eaton appeared and requested an
opportunity to review his notes.570 Marshall asked whether Eaton
wrote these notes, to which Eaton replied “[t]hey were taken and
copied by me from others, which are at my lodgings.” The defense
objected, as the prosecution attempted to lay a foundation to the
notes.571 Burr argued that Eaton’s notes “are nothing but
memoranda, taken from notes which I made of the conversations
between you and myself at the times when they passed.”572
Accordingly, Marshall ruled that the notes were not admissible.573
564. Id. (internal citations omitted).
565. Id.
566. Id. at 90. See generally John Fries Trials: 1799, L. LIBR.- AM. L. &
LEGAL INFO.,
www.law.jrank.org/pages/2397/John-Fries-Trials-1799.html
[perma.cc/ZT4L-F46Z] (last visited Apr. 08, 2020) (stating that Chase insisted
that English common law was baseless as to treason's meaning in this American
case); id. (writing that some functional quantum of force is necessary); id. (“Any
insurrection . . . for the purpose of resisting or preventing by force . . . the
execution of any statute of the United States . . . is levying war against the
United States, within the … true meaning of the Constitution.” (emphasis
added)).
567. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 90.
568. HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 246.
569. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 90. (“The argument on the question consumed the
balance of the day. The chief justice rendered an opinion on the following day
(Tuesday August 18, 1807), which will be found reported as Case No. 14,692h.”
Id.)
570. Id.
571. Id.
572. Id.
573. Id.
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Questioning continued, and the defense made numerous objections,
Marshall announced, “though more time was wasted by stopping
the witness than by letting him tell his story in his own way . . . he
must be stopped when he [gives] improper testimony.”574 Marshall
instructed Eaton, “[y]ou are at liberty to vindicate yourself, but
[hearsay] declarations of other gentlemen are not to be mentioned,
because that certainly would be improper.”575
The prosecution called to the stand Peter Taylor,
Blennerhassett’s gardener; Colonel George Morgan; and, Jacob
Allbright, a worker on the island.576 Taylor testified that the boats
at Blennerhassett’s Island “contemplated to sail on the 6th of
December, but . . . were not ready [and] did not come till [December]
10th. Mr. Knox and several other men were with him, and they
sailed on the Wednesday night following.”577 Next, the prosecution
called Colonel George Morgan, and he began to testify when Burr
objected to the testimony because it “consist[ed] of conversations
and previous declarations.”578 Burr claimed that he “did not mean
to interrupt the inquiry, but to prevent the time of the court from
being wasted.”579 Marshall quelled ensuing debate, stating that
going forth, “the same objections would hereafter apply as well to
the consideration as to the introduction of testimony; that these
objections might be hereafter urged,” but “it was impossible for the
court to know the nature of the evidence before it was
introduced.”580 Therefore, he directed Burr to refrain from
interrupting proceedings.581 Burr then interrupted the direct
examination of Jacob Allbright, “I beg the court to call on the
prosecution for the deposition of this witness, taken before John G.
Jackson.”582 Hay countered that “Mr. Jackson might not have taken
down the testimony of the witness in his language, but couched it
in his own; hence there might be an apparent variation between the
present evidence and the affidavit.”583 Hay asserted Jefferson’s
executive privilege, stating that the government “would not let
gentlemen have access to [the President’s] portfolio when they
pleased;” rather, access “must be satisfied by reasons assigned or
574. Id. at 93.
575. Id.
576. McCaleb, supra note 386, at 344; see also Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 61 (noting
that Albright “was hired on the island to help to build a kiln for drying corn”);
id. at 104.
577. Id. at 100.
578. Id. at 101.
579. Id.
580. Id.
581. Id.
582. Id. at 106.
583. Id.
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required by the order of the court, before he produced it.”584
Marshall, however, “was not [necessarily] satisfied that the court
had a right to call for the affidavit.”585
After more examination, consisting of questions levied to
witnesses by individual jurors, on Thursday, August 20, Burr and
his counsel demanded that “counsel for the prosecution should
produce all the evidence” that pertains “to the overt act, before they
. . . offer any collateral testimony.”586 Burr reminded the court, “as
soon all [of the prosecution’s] testimony on that point [is]
introduced,” he had “certain propositions to submit to the court.”587
This significant tactical trial decision by the defense attempted to
shift the case from the jury to the judge.588 Nevertheless, the Court
afforded the prosecution elasticity, as the prosecution claimed it had
“more evidence to introduce on this point.”589 With that, Simeon
Poole was sworn and stated, “I never was on the island at that time,
but was opposite to it [and] I saw boats and men there . . . on the
10th of December.”590
As the prosecution examined witness Edmund P. Dana, juror
Henry E. Coleman asked, “[i]s it proper to ask any questions about
the conversations which took place with those gentlemen?”591
Marshall declared, the propriety of it “is left to the consent of the
accused.”592 Burr, appearing magnanimous, offered “[i]f any of the
jury think proper, I have no objection.”593 Though Burr quickly
shifted into (what the transcript described as) “an interesting and
animated discussion.”594 Burr stated “[b]efore the gentleman
proceeds with his evidence, I will suggest that it has appeared to me
that there would be great advantage and propriety in establishing
a certain principle founded upon the facts which have been
presented to the court.”595 Burr said facts had been taken for
granted, which “failed to prove that any overt act of war had been
committed.”596 Moreover, he was more than one hundred miles
584. Id.
585. Id.
586. Id. at 111.
587. Id.
588. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 6, 50 (writing that this was a “key
moment” of the Burr trial for the defense, who “believ[ed] that a Virginia jury
would be unsympathetic with the accused, settled on a strategy of taking the
case from the jury and placing the question of Burr’s guilt in what it hoped
would be the safer hands of the court”).
589. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 111-112.
590. Id.
591. Id. at 112-13.
592. Id. at 113.
593. Id.
594. Id.
595. Id.
596. Id.
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away from the location in which the conduct at issue occurred.597
Next, Burr cited Bollman, declaring that it was “totally
misunderstood by the counsel for the prosecution,” and the defense
“had the right here to call upon the attorney for the United States
to say whether an assemblage of men merely can be called, or in any
way tortured into an act of ‘levying war.’”598 The case became
circensian when the prosecution nevertheless called ten additional
witnesses who were not present on Blennerhassett’s Island and who
could not establish thereon Burr levied war.599 Burr declared a
“right to require of the prosecutor to show that every witness will
give testimony tending to prove an overt act of war, or his testimony
would be irrelevant and immaterial.”600 Therefore, said Burr, it was
unnecessary to examine one hundred and thirty five “because their
testimony can have no bearing on the case.”601 He challenged that
his conduct was continually being prosecuted as constructive at best
with circumstantial evidence.602 The government argued that the
question of whether Burr levied war was a question of fact properly
to be decided by the jury.603 Burr, however, feared his fate before
the jury.604 Hay stated that he would have “no objection to any fair
inquiry into these principles; but the motion was premature,” and
he believed that ultimately “testimony would be introduced . . .
which would give a very different aspect to the transactions on
Blennerhassett’s Island [versus] what had appeared.”605
Beneath the surface, the problem of prematurity found its
genesis in the Jefferson Administration’s desires, as the
administration wanted chiefly to get the testimony out before the
public.606 If the legal prosecution would not manifest into a
597. See id. (offering that Burr was over “one hundred miles distant from
the place where the overt act is charged to have been committed”).
598. Id.
599. SMITH, supra note 222, at 369.
600. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 113.
601. Id.
602. Id.
603. SMITH, supra note 222, at 369.
604. See NEWMYER, supra note 165, at 106 (“[J]urors thought [Burr] was
guilty as charged. If the prosecution could tap this well of prejudice by
hammering away at Burr's character, which they attempted to do, he could be
in trouble. How much trouble . . . depend[ed] . . . on how much hammering John
Marshall would allow.”).
605. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 113.
606. NANCY ISENBERG, FALLEN FOUNDER: THE LIFE OF AARON BURR 328
(2007) (“Jefferson was doing his utmost to shape public opinion . . . . [H]is public
denunciation seriously undermined Burr’s ability to receive a fair trial.”); id.
(containing a writing from Jefferson to Ohio Governor Edwin Tiffin that stated
“the hand of the people has given the mortal blow to the conspiracy which, in
other countries, would have called for an appeal to armies”); id. (stating that
the President believed his efforts “will be supported by the public opinion”).
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successful conviction, the public discourse could effectively
persecute Burr.607 Burr lamented, the prosecution could not connect
him with the act, “and no testimony can be brought to prove that
there was war . . . surely the article war is of imperious necessity in
the charge of treason . . . will the court go on week after week,
discovering nothing that can affect me?”608 Luther Martin
interjected at length that the season had proven quite dangerous
with rampant illness and the prosecution’s laborious approach to
trying its case in chief risked a greater “probability of sickness
among some of the jury or the court, . . . which would prevent the
case going on. If one of the jurors should die, however far the case
may have progressed, the trial must [then] begin anew.”609 Burr
announced, “I demand the opinion of the court on [my] points.”610 In
a balance of principles, Marshall gave his opinion that the defense
had the right to object to such evidence, but nevertheless suggested
that it be best for the defense to postpone its motion, stating with
“no doubt . . . court must hear the objections to the admissibility of
the evidence; it [is] a right, and gentlemen might insist on it.”611
However, “some of the transactions on Blennerhassett’s Island
remained yet to be gone into,” and Marshall suggested that the
defense “postpone the motion till that evidence was gone
through.”612 Marshall attempted to mitigate some of the political
antagonization that he expected from Jefferson for granting Burr’s
subpoena by acknowledging the prosecution’s right to make a
motion.613
The court turned to the issue of witnesses. Defense counsel
Botts requested that the indigent witnesses who were summoned
should be financially assisted, stating that “when the United States
[has] imprisoned witnesses to compel their attendance, those of the
accused ought at least to be supplied with the means of
subsistence.”614 However, the Jefferson Administration had
wagered the witnesses’ payment upon the value of their testimony.
The marshal said that he “was cautioned by the attorney for the
United States not to pay [these witnesses] till their materiality was

Jefferson wrote to Hay, urging his prosecutor to publish the testimony before
Congress, effectively “through them [to] the public.” Id.
607. Id.
608. Id. at 114.
609. Id.
610. Id.
611. Id.
612. Id.; see HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 251 (noting that, at
Blennerhassett’s order, Blennerhassett’s Island became a hub for the
expedition’s supply chain).
613. NEWMYER, supra note 165, at 96.
614. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 114.
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ascertained, or till the court ordered him.”615 Hay defended that
position saying that court “expenses were so enormous, that they
would be felt by the national treasury, though it was full.”616 Burr
indicated that Hay’s instruction was premised upon an earlier belief
that “between two and three hundred witnesses” had been
summoned “whereas the truth was that they did not exceed twenty;
that they were material; that some of them were summoned to repel
what might be said by the witnesses for the United States.”617 Burr
highlighted to the court, “the United States had many advantages
in commanding the attendance of their witnesses,” an advantage
that he lacked, and he “would not acquiesce in the establishment of
a principle that might prove injurious to others.”618 Burr ended by
stating that these witnesses should be paid, and he “hoped that
there would be no more difficulty made on the subject.”619 Hay
responded that he objected, but “had only one or two more witnesses
on that point.”620 However, once again, Hay’s witnesses on that part
were absent, and Hay invited the defense’s motion after these
witnesses were heard.621
Hay offered that the prosecution had only two more witnesses,
and the defense could make its motion after that time, if it
wished.622 In response, Burr’s defense team led an impassioned
attack against the prosecution’s case and analyzed the definition of
treason.623 Randolph argued passionately that if the Court extends
the Constitution’s treason to include constructive treason, it allows
the Executive to attack its enemies, stating “if the doctrine of
treason [is not] kept within precise limits, but left vague and
undefined, it gives the triumphant party the means of subjecting
the other.”624 This strategy successfully deflected the government’s
case from prosecuting Burr conduct as treason to the Jeffersonadministration’s being forced to defend the concept of constructive
treason as a nonpolitical weapon.625

615. Id. at 114-15.
616. Id.
617. Id.
618. Id.
619. Id.
620. Id. at 115.
621. Id.
622. See SMITH, supra note 222, at 369 (noting that those two witnesses did
not provide any substantial testimony).
623. Id.
624. Id.at 369-70.
625. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 22 (“The President unwittingly made it
possible for the Burr prosecution to become an indictment and trial of his own
administration.”).
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Final Arguments: August 20-29, 1807

Finally, from Thursday, August 20 until Saturday August 29,
over the course of eight days, the court heard arguments, “which
finally put an end to the case.”626 However, this was not before
defense counsel Wickham gave an opening argument.627 Wickham’s
argument appeased Marshall’s logic, invoking the absurdity
doctrine and stating, “[t]he constitution is a new and original
compact” and must be construed, “not by the rules of art belonging
to a particular science or profession, but like a treaty or national
compact, in which words are to be taken according to their natural
import, unless such a construction would lead to a plain
absurdity.”628 Moreover, Wickham sidestepped Bollman, stating,
because “there is no general common law of the United States, the
act of congress must be construed without any reference to any
common law, and treason is to be considered as a newly created
offence, against a newly created government.”629 He argued that
Congress wrote what it intended, and constructive treason, was the
very type of tyranny that the Framers wished to eradicate.630
Wickham concluded his argument on Friday, August 21, by
suggesting a side-step of Bollman, arguing that the expressions in
Bollman, “which might seem to imply that force was not necessary
. . . were obiter and extra-judicial.631 Randolph continued from
there.632
On the following Monday, August 24, MacRae argued on behalf of
the prosecution.633 Arguments continued to circle back to Bollman. The
next day, William Wirt argued on behalf of the prosecution.634 Wirt
asserted that the issue before the court was “whether the presence at
the overt act be necessary to make a man a traitor. The [defense claims]
that it is necessary -- that he cannot be a principal in the treason without
actual presence. What says the supreme court in the Case of Bollman
and Swartwout?”635 He highlighted the defense’s conspicuous avoidance
of defending against precedent under Bollman.636 Wirt then chastised
the defense’s motion before the court, that it “marks the genius and hand
626. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 115.
627. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 6 (writing that the Court heard an
“exhaustive hearing on this motion, [as] the lawyers rummaged through the
whole course of English and American precedents on the law of treason”); see
also Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 115-116.
628. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 116.
629. Id. at 118.
630. Id.
631. Id. at 122.
632. Id. at 115-16.
633. Id.
634. Id.
635. Id. at 124.
636. HOBSON, supra note 8, at 53.

868

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:705

of a master . . . giv[ing] to the prisoner every possible advantage, . . .
[with] full benefit of his legal defence: the sole defence which he would
be able to make to the jury, if the evidence were all introduced before
them.”637 Likewise, he chided, that masterful stroke robbed of “the
prosecution all that evidence which goes to connect the prisoner with the
assemblage on the island” and denied the opportunity for the
prosecution “to explain the destination and objects of the assemblage,
and to stamp beyond controversy the character of treason upon it.”638
Wirt rhetorically asked, “Who is Blennerhassett?” and drew a stark
contrast of culpability between Blennerhassett and Burr.639 According to
Wirt, Blennerhassett had been unwittingly duped into literal action,
while Burr committed treason within the interpretive definition of the
Court’s judicial construction.640 Albeit disingenuously, for a prosecution
executively directed to disavow the Marshall Court’s authority, Wirt
purported a certain reverence for the Supreme Court precedent of
Bollman, rallying, “[w]e . . are seeking truth and not victory, whether
right or wrong, have no reason to turn our eyes from any source of light
which presents itself, and least of all from a source so high and so
respectable as the decision of the supreme court of the United States.”641
Wirt selected a favorable quote from Bollman, stating:
It is not the intention of the court to say that no individual can be
guilty of this crime who has not appeared in arms against his country.
On the contrary, if war be actually levied, that is, if a body of men be
assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable purpose,
all those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote
from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general
conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors.642

Wirt insisted that Bollman “settled the principle that actual
presence was not necessary,” and while he obsessed on the defense’s
evasion of precedent, he perhaps revealed the prosecution’s
Achilles, a preoccupation with precedent.643 Wirt pleaded that quote
“was not a mere obiter dictum, and not extra judicial.”644 Rather, it
“was a material question to be considered by the court.”645 According
637. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 122-23.
638. Id.
639. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 33 (writing that Wirt’s rhetorical question
“became a classic of American oratory”); id. (“With his ample literary gifts, the
lawyer spun a riveting tale of corrupted innocence, of Blennerhassett’s peaceful,
tranquil life on his Eden in the Ohio River until the ‘serpent entered its
bowers.’”).
640. See id. (writing that Wirt “presented a well-reasoned argument
portraying Burr as the mastermind who set in motion the great treasonable
enterprise, of which the assemblage on Blennerhassett’s Island formed a part”).
641. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 124.
642. Id.
643. Id.
644. Id.
645. Id.
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to Wirt, Bollman meant that Burr was guilty of treason.646 He went
on to say that Burr was “sufficiently and properly charged in the
indictment . . . [of] treason, whether he be absent or present, he may
be indicted generally,” as a “principal in a treason of levying war, it
is sufficient to charge that he did levy war.”647 Marshall countered,
“[d]o you mean to say that it is not necessary to state in the
indictment in what manner the accused, who it is admitted was
absent, became connected with the acts on Blennerhassett’s
Island?”648 Wirt asserted that under precedent (i.e., Bollman) it
would be “sufficient to make this charge generally,” in part “because
it is authorized by the constitutional definition.”649
On the remainder of that day, Botts began an argument that
continued until Wednesday, August 26.650 From there, Hay argued
into August 27, over “whether the motion to arrest the evidence was
one which, on principle and precedent, could be entertained by the
court.”651 Hay warned Marshall and the court that it was “a most
dangerous proposition” if a judge should usurp the jury’s proper role
to weigh the evidence of a trial.652 Hay likely intimated the
impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase, occurring two years prior,
the only judicial impeachment in American history and one that
Jefferson initiated in political revenge upon the Federalist Justice
Chase who, while on the bench, had suggested that Jefferson was
an Atheist.653 Jefferson had tried to distance himself from Justice
Chase’s impeachment that temporally coincided with the Court’s
decision against the Jefferson-administration in Marbury.654
646. See id. at 128 (“Burr, therefore, was not only legally but actually
present on this theatre of action.”).
647. Id. at 130.
648. Id.
649. Id.
650. Id. at 115-16.
651. Id. at 136.
652. HOBSON, supra note 8, at 32.
653. See JAMES F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION THOMAS JEFFERSON, JOHN
MARSHALL, AND THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO CREATE A UNITED STATES 197-98
(2003) (“There is no doubt that the idea of impeaching Chase was initiated by
the president . . . . Chase, from the bench, [had taken] a thinly disguised swipe
at Jefferson's suspected atheism.”); see also HOBSON, supra note 8, at 32
(referring to an impeachment article against Justice Chase concerning his
conduct in an earlier treason trial with, “Hay appeared to be warning Chief
Justice Marshall of what might happen if he granted the motion to exclude
evidence”).
654. See Simon, supra note 663, at 197-98 (“Chief Justice Marshall’s stern
lecture to the president and his secretary of state on their duties in Marbury v.
Madison may have grated, but at the time, Jefferson made no recorded
criticism.” Id. “Jefferson promptly backed away from taking responsibility for
the suggestion [of impeachment].” Id. at 199. Backing away from his own
suggestion after achieving its genesis in other’s minds was “a familiar Jefferson
stratagem when he anticipated a nasty political fight.” Id. at 199.).
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Curiously, Burr presided over Chase’s impeachment.655
Nevertheless, Jefferson had written on April 20 to Virginia Senator
William B. Giles, “impeachment is a farce which will not be tried
again” and arguing that an amendment “will do more good” to limit
Marshall's power.656 Still, it was a Republican tactic.657 However,
depending on the result of Burr’s trial, a constitutional amendment
on the Judiciary or a politically charged impeachment were a
tangible risk to Marshall.
Hay pressed for a logical “suppos[ition] that Burr had never
been at [Blennerhassett’s Island] at all, but he kn[ew] that his
troops [were] there.”658 If Burr commanded those men, said Hay,
and “[t]housands fall in the battle. [Did] he not, then, levy war?”659
With that, Hay turned back to Bollman, urging the court to
“examine the subject and see whether it be extra-judicial or not.”660
Hay then perhaps gave a fatal opportunity for Marshall when he
spoke, “I do not wish to be bewildered in this labyrinth of law. I have
seen gentlemen, in merely attempting to argue, perfectly
bewildered in a chaos which they themselves had created.”661 Hay
advocated for a “practical construction of the constitution.”662 He
said the Constitution should be “expound[ed] . . . by the rules of
common sense, without the distinctions of the common law” in
which “[t]here is too much subtility, too much refinement, too much
complexity in [precedent] for a practical system.”663 Hay elaborated
that scholars “may devote twenty or thirty years to its study, and
not be able to comprehend it completely . . . [and] will misinterpret
some parts of it, however learned he may be.”664 Attempting to
assert the mission of the Jefferson administration, Hay stated, “[l]et
us . . . have a system of our own, adapted to the situation, habits
and feelings of the country, without the absurdities, the trash and

655. See 2 SAMUEL HARRISON SMITH & THOMAS LLOYD, TRIAL OF SAMUEL
CHASE, AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, IMPEACHED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FOR HIGH CRIMES
AND MISDEMEANORS, BEFORE THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 444 (1805)
(noting Burr’s role in presiding).
656. 4 THOMAS JEFFERSON, MEMOIRS, CORRESPONDENCE, AND PRIVATE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON LATE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 75
(1829).
657. See Hobson, supra note 18, at 1430 (“[R]adical Republicans were bent
on using impeachment as a means of removing federal judges.”).
658. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 137.
659. Id.
660. Id. at 138.
661. Id. at 140.
662. Id. at 141.
663. Id. at 140.
664. Id.
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rubbish of the common law.”665 The common law of Bollman was
indeed on Hay’s side, for now. Nevertheless, Hay underestimated
Marshall’s ability to navigate that proverbial labyrinth and do so
both practically and with common sense.
That same day, Charles Lee gave what the Court called a “brief
but very lucid argument” for Burr.666 Lee argued against Bollman’s
potential for constructive treason, stating, “[t]his common law
doctrine [was] cut up by the constitution. If one common law treason
be cut up, all are cut up; there is no common law treason.”667 Lee
offered a floodgates argument; “[i]t is only by construction and
deduction that any common law treason can be admitted. If one
constructive treason be admitted, all may enter.”668 He argued that
the prosecution “forget[s] the distinction: that our constitution is in
abridgment of the common law, and that it was intended to stand
on its own feet independently of common law reasons.”669 Appealing
to Marshall’s textualistic leanings, Lee exclaimed, [“t]here are no
words in the constitution which warrant their arguments.”670
On Friday, August 28, Martin argued for fourteen hours,
arguing the whole day into August 29.671 The court transcript
described that Martin’s oration was “learned and searching, but illarranged and ungraceful” and effectively “obtained more celebrity
than any other delivered in the case.”672 Martin bitingly stated, the
grand jury “waited patiently from [May 22] to the 13th day of June,
before the primum mobile General Wilkinson thought proper to
appear in obedience to the process of the court, by which means our
client . . . and a great number of witnesses have suffered still more
inconvenience.”673 Martin reminded the court that constructive
treason was not a doctrine in America and however revered some of
Britain’s legalism may be, it is “not binding authority in this
country” and “thanked God that such [is] the case.”674 He argued
that Britain’s “rules of evidence with respect to treason” serve to
“shock humane judges.”675 Martin stated that Britain’s treason
doctrine was the product of “judges [acting] in the most arbitrary
manner . . . [executing] the most wicked wishes of the persons who
665. Id.
666. Id. at 115-16.
667. Id. a 144 (emphasis added).
668. Id.
669. Id.
670. Id.
671. Id. at 115-16; see also HOBSON, supra note 8 at, 29 (writing that Martin
who had conceived of framing the treason trial as a political assassination levied
by Jefferson for Jefferson, inciting “public prejudices”).
672. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 115-16.
673. Id. at 145 (emphasis added).
674. Id. at 147.
675. Id.
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held the crown,” perhaps attempting to subtly engender thoughts of
President Jefferson over Burr.676 G. Edward White stated that as
Chief Justice, Marshall favored oral arguments that took generous
liberty with time, as this aided his ability to deeply analyze a case’s
legal issues.677 Marshall took the time here. Randolph closed out the
last day of oral arguments defending Burr, leaving fate in
Marshall’s pen.678

III. IN RE BURR: A PRAGMATIC DECISION OF JUDICIAL
STATESMANSHIP
On Saturday, August 29, Marshall had declared the Court’s
adjournment until Monday.679 Similarly to Marbury, Marshall cited
to English law.680 In greater similarity, when writing the opinion,
Marshall had time for only one draft.681 Marshall spent that time
writing a careful opinion in which he cited heavily to court
precedent and learned treatises of great legal scholars.682 At roughly
25,000 words, Burr was the longest opinion in Chief Justice
Marshall’s thirty-five year career.683 Consequent to the opinion’s

676. Id.
677. See WHITE, supra note 6, at 13 (“At the Supreme Court[,] it was said
that [Marshall] encouraged lengthy oral arguments, using them to educate
himself on the particulars of a case . . . . [T]here was no limit on the length of
arguments, and lawyers sometimes spoke continuously for four or five days.”).
678. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 115-16.
679. SMITH, supra note 222, at 370.
680. Rehnquist, supra note 168, at 109; see HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note
12, at 246 (writing that Burr demonstrates Marshall’s “extraordinary legal
talents . . . at the trial level, revealing not only the care and meticulousness of
his scholarship and his keenly balanced judgment, but also his ability to reach
out and formulate . . . [English doctrine into] new and revised concepts in
American law, notably that of treason”).
681. See SMITH, supra note 222, at 370; see also HOBSON, supra note 8, at
21(writing under these time constraints, Marshall “must have written at a
furious pace or else begun his draft while the lawyers were still orating”); see
also White, supra note 4, at 787 (“Despite the limited duration of its Terms, and
the unlimited time accorded to arguments, the Marshall Court was, by today's
standards, remarkably quick in rendering its decisions.”).
682. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 7. Marshall’s “opinion was dense and
complicated, full of qualifications and intricate legal distinctions.” Id. He
“appeared to shy away from making definitive pronouncements on such a
difficult and sensitive constitutional issue as the law of treason.” Id. However,
“[t]he opinion was nonetheless clear and forthright in its essential holding that
the Constitution required a strict definition of treason.” Id. See generally Burr,
25 F. Cas. at 160 (“Principles laid down by such writers as Coke, Hale, Foster,
and Blackstone, are not lightly to be rejected. These books are in the hands of
every student.”).
683 PIERPAOLI, supra note 75, at 64.

2020]

A Pragmatic Political Balancing

873

length and the time constraints under which he wrote, it is
repetitive.684 In the same way that the Marbury opinion is said to
bear syllogistic reasoning, an odd sense of structure, and an
excessive amount of dicta,685 Burr reflects sharp political
shrewdness and a clear concept of constitutionalism. Marshall used
distancing language in the opinion to refer to Burr as “the accused”
and “the individual,” addressing Burr by name only three times in
his record-length opinion, likely a tactical choice to lessen
impending Jeffersonian backlash.686
On August 31, Marshall announced his opinion in toto.687 He
prefaced his ruling by praising both the prosecution and the defense
for their utmost eloquence and a great “depth of research” that
aided in his decision.688 Moreover, he began by commending the
parties for “argu[ing] in a manner worthy of its importance, and
with an earnestness evincing the strong conviction felt by the
counsel on each side.”689
Marshall, a pragmatist, grounded his analysis of “levying war”
in treason within textualism, seeking to establish its meaning
“within the letter and the plain meaning of the constitution.”690
Marshall was not limited to one approach, however, in
accomplishing legal analysis. While Marshall used these
approaches, it is anachronistic to apply the titles upon Marshall and
not the purpose or intent of this section. Northwestern University
Law Professor Steven G. Calabresi stated that Marshall used
originalist, textualist, and structuralist approaches in his
decisions.691 University of California Hastings Law School Professor
Joel Richard Paul stated that Marshall rejected “strict
construction[alism]” and invoked a limited living constitutionalism
by “insist[ing] on reading the Constitution broadly as a living
document that responded to the needs and demands of a growing
nation.”692 In Re Burr was no exception to Marshall’s pragmatic use
of these principles. These theories attributed to Marshall gained
684. SMITH, supra, note 222, at 370.
685. Olken, supra note 5, at 400.
686. See Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 175 (“The guilt of the accused, if there be any
guilt, does not consist in the assemblage, for he was not a member of it.” Id. at
175. Marshall presented this is so because “[t]he mind is not to be led to the
conclusion that the individual was present by a train of conjectures, of
inferences, or of reasoning.” Id. at 176. Rather, the text of the Constitution is
clear; “the fact must be proved by two witnesses.” Id.).
687. Id. at 159.
688. Id. at 115.
689. Id. at 159.
690. Id. at 160.
691. See ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE, supra note 105, at
202 (featuring Panel on Originalism and Precedent: Text vs. Precedent in
Constitutional Law).
692. PAUL, supra note 13, at 3.
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their titles long after Marshall’s tenure on the Court. Moreover,
while they bear seemingly disparate principles, that conflict is not
an indication of error on the part of these scholars. Rather, it
indicates a wide array of principles utilized by Marshall, a
consummate pragmatic jurist. Judge Richard Posner noted that
Marshall’s pragmatism and talent for surmounting complex
“legalisms . . .
cutting through . . .
to the practical
considerations,”693 a talent that shone brightly in Burr.

A. Marshall’s Originalism and Historical Analysis
Originalism, the first of aforementioned constitutional
theories, is a family of theories rather than one unified theory.694 An
originalist seeks to recover and apply the original meaning of a law’s
text.695 In a manner of speaking, the contemporary originalist seeks
also to present the reader with the appearance and “unmediated
transfer of historical truth, embodied in the ‘original intention’ of
the framers of constitutional provisions, from the past to
present.”696 While acknowledging the neological nature of
originalism, applied over Marshall’s analysis, Marshall
nevertheless undertook an characteristically originalist approach to
whittle away Bollman and return to the original meaning of
treason. In answering the question of what constituted war levied
in an act of treason, Marshall stated that the term, “treason,” was
an artful adoption by the American Constitution and “must be
understood in that sense in which it was universally received in this
country when the constitution was framed. The sense in which it
was received is to be collected from the most approved authorities
of that nation from which we have borrowed the term.”697
Among the main forms of originalism are original intent and
original meaning. While original intent seeks to gauge the original
intent of the Framers, it takes in the Ratifiers, including Marshall,
as well.698 Original meaning contains two subsets with an original
693. See Posner, supra note 23, at 86 (writing that Chief Justice John
Marshall’s pragmatism is “a somewhat neglected theme in the voluminous
literature about him . . . influential judges tend to be pragmatic judges”).
694. Lawrence B. Solum & Carmack Waterhouse, Originalism 3.0
Symposium: Symposium Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The
Conceptual Structure of The Great Debate, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1243, 1247 (2018).
695. Id. at 1251.
696. G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship,
88 VA. L. REV. 485, 587-88 (2002).
697. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 163.
698. Lawrence B. Solum, What is Originalism? The Evolution of
Contemporary Originalist Theory, GEO. L. FAC. PUBL’N & OTHER WORK 1, 6
(2011), www.scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1353 [perma.cc/K55N-
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public understanding and original public meaning.699 The pursuit of
original intent is said to suffer from certain foundational flaws as to
the anachronistic difficulties of determining what the Framers
understood as the given meaning of a constitutional concept or
phrase.700 Additionally, scholars criticize original intent for the
varying issues of how specific or broad the Framers and Ratifiers
wished to be in their drafting and the troubles in applying the intent
of the Founding to contemporary issues.701 Lawrence B. Solum
noted that the shift towards seeking original Ratifiers’ intent is in
and of itself a form of popular sovereignty.702 While original public
meaning is said to ensure a more objective rule of law, when it finds
its limit in application of a doctrine or case, originalists must turn
elsewhere.703 For instance, Georgetown University legal theory
Professor Randy E. Barnett, noted that while Justice Antonin Scalia
was revered as an “originalist,” Scalia demonstrated the limits by
avoiding absurd results that could flow from strict adherence to
text, he uses precedent, and finally, history in justification of a legal
outcome.704
Marshall used various aspects of both original meaning and
intent. Marshall addressed the question of what constituted
treason’s original meaning with a historical analysis of the model
upon which America followed. Unlike Bollman, Marshall buttressed
this opinion with a myriad of historical sources. He explained that

G7FR].
699. Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 379-80 (2013) (“Alternative ways of framing the theory
appealed to ‘original public understanding’ or ‘original public meaning’” and
noting that original public meaning has become the dominant approach among
contemporary originalists).
700. Solum, supra note 708, at 8.
701. Id. at 9.
702. See id. at 11 (“The move to ratifiers’ understanding or intent is best
understood in conjunction with popular sovereignty as a justification for
originalism. The ratifiers, rather than the Framers, could plausibly be viewed
as expressing the political will of ‘We the People.’”).
703. See Whittington, supra note 709, at 379 (writing, “original meaning
better captures the search for the public meaning of an objective legal rule”);
see also, Solum, supra note 708, at 16 (writing that “the original meaning of the
text does not fully determine constitutional doctrine or its application to
particular cases” and “when the original public meaning of the text “runs out,”
application of the linguistic meaning of the constitutional text to a particular
dispute must be guided by something other than original meaning.”); see also
Tara Smith, Originalism's Misplaced Fidelity: "Original" Meaning Is Not
Objective, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 49 (2009) (Originalism’s objectivity is a point
of scholarly debate. “Originalism elevates subjective beliefs over objective
meaning.”) Id. at 49.
704. See Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted”
Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7,13-14 (2006) (noting however that Barnett
believes Scalia was not in actuality a bona-fide originalist by practice).
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the Framers of the United States Constitution had provided to
Americans a Treason Clause that stated: “Treason against the
United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in
adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person
shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two
witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.”705
The Framers established limitations on the extent to which it
functions, establishing that “[t]he Congress shall have power to
declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall
work corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during the life of the
person attainted.”706 As a preliminary matter of analysis, Marshall
offered, “[i]ndependent of authority, trusting only to the dictates of
reason, and expounding terms according to their ordinary
signification,” as a tenet of treason, “war could not be levied without
the employment and exhibition of force.”707 Marshall gave the
etymology for treason, writing that “the term is not for the first time
applied to treason by the constitution of the United States. It is a
technical term. It is used in a very old statute of that country whose
language is our language, and whose laws form the substratum of
our laws.”708 America’s Treason Clause greatly “differed from all
historical models.”709 Thus, Marshall turned to the concept of
levying war, asserting himself as a historian, writing, that its use
in the Constitution, was “in the same sense in which it was
understood in England, and in this country, to have been used in
the statute of the 25th of Edward III, from which it was
borrowed.”710 America’s concept of treason found its meaningful
genesis in the English Statute of 1351, which categorized treason
respectively into two broad forms, high treason and petty treason.711
America’s concept of treason notably differed from England’s insofar
as the United States did not exist in the idolatrous form of an oath
to the personal leader, such as the figurehead of the royal family.712
America’s treason was new and established alongside a Republic in
which the Founders constitutionally declared the People
705. U.S. CONST. ART. III, §3
706. Id.
707. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 162.
708. Id. at 159.
709. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
710. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 159.
711. See Fletcher, supra note 28, at 194 (citing Statute of Treasons, 1351 25
Edw. 2, ch. 2 and asserting that disloyalty to the throne constituted high
treason, while petty treason was the historic equivalent to homicide).
712. See id. at 196, 199 (“We do not regard the president as the embodiment
of the state or as the object of our allegiance;” it is “The People” of the United
States of America. Thus, this is why an assassination attempt on the president
does not constitute treason).
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supreme.713 Thus, in the United States, an act of treason was
conceived to be an act against the American people.
Marshall operated in Burr with a pursuit of Founders Intent
by invoking the authority of Ratifiers intent, a constitutional
lineage of sorts that at that time now manifested before the
Judiciary. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall, “force and
violence were in the mind of the court, and . . . there was no idea of
extending the crime of treason . . . beyond the constitutional
definition which had been given to it.”714 Based upon his presence
as a Ratifier at the Constitutional Convention, Marshall could
speak authoritatively that the Framers wished to prevent Congress
from inventing additional treasons and due to the limited manner
in which they structured the Treason Clause, effecting one of many
checks and balances on the executive and legislative branches in the
constitutional system.715 The need for a treason clause in the United
States Constitution grew from Shays’ Rebellion of 1786,716 an act
that greatly disturbed Marshall, in which American Revolutionary
War Veteran Daniel Shays attempted to overthrow the government
by force and seize Springfield Amory.717 The Framers thusly treated
treason as a “genuine breach of allegiance” holding no reluctance to
punish the offense with great severity.718 The Rebellion
demonstrated the dire need to reform the ineffective Articles of
Confederation, causing in part the very need to reform the Articles

713. U.S. CONST. preamble; see also Christian Ketter, A Jury of Citizens
Both Free and Imprisoned: If Voter Rights are Ensured for the Incarcerated, is
a Prisoner’s Right to Serve on a Jury Far-Fetched?, 51 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 37, 50
(2019); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
714. See Cramer, 325 U.S. at 32 (noting Anti-Federalist George Mason
wished for a broad treason clause at the Constitutional Convention); see also
Historical Concept of Treason: English, American, supra note 272, at 78 (noting,
however, the limited clause resulted in part from James Wilson’s strong
concerns voiced to limit the potential for misuse); Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 166.
715. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. at 127 (“[T]he framers of our constitution, who
not only defined and limited the crime, but with jealous circumspection
attempted to protect their limitation by providing that no person should be
convicted of it, unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act,
or on confession in open court.”); see also Historical Concept of Treason: English,
American, supra note 272, at 78.; Stewart Harris, Barron, Baltimore, and the
Bill of Rights, Part II., YOUR WEEKLY CONSTITUTIONAL (May 17, 2017),
www.beta.prx.org/stories/317245 [perma.cc/QE4X-C8MV] (remarking at 34:00
by William Davenport Mercer of University of Tennessee that Marshall’s
authority over original intent comes from having attended the Constitutional
Convention).
716. Historical Concept of Treason: English, American, supra note 272, at
77.
717. SEAN CONDON, SHAYS’S REBELLION: AUTHORITY AND DISTRESS IN
POST-REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 81 (2015).
718. See Cramer, 325 U.S. at 8, (noting the Framers, as products of the
American Revolution, also had Benedict Arnold’s treason of 1780 in mind).
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into a new form of governance.719 The Rebellion was present in the
minds of the Framers at the Convention who feared future
insurrections.720 For instance, Marshall once wrote, “[t]hese violent
. . . bloody dissentions . . . cast a deep shade over that bright prospect
which the revolution in America and the establishment of our free
governments had opened to the votaries of liberty throughout the
globe.”721 Thus, for Marshall treason was significant.
Marshall’s authority as a progenitor of the Founding allowed
him to largely surmount the contemporary criticisms of
originalism’s difficulty in determining original meaning.722
Jefferson’s presence in the early Founding, as a drafter of the
Declaration of Independence (in comparison to Marshall’s role as a
constitutional Ratifier) nevertheless supports his characterization
as a strong contender on that subject.723 Still, Marshall’s use of
original meaning could be said to suffer from Professor Barnett’s
criticisms of the contemporary Scalia by invoking history to justify
in part the case’s outcome, this constituted a deviation of the
aforementioned intent that varied among Founders and Ratifiers.724
Nevertheless, judicial statesmanship is characterized by a
pragmatic approach, and selective use of originalism fits within that
model.725
Ultimately, Marshall used an originalist’s attention to
Founder’s intent, piece by piece, surmounting Bollman’s purported
confusion and its problematic aspects, and stating that “an
assemblage to constitute an actual levying of war, should be an
assemblage with such appearance of force as would justify the
opinion that they met for the purpose.”726 He characterized this
reinterpretation as one in which he “believed to be the natural,
certainly not a strained, explanation of the words . . . obviat[ing] an
inference which might otherwise have been drawn;” assemblages

719. See LEONARD L. RICHARDS, SHAYS’S REBELLION: THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION’S FINAL BATTLE 131 (2014) (writing, George Washington
“[u]ndoubtedly . . . saw Shays’ Rebellion as inextricably tied to the inadequacies
of the Articles of Confederation”).
720. Historical Concept of Treason: English, American, supra note 272, at
77.
721. PAUL, supra note 13 ,at 34.
722. Solum, supra note 708, at 8. Nevertheless, Marshall’s judicial voice on
behalf of the Ratifiers could be said to inappropriately minimize his
contemporaries who spoke in the alternative or contrast.
723. See generally WOOD, supra note 148, at 391.
724. See Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted”
Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 13-14 (2006) (noting however that Barnett
believes Scalia was not in actuality a bona-fide originalist by practice).
725. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 85 (2003).
726. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 166.
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require arms.727 Marshall’s systematic constitutional analysis,
specifically arguing each clause, was an invaluable approach that
he had taken when he argued for ratification at the Constitutional
Convention.728

B. Marshall’s Textualism: English Jurists and
American Judges
A textualist, at the theory’s foundation, draws from written
sources only, giving no consideration to non-textual authorities.729
In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall had acknowledged the textual
command of the Treason Clause over the Judiciary.730 In Burr, he
adopted a strict adherence to the text and its construction.731 He
pointedly asked the question in In Re Burr, “What is the natural
import of the words ‘levying war?’ And who may be said to levy
it?”732 Marshall explained “[t]aken most literally,” the words
“levying war . . . are, perhaps, of the same import with the words
raising or creating war, but as those who join after the
commencement are equally the object of punishment, there would
probably be a general admission, that the term also comprehended
making war, or carrying on war.”733 Marshall, reviewed a broad
swath of textual authorities in depth.734 However, Marshall tacitly
acknowledged that a treasonous act requires some act of force.735 He
wrote, “it is difficult to conceive how such a transaction could take
place without exhibiting the appearance of war, without an obvious
display of force.”736 The Marshall Court understood that the
Framers anticipated the international conflict of laws and that
decisions of constitutional law would be made without the benefit of
727. Id.
728. PAUL, supra note 13, at 40.
729. Leah M. Litman, New Textualism and The Thirteenth Amendment, 104
CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 138, 139 (2019).
730. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 179 (writing that the Constitution’s Treason
Clause “is addressed especially to the courts. It prescribes, directly for them, a
rule of evidence not to be departed from. If the legislature should change that
rule, and declare one witness, or a confession out of court, sufficient for
conviction, must the constitutional principle yield to the legislative act”).
731. See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 261 (political weaponization
of the treason clause, “opportunism disguised by a veil of supposed national
security” could be prevented by Marshall’s “[s]trict construction, and adherence
to the law enunciated by the Constitution.”).
732. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 159.
733. Id.
734. Litman, supra note 739, at 139.
735. See Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 162 (“[W]e should probably all concur in the
declaration that war could not be levied without the employment and exhibition
of force.”).
736. Id. at 168.
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reference to a sufficient common law or to any developed
constitutional doctrines.737 Marshall could then begin undoing
Bollman’s pitfalls.
In Bollman, Marshall had explained that treason consisted of
“[a]ny assemblage of men for [the] purpose” of revolution by force
“would amount to a levying of war.”738 Moreover, Bollman
established that it may have been “sufficient for the court to say,
that unless men were assembled, war could not be levied.”739
However, he defended Bollman, stating that it “was not a treatise
on [the definition of] treason, but a decision [in which] a particular
circumstance was necessary to the consummation of the crime.”740
He acknowledged his problematic obitur dictum, stating that the
Court’s “[g]eneral expressions ought not to be considered as
overruling settled principles, without a direct declaration to that
effect.”741 Thus, in Marbury, the Court asserted the authority to say
what the law is; and in Burr, it asserted the final authority to
interpret what the Court said law was.
Marshall cautioned that treason’s working definition was not
“to be collected only from adjudged cases.”742 He wished to shift the
precedent concerning treason and cautioned that “if a spurious
doctrine have been introduced into the common law, and have for
centuries been admitted as genuine, it would require great
hardihood in a judge to reject it.”743 Marshall generated a historical
analysis in which he asserted that “celebrated elementary writers
who have stated the principles of the law, whose statements have
received the common approbation of legal men, are not to be
disregarded,” and “[p]rinciples laid down by such writers as Coke,
Hale, Foster, and Blackstone, are not lightly to be rejected.”744
Marshall would not lightly reject such writers, however. William
Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England was among

737. G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and International Law: The
Piracy Cases, 83 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 727, 727 (1989).
738. Ex parte Bollman, 8. U.S. at 75, 133.
739. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 165 (“In the case of the United States against
Bollman and Swartwout, there was no evidence that even two men had ever
met for the purpose of executing the plan in which those persons were charged
with having participated.” Id. at 165. Based on this, “it was, therefore, sufficient
for the court to say that unless men were assembled, war could not be levied.
That case was decided by this declaration.”).
740. Id. at 166; see also HOBSON, supra note 8, at 6 (“Rather than repudiate
his earlier decision in Ex parte Bollman and Swartwout, Marshall explained
and qualified it.”).
741. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 166.
742. Id. at 159 (emphasis in italics)
743. Id. at 160.
744. Id.

2020]

A Pragmatic Political Balancing

881

young John Marshall’s favorite literature in his formative years.745
Nevertheless, Marshall’s use of scholarship in the treason’s cases is
curious, as G. Edward White noted that Marshall “unquestionably
did not like legal research.”746 Rather, Marshall drew his legal
insights from his refutation of or expansion upon the arguments
presented to him.747 Nevertheless, Marshall offered in Burr a
synthesis that came close to serving as the treatise he cautioned
Bollman was not, warning however that the “circumstances [of
levied war] are so various . . . [,] it is hard to describe all [these
principles] particularly.”748
Marshall recounted that Lord Edward Coke suggested “actual
rebellion or insurrection . . . is a levying of war.”749 Furthermore,
Lord Coke, believing that conspiracy alone is insufficient to
constitute treason, required that “there . . . be a levying of war in
fact” with a “necessary ingredient” of “actual violence.”750 Jefferson
too had once cited to Lord Coke, ironically, when then-Governor he
drafted Virginia's criminal statute of 1788, suggesting a limitation
the scope of treason to “prevent an intimidation of common law
treasons.”751 Now, Marshall bore the responsibility undoing the
common law treason that his own words created. Marshall cited
Lord Matthew Hale’s doctrine for the proposition that “a levying of
war is partly a question of fact,” but one comprised of both speciem
belli and vexillis explicatis.752 That is, with the “appearance of war”
and explained by the banners and pageantry of war “with colors
flying” or so “armed with military weapons, as swords, guns, . . . it
may be reasonably concluded they are in a posture of war.”753
Though, Marshall noted Hale’s purpose in requiring both
appearance and pageantry was to prevent overbroad application in
which “de facto . . . act[s]” of levying war magically rendered every
public riot as treason.754 In Marshall’s eyes, Hale envisioned treason
as a human assembly of war.755 Marshall noted, under Hale’s
745. PAUL, supra note 13, at 22.
746. WHITE, supra note 6, at 14.
747. Id.
748. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 163.
749. Id. at 160.
750. Id. at 163.
751. Zellar, supra note 39, at 60-61.
752. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 163.
753. Id. at 163.
754. Id.
755. See id. (asserting, “[i]t is obvious that Lord Hale supposed an
assemblage of men in force, in a military posture, to be necessary to constitute
the fact of levying war. The idea, he appears to suggest, that the apparatus of
war is necessary, has been very justly combated by an able judge who has
written a valuable treatise on the subject of treason; but, it is not recollected
that his position, that the assembly should be in a posturn of war for any
treasonable attempt, has ever been denied.”).
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doctrine, treasonous war levied included guerrino arraiati, a
warlike array.756 Marshall noted a distinction between preparation
and manifestation of war; that is, when war is levied in a visible
array, in which it is bellum levatum, preparing for a treasonable
attempt.757 However, once the overt act manifests, it is bellum
percussum.758 Marshall argued, in contrast to Hale, advising
treason and assembling in treason are two distinct acts, and Hale’s
historical suggestions to the contrary are dicta without any legal
support thereof.759 Marshall characterized the prosecution’s
assertion of Hale’s doctrine as “repugnant to the declarations we
find elsewhere.”760 Moreover, the Court cannot extend a judge’s
“dictum . . . beyond its terms.”761 Parenthetically, Marshall was
speaking introspectively in part with regard to his own dictum in
Bollman. He noted that the great difficulty in applying Hale’s
principles was a lack of particularity and quantification of guilt
when multiple parties levy war.762 Nevertheless, he highlighted the
fact Hale established no man could be declared “a principal in felony
unless he be present . . . [h]e must be present at the perpetration.”763
Thus, without Burr’s presence on Blennerhassett’s Island, he could
not commit treason.
Marshall turned to William Hawkins, who considered acts of
treason to be acts purposed “to redress a public grievance, whether
it be a real or pretended one,” and an invasion of the government’s
“prerogative,” requiring both “force and violence.”764 Next, Marshall
recounted that English Judge Sir Michael Foster defined treason as
“joining with rebels in an act of rebellion, or with enemies in acts of
hostility” in which all are principal actors.765 Judge Foster required
a “pomp and pageantry of war, as essential circumstances to
constitute the fact of levying war” and furor arma ministrat, tools
of war “proper for the mischief [actors] intended to effect.” 766 Most
importantly for Foster, treason required “the actual employment of

756. Id.
757. Id.
758. Id. at 164
759. Id. at 174
760. Id.
761. Id.
762. See id. at 160 (Marshall writing, “Hale, in treating on the same subject,
puts many cases which shall constitute a levying of war, without which no act
can amount to treason; but he does not particularize the parts to be performed
by the different persons concerned in that war, which shall be sufficient to fix
on each the guilt of levying it.”).
763. Id. at 171.
764. Id. at 163.
765. Id. at 160.
766. Id. at 164.
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force” to be present when one levies war.767 Marshall summarized
that Foster envisioned “a [real] state of force and violence” and “a
posture of war” with “enlisting and marching.”768 Nevertheless,
noted Marshall, while Foster conceived of constructive treason, he
nevertheless saw force “as a material ingredient.”769 Whether
“technically[,] as well as really,” force was vital to treason.770
Moreover, pursuant to the doctrine of principal participation, Foster
asserted that he who “is charged . . . must be ready to render
assistance to those who are” treasonously acting.771 Citing both
Foster and Hawkins, Marshall noted that a treasonist must “be
ready to give immediate and direct assistance” to the other actors.772
Thus, no matter what, from a doctrinal standpoint, Marshall could
discount constructive treason from its very foundation.773
Marshall moved onto Blackstone and continued the
development of the doctrine conclusively to establish an
indisputable necessity of force. He wrote, Blackstone, “concur[ring]
with his predecessors,” expanded the doctrine by defining it as
“taking arms, not only to [overthrow the government] but under
pretense to reform religion or the laws, or to remove evil counsellors
or other grievances, whether real or pretended. For the law does
not. neither can it, permit any private man or set of men to interfere
forcibly in matters of such high importance.”774 Blackstone too
“contemplated actual force as a necessary ingredient” to treason
with added hostility when war is levied.775
Beyond the text of historical jurists, Marshall afforded
“particular attention” and looked over the opinions of several
contemporary circuit judges who stated as much: Judges James
Iredell and Richard Peters, who felt force and actual assemblage
was necessary to levy war; Judge Chase who felt that a quantum of
force is necessary and the exact number of persons “is wholly
immaterial.”776 Thus, Marshall established that of the required
assemblage, force was perceptively “never separated” therefrom and
“was the particular point the court meant to establish.”777 He noted
that American judges “required still more to constitute the fact of
levying war, than has been required by the English books.”778
767. Id.
768. Id.
769. Id.
770. Id.
771. Id. at 172.
772. Id.
773. See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 246.
774. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 164.
775. Id.
776. Id. at 165.
777. Id. at 166.
778. Id. at 165.
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However, Marshall acknowledged that it is asserted that “[a]ll these
authorities have been overruled by the decision of the Supreme
Court in” Bollman.779 Marshall therefore laid the means by which
he may resolve this seeming refutation.

C. Marshall’s Structuralism
A structuralist infers meaning from multiple aspects of one
legal document, inferring meaning from another across the
Constitution’s whole.780 The process balances an analysis from other
portions of the document to gain an understanding in “adherence to
the Constitution’s text.”781 Structuralism, however, requires
“sufficient flexibility to apply across time as circumstances
evolve.”782 Here, Marshall’s pragmatic use of structuralism evoked
a mission to maintain the Constitution’s supremacy and to
demonstrate the superiority of its firm American republican
principles over England’s malleable tools of tyranny.783 Marshall
briefly acknowledged structuralism in Burr and wrote, “[t]he
question which arises on the construction of the constitution, in
every point of view in which it can be contemplated . . . requires the
most temperate and the most deliberate consideration.”784 The
demands of logic and the construction of the Treason Clause led
Marshall to the brisk conclusion that “there must be a war, or the
crime of levying it cannot exist.”785 Structuralism plays upon the
779. Id.
780. Casey L. Westover, Structural Interpretation and the New Federalism:
FindingtThe Proper Balance Between State Sovereignty and Federal
Supremacy, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 693, 694 (2005).
781. Id. at 694.
782. Id. at 694.
783. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism And
Functionalism In Separation Of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 21
(1998) (writing of a pragmatic use of various approaches in which “Chief Justice
John Marshall deduced from the text and structure-and maybe even the original
intent-of the Constitution, rules apportioning national and state authority”);
Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 752 (1999) (writing,
Marshall demonstrated “how structural argument often goes hand in hand with
a certain kind of pragmatic argument. Stingy construction of the Constitution,
Marshall argues, would offend the nature of the Constitution not merely as a
suitably nationalist and populist document, but also as an inherently practical
document. The Constitution was meant to work—and to work over long
stretches of time, and vast reaches of space”). See generally Westover, supra
note 790, at 702 (writing that Marshall “establish[ed] that the Constitution
provides for judicial review [and] relied in sequence on two distinct structural
themes, beginning with the supremacy of the Constitution and its superiority
to other law”).
784. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 159.
785. Id.
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reader’s subconscious by logically connecting various aspects of the
written document.786 Marshall’s use of structuralism follows
naturally from his passion for dramaturgy and therefrom his
working knowledge of perception, illusion, and human nature.787
Marshall’s use of structuralism was a necessary component in
legitimizing the Court’s power to restrict the political branches’
hectoring application of the Treason Clause by stressing the Court’s
judicial review over matters constitutional.788 He had an uncanny
ability to use seemingly disparate aspects of the Constitution to
reconcile a proposition against the whole of the document and
justify that proposition.789 One gleans a functional application of
logic in Marshall’s structuralism.790 Marshall accomplished this, for
instance, by using thematic concepts and syllogism in reasoning the
Constitution’s text against itself.791 Marshall strategically had used
786. Maxwell O. Chibundu, Structure And Structuralism In The
Interpretation, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1439, 1494 (1994) (“[S]tructuralism builds on
the result of the deconstructive practice by exploiting both the conscious and
subconscious forces at work in shaping institutional relationships.”).
787. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (writing that Marshall
justifies his position without the specificity of text itself, writing, “[t]here is no
express provision for the case, but the claim has been sustained on a principle
which so entirely pervades the Constitution, is so intermixed with the materials
which compose it, so interwoven with its web, so blended with its texture, as to
be incapable of being separated from it without rending it into shreds.”); H.
RICHARD UVILLER, WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS,
OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT 96 (Duke Univ. Press 2002)
(writing that Marshall acknowledged the power of perception and its relation to
the Constitution, writing that if there exists a power of “persuasion by
convincing, then Mr. Madison was the most eloquent man I ever heard.”). See
generally PAUL, supra note 13, at 2,112.
788. See generally Sylvia Snowiss, Text and Principle in John Marshall's
Constitutional Law: the Cases of Marbury and McCulloch, 33 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 973, 1016 (2000) (The legitimacy of a judicial restraint is tied to the
structural characteristics of legal and judicial decision-making.”).
789. See id. at 993 (noting among Marshall’s major opinions is evoked his
“capacity to confound principle and text and to maintain some kind of
compliance with the doubtful case rule.”); see also McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407
(stating Marshall wrote, the Constitution’s “nature . . . requires, that only its
great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the
minor ingredients which compose those objects, be deduced from the nature of
the objects themselves. That this idea was entertained by the framers of the
American constitution, is not only to be inferred from the nature of the
instrument, but from the language. Why else were some of [its] limitations . . .
introduced? It is also, in some degree, warranted, by their having omitted to use
any restrictive term which might prevent its receiving a fair and just
interpretation. In considering this question, then, we must never forget that it is
a constitution we are expounding” (emphasis added)).
790. See Amar, supra note 793, at 752 (writing that, for Chief Justice
Marshall, "as a matter of general structural logic, surely the part cannot control
the whole").
791. See generally Westover, supra note 790, at 702 (writing that
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structuralism in rationalizing and strengthening the Judiciary’s
ability to enforce subpoenas over the political branches, specifically
the Executive.792 He noted that unlike English evidentiary rules,
the American Constitution lacked a Presidential exemption for
subpoena compliance, and leveraged that omission by structurally
reasoning that the United States Constitution acknowledged
limitations on the President, that he may be “impeached and
removed from office,” as his power flows “from the mass of the
people.”793 Marshall declared that the President is not above the law
and drew a distinction between Jefferson and the King of England,
painting the contrast of American accountability against Great
Britain’s concept in which “the King can do no wrong.”794 Thus,
according to structuralism, in Marshall’s eyes, the Constitution
treated no differently the President and the average person subject
to subpoena.795 Marshall, therefore, reasoned that the Court had
authority to compel the President’s compliance. What had been for
Marshall an unproductive and, albeit unbeneficial battle between
the Judiciary and the Executive, with the looming risk of
impeachment via Legislative pawns, became yet another
opportunity for Marshall to both check and balance the power of the
Executive via structural reasoning.

D. Marshall’s Common-Law Constitutionalism to
Backtrack Bollman.
According to University of Chicago law Professor and
constitutional theory scholar, David A. Strauss, common-law
constitutionalism uses a body of judicial decisions to resolve the
interpretive gaps that result between textual reliance and the daily
practice of constitutional interpretation.796 Professor Strauss noted,

characteristically Marshall justifies the Court’s position on an issue by “pulling
themes from the text of the document, pointing to various clauses in the
Constitution that imply a role for the Court”).
792. See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 12 at 272-73 (“[Marshall] observed
that the Constitution admitted of no exception to the right of an accused to the
compulsory process of the court, and [England’s] law of evidence reserved an
exception only for the king”).
793. Id.
794. HARLOW GILES UNGER, JOHN MARSHALL: THE CHIEF JUSTICE WHO
SAVED THE NATION 254 (2014).
795. See Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 37 (ruling that “a subpoena may issue to the
president, the accused is entitled to it of course; and whatever difference may
exist with respect to the power to compel the same obedience to the process, as
if it had been directed to a private citizen, there exists no difference with respect
to the right to obtain it”).
796. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U.
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however, the risk of judicial decisions that depart from text or the
literal foundations of a law as lacking the perception of
legitimacy.797 While, like many theories of constitutional law,
common-law constitutionalism has its variations, the prevailing
theme emphasizes that the Constitution’s power today derives from
the continuous human faith in the wisdom of the authorities who
ratified it.798 Marshall’s efforts in Burr led to his description as “a
hard-nosed realist about human nature[,] . . . an idealist regarding
. . . [how] law might aid human beings in rational deliberation,” and
a Justice “deeply rooted in his notion of the common law itself,
which was part and parcel of his view of republican leadership.”799
Marshall overstepped in Bollman, trying to criticize subtly the
Jefferson administration. It required that Marshall judicially
recoil.800 Marshall had therefore used his role on the Court and
risked the posterity and legitimacy of the Judiciary on an
unnecessary constitutional shell fight stemming solely from his
personal conflicts with Jefferson.801 Thus, in Burr, Marshall
backtracked from his previous opinion in Bollman, disclaiming his
error, “[t]his court is . . . required to depart from the principle there
laid down.”802 He cautioned, “[i]t may not be proper to notice the
opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of . . . Bollman and
Swartwout. It is said that this opinion, in declaring that those who
do not bear arms may yet be guilty of treason, is contrary to law,
and is not obligatory, because it is extrajudicial, and was delivered
on a point not argued.”803 Marshall declaimed that an opinion, such
as Bollman, “which is to overrule all former precedents, and to
establish a principle never before recognized,” if truly meant to
make such a change, “should be expressed in plain and explicit
Chi. L. Rev. 877, 877 (1996).
797. See id. at 877 (“An air of illegitimacy surrounds any alleged departure
from the text or the original understandings.”).
798. See generally id. at 885 (“The currently prevailing theories of
constitutional interpretation are rooted in a different tradition: implicitly or
explicitly, they rest on the view that the Constitution is binding because
someone with authority adopted it.”).
799. NEWMYER, supra note 165, at 202.
800. UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra, note 203, at 224; see also SMITH, supra,
note 222, at 366,640 n. 108 (citing a letter from Marshall to Cushing, June 27,
1807).
801. See generally Ian Lancaster, Agurus Bernhardus (L.)—An Introduction
To The Natural History Of Hermit Crabs, VLAAMS INSTTITUUT VOOR DE ZEE/
FLANDERS MARINE INSTITUTE FIELD STUDIES 189, 214 (1988) (writing “Shell
fights” are a natural phenomenon in which two hermit crabs fight over a shell
in a violent power struggle that will “follow a generally predictable pattern, and
involve the attacker in manipulating the other crab’s shell [via shaking] and
usually ‘rapping’ its own shell against it a number of times before attempting to
pull the occupant out and flinging it away”).
802. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 161.
803. Id.
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terms.”804 Marshall presented the absurd reality of Bollman taken
to its extreme and reigned in the means to enact a course correction.
He stated that if the Court’s true intention had been to change the
historic doctrine of treason in such a revolutionary manner, “the
court ought to have expressly declared, that any assemblage of men
whatever, who had formed a treasonable design, whether in force or
not, whether in a condition to attempt the design or not, whether
attended with warlike appearances or not, constitutes the fact of
levying war.”805 Still, Marshall was apt to note Bollman’s criticisms
are in hindsight and it should not be viewed with unfair
aggrandizement or diminishment because it “was not a treatise on
treason, but a decision of a particular circumstance . . . necessary”
for the crime.806 Marshall asserted the Court’s sole power to limit
what is read into the Court’s opinions, as “[g]eneral expressions
ought not to be considered as overruling settled principles, without
a direct declaration to that effect.”807 It is altogether fitting that
Marshall corralled the significance of precedent, as Professor
Strauss noted the legitimacy of American constitutional law is
largely a product of the Marshall Court.808 For example, the
Marshall Court’s expansion of federal power both from and for the
Judiciary.809
Marshall acknowledged the propriety of the defense’s
argument for Bollman’s abrogation, because it was “incorrect it
ought not be obeyed, because it was extrajudicial.”810 In spite of
Marshall effectively overturning Bollman, he attempted to justify
why the Court had addressed issues beyond the mere inquiry of
whether a treasonable assemblage had taken place. Sidestepping
Bollman, he nevertheless bulwarked respect for common law and
judicial precedent, writing:
For myself, I can say that I could not lightly be prevailed on to disobey
it, were I even convinced that it was erroneous, but I would certainly
use any means which the law placed in my power to carry the

804. Id. at 165 (emphasis added).
805. Id. at 165.
806. Id. at 166.
807. Id.
808. See Strauss, supra note 806, at 904 (“The great achievements of
American constitutional law today are the product not just of the Framers and
their generation but of Marshall and Story, of the generation that fought the
Civil War and initiated Reconstruction, of Brandeis and Holmes, of the New
Deal generation, of the Warren Court, and of many other people (not just judges)
along the way.”).
809. See generally id. at 884 (“Most of the great revolutions in American
constitutionalism have taken place without any authorizing or triggering
constitutional amendment.”).
810. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 161.
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question again before the supreme court, for reconsideration, in a case
in which it would directly occur and be fully argued.811

Marshall hesitated to admit an explicit error in precedent.812
He wrote, “I then thought, and still think, [Bollman] perfectly
correct, to carry the point, if possible, again before the supreme
court, if the case should depend upon it . . . I still think the opinion
perfectly correct[;] I do not consider myself as going further than the
preceding reasoning goes.”813 Marshall had completed a great
reframing of the circumstances in which the Court found itself. By
marshalling respect for precedent, he redirected the burden to find
the correct outcome the first time off of the Court and onto counsel
to try harder the next time such an issue appeared before the Court.
More than that, however, by surmounting his own opinion and
admitting
some
error,
Marshall
used
common-law
constitutionalism by redirecting the understanding of American
Constitutional governance back to the Constitution itself, and not
the Court. Burr effectively brought closure to the mission of
Marbury by transforming the Judiciary from the final point of
authority into a portal by which all branches of government
continually defer to the Constitution’s power derived from “We the
People. 814

E. Marshall’s Living Constitutionalism, Redefining
“Treason” in Burr
A living constitutionalist recognizes that power is not centered
in the government per se, but rather, leveraged by the ever-growing
needs of the people.815 As Alexander Hamilton stated in Federalist
Paper 78, “the power of the people is superior” because sovereignty
lies with the people.816 Thus, a living constitutionalist views the acts
of the judiciary as flowing of the people, by the people, for the people.
Constitutional theorist Jack M. Balkin posits that living
constitutionalism and originalism are “actually flip sides of the

811. Id.
812. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 6 (“Rather than repudiate his earlier
decision in Ex parte Bollman and Swartwout, Marshall explained and qualified
it.”).
813. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 161.
814. See generally Strauss, supra note 806, at 885 (“The currently prevailing
theories of constitutional interpretation are rooted in a different tradition:
implicitly or explicitly, they rest on the view that the Constitution is binding
because someone with authority adopted it.”).
815. Ozan O. Varol, The Origins and Limits of Originalism: A Comparative
Study, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1239, 1251 (2011).
816. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Ketter, Second
Amendment in Jeopardy, supra note 55.
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same coin”817 Regardless, it functions as a constitutional analysis of
“text and principle” in which “interpreters must be faithful to the
original meaning of the constitutional text and to the principles that
underlie the text” with a “method of text and principle . . . as a
process of permissible constitutional construction.”818 Marshall had
acknowledged that the Constitution is “the whole American fabric,”
as such, its threads are inescapably weaved in relation to one
another.819 Marshall, however, did not see an unlimited room for
expounding upon the Constitution, but rather, a fledgling period of
growth and a working understanding for the new republic’s
Constitution and its Judiciary.820 Still, what he saw was an
adaptable living framework of initial principles that may manifest
in new concepts.821
When Marshall faced the question of what constituted treason,
he had to eradicate the possibility of constructive treason and thus
began his analysis by noting that Aaron Burr “was at a great
distance and in a different state.”822 By contrast, the evidence
showed Burr was not among the assembly on Blennerhassett’s
Island.823 Explicitly addressing the issue of requisite evidence was
vital for Marshall after Hay signaled to the Jeffersonianimpeachment of Justice Samuel Chase.824 Marshall therefore wrote,
817. Jack M. Balkin, Original Ideas on Originalism: Framework
Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 551 (2009).
818. Id. at 551-52.
819. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176.
820. White, supra note 4, at 791 (writing, “when Marshall described the
Constitution as requiring ‘expounding,’ and being ‘adapted to the various crises
of human affairs [in McCulloch v. Maryland],’ he did not mean that the
Constitution’s principles changed with time. He meant, instead, that because
the surfacing of newly contested legal issues was an endemic feature of
American society, the continuing application of constitutional first principles to
new disputes would be required.”); see generally, Sylvia Snowiss, Text and
Principle in John Marshall's Constitutional Law: The Cases of Marbury and
McCulloch, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 973, 1014 (2000) (acknowledging
“Marshall's extension . . . to circumstances not immediately in the mind of the
framers.”).
821. G. Edward White, The “Constitutional Revolution” as a Crisis in
Adaptivity, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 874 (1997) (writing of “Marshall's meaning of
adaptability: the equivalent of a restatement of first principles in new
contexts.”).
822. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 170; see HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 282
(arguing that Marshall hedged off even the possibility that Burr could be said
to have been constructively present).
823. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 170.
824. See Simon, supra, note 663, at 197-98 ( “There is no doubt that the idea
of impeaching Chase was initiated by the president . . . Chase, from the bench,
[had taken] a thinly disguised swipe at Jefferson's suspected atheism.”); see
also, HOBSON, supra note 8, at 32, 58 (writing that referring to an impeachment
article against Justice Chase concerning his conduct in an earlier treason trial,
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“[i]t is . . . necessary to inquire whether . . . the doctrine of
constructive presence can apply” to Burr’s case.825 Marshall again
turned to Lord Coke stating that Coke supported the notion that all
are principals in treason, but nowhere is there support for treason
by constructive presence.826 He turned back to Judge Foster for
similar support to dismiss constructive treason and assert that as a
“point of law . . . [a] man who incites, aids, or procures a treasonable
act, is not . . . legally present when that act is committed” simply by
“consequence of that incitement, aid or procurement.”827 Marshall
invoked the doctrine of absurdity, declaring that if one may be
“constructively present” several states removed from the scene of
the act, “then he is present at every overt act performed anywhere;
that omnipresent participant may then be tried in any state on the
continent, where any overt act has been committed . . in which he
had no personal participation.”828 Evidently, Wickham’s argument
resonated with Marshall.829 Such an extension was “too extravagant
to be in terms maintained” and “[c]ertainly . . . cannot be supported
by the doctrines of the English law.”830 Marshall expressly rejected
the prosecution’s argument that in Bollman America adopted
constructive treason under English common law.831
Marshall synthesized the meaning of treason as conduct in
which the accused “appeared in arms against their country. That is,
in other words, that the assemblage was . . . a warlike
assemblage.”832 Marshall presented a definition of treason and
accordingly opined in Burr that “war [as opposed to simple murder]
is a complex operation, composed of many parts, co-operating with
each other.”833 For Marshall, treason taken on its whole, consisted
of a person’s acts “subverting their government.”834 Marshall
suggested that an act of war would bear “such appearance of force”
to suggest an actor’s “particular purpose” is to effect “an actual
levying of war.”835 Indeed, Marshall recognized that “[a]ll those who
perform the various and essential military parts of prosecuting the
war which must be assigned to different persons, may with

“Hay appeared to be warning Chief Justice Marshall of what might happen if
he granted the motion to exclude evidence”).
825. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 170.
826. Id. at 116, 171.
827. Id. at 171.
828. Id. at 173.
829. Id. at 116.
830. Id. at 173.
831. HOBSON, supra note 8, at 56.
832. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 166.
833. Id. at 160.
834. Id. at 159.
835. Id. at 166.
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correctness and accuracy be said to levy war.”836 Moreover, when
war is “actually levied, that is, if a body of men be actually
assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable object,
all those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote
from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general
conspiracy,” are traitors. 837 However, an actor must be “legally
present” among an actual “assemblage in force.”838 Thus, pursuant
to In Re Burr, a forceful domestic act, consisting of warlike
assemblage, made against the people of the United States, properly
constituted an act of treason. Marshall defined war stating that a
levy of “[w]ar is an appeal from reason to the sword; and he who
makes the appeal evidences the fact by the use of the means.”839 A
levier’s “intention to go to war may be proved by words; but the
actual going to war is a fact which is to be proved by open deed.”840
Simply put, without putting on a case in which Burr was actually
on Blennerhassett’s Island, there could be no treason.
Giving some transparency to his definition, Marshall surmised
an example; “[i]f a rebel army,” hostile to the government, marches
and disperses from military maneuver without firing a gun, “I
confess I could not, without some surprise, hear gentlemen seriously
contend that this could not amount to an act of levying war.”841
Marshall noted, as he did in Bollman, a critical distinction between
conspiring to levy war and actually levying war.842 He suggested
that treason bears a general conspiratorial nature stating that “only
who perform a part, and who are leagued in the conspiracy, are
declared to be traitors.”843 Marshall’s qualification of treason as a
conspiracy, however, tacitly suggested that it is an offense requiring
two or more parties, something that the Constitution’s treason
clause explicitly does not do. Thus, Marshall likely still left
problematic obitur dictum rendering an obstacle to prosecuting a
treasonist who levies war alone.

836. Id. at 161.
837. Id. at 161. (emphasis added).
838. Id. at 161, 171.
839. Id. at 162-63.
840. Id. at 163
841. Id. at 162.
842. Id. 177 (“This opinion does not touch the case of a person who advises
or procures an assemblage, and does nothing further. The advising, certainly,
and perhaps the procuring, is more in the nature of a conspiracy to levy war
than of the actual levying of war."); see also Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. at 126.
843. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 161.
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F. Marshall’s judicial statesmanship and public policy
concerns
Marshall’s opinion reflects that he was torn between politics,
principle, and the People, and strove to achieve a balance thereof.844
Marshall noted the compounded position the Court faced, writing,
“[t]hat this court dares not usurp power is most true. That this court
dares not shrink from its duty is not less true. No man is desirous
of placing himself in a disagreeable situation;” however, the Court
has “no choice in the case” with “no alternative presented . . . but a
dereliction of duty, or the opprobrium of those who are denominated
the world, he merits the contempt as well as the indignation of his
country, who can hesitate which to embrace.”845 If Marshall’s career
was going to take a critical hit from Jefferson via impeachment or
public disgrace over Burr’s treason case, his historian experiences
taught him to do his best to find his place in history as a martyr of
the law, seemingly following the principle to its appropriate and
logical junction.846 His paramount goal was to continue the mission
of American constitutional law and remove treason from a
politicized definition while guaranteeing a fair trial to the
accused.847
Echoing thoughts of the legendary British Conservative jurist,
Edmund Burke, Marshall expressed concern that “man is incapable
of governing himself” and feared another American Revolution
against the newly formed Republic.848 Marshall knew that if
additional treasons could be invoked by the government and
effectively read into the text of the Constitution, it could indeed
844. See Hobson Interview, supra note 16, at 2 (“Marshall tried as best he
could to cast his decision in favor of Burr’s acquittal as a clash between the rule
of law and the popular will — with the judge having no choice but to uphold the
rule of law.”).
845. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 179 ; see HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 12, at
284-85 (arguing that here Marshall acknowledged the possibility that this
decision risked his judicial impeachment).
846. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 59 (“Marshall anticipated the criticism
that would inevitably follow from his decision to prevent the jury from hearing
further evidence in the case. He cast himself as the embattled judge obeying the
stern dictates of judicial duty in resisting the popular tide.”). See generally
White, supra note 4, at 794-95 (“The authority of legal interpreters, by contrast,
did not come from their human, partisan ‘wills,’ but from their status as
savants, trained agents whose cultural and professional roles were to discern
and to apply the law’s fundamental principles, whose meaning was sometimes
mysterious or obscure to average persons.”).
847. See NEWMYER, supra note 411, at 196-97 (“[Marshall’s] main concern
and greatest accomplishment was to move American constitutional law toward
a nonpolitical definition of treason and assure Aaron Burr a fair trial according
to prevailing legal standards.”).
848. PAUL, supra note 13, at 34.
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create a revolt against the government. Thus, Marshall made a
policy decision by avoiding this societal risk, but it required
correcting course from Bollman and potentially undermining the
Court’s authority. In this case, Marshall rejected the common-law
theory of constitutionalism, which bears relation to Edmund Burke
himself.849 For instance, the “Burkean Minimalism” theory
suggests that judges decide as little as possible, to the narrowest of
decisions according to judicial “experience and tradition.”850 As
such, only overtime can large changes be made to bodies of
precedent. Its purpose is to make change slowly, in order to
maintain the Judiciary’s credibility.851 From a Burkean perspective,
a Court potentially undermines its posterity by overturning
precedents at will with no respect for the established prior ruling.852
It is similar to the Common-Law Theory of constitutionalism in its
respect for precedent, an approach for which scholars advocate that
the country was founded upon notions of common-law, with the
recognition that the Constitution is a higher power, but functions
like the common-law.853 Here, Marshall implicitly overturned his
own Court’s precedent generated within the same year of 1807.
Marshall was forced to take this risk to the Court’s credibility was
that by overturning Bollman. Explicitly, Marshall acknowledged
the overstep and a viable minimalistic approach, by noting that
Bollman could have merely functioned as an “opinion that no
treason could be committed, because no treasonable assemblage
had taken place,” and “the court might have [sufficiently] dispensed
with proceeding further in the doctrines of treason.”854 Similarly to
the disclaimer that Marshall inserted into Bollman, he attempted
to limit In Re Burr’s scope, writing, “this opinion does not extend to
the case of a person who performs no act in the prosecution of the
war, who counsels and advises it- or who, being engaged in the
849. Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory
and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 656 (1994).
850. Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 356
(2006).
851. Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1454, 1527 (2000).
852. See id. (“When the Court overrules its own precedent - at least when it
does so in fairly short order, . . . , it acts like a legislature repealing a statute,
and thus arguably forfeits some of its credibility as a trustworthy decisionmaker
about rights. Of course, it can also be argued that the Court bolsters its
credibility by quickly repudiating decisions that are obviously wrong.”).
853. See Young, supra note 859, at 656, 668 (“Burke’s theory of reform is . .
. grounded in the common-law tradition of evolutionary change whereby custom
was constantly being subjected to the test of experience . . . Burke’s view
coincides roughly with that of the common-law constitutionalists of the late
nineteenth century.”).
854. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 161.
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conspiracy, fails to perform his part.”855
Marshall took the opportunity to again defend Bollman,
stating, “[i]t was not surprising” that the Court “made some attempt
to settle principles which would probably occur, and which were in
some degree connected with the point before them.”856 For just as
judicial statesmanship has its success, it also has its failure. Here,
Marshall acknowledged the failure of overswinging in Bollman. He
would not make this mistake again. Marshall explicitly clarified
that after this opinion in Burr, Bollman “contains nothing contrary
to the doctrine now laid down.”857 Though just as he noted the
Court’s overswing, he noted Jefferson’s. Knowing full well that Burr
was found with only sixty men – a number that greatly contrasted
the seven thousand with which the Jefferson administration
purported Burr planned to assemble – Marshall wrote that an
actual assemblage of “7,000 men is unquestionably to place those
who are so assembled in a state of open force.”858 However, that was
not the case.
Marshall asserted one more means by which Burr could not be
found guilty. Marshall characterized Burr as an accessory to the
Blennerhassett incident and, as a matter of criminal procedure
“however atrocious, the trial of the accessory can never precede the
conviction of the principal” because “[t]he legal guilt of the accessory
depends on the guilt of the principal.”859 As such, it “can only be
established in a prosecution against” the principal.860 Therefore,
Burr’s guilt depended on the guilt of those who first assembled on
Blennerhassett’s Island.861 Thus, Marshall affirmed another
element of criminal procedure, an essential particularity that an
indictment for treason cannot merely allege war was levied in a
general manner, but instead, “must be more particularly specified
by laying what is termed an overt act of levying war.”862 Marshall
made sure to note that this opinion did not preclude accessorial
charges of treason; nor did it address them.863 He stated, rather, “I
will not pretend that I have not individually an opinion on these
points, but it is one which I should give only in a case absolutely
requiring it.”864 Thus, Marshall found ways to assert himself
without compounding problematic dicta. Moreover, he wrote, “[t]his
opinion does not touch the case of a person who” takes no action
855. Id. at 161, 182.
856. Id. at 161
857. Id. at 176-77
858. BROOKHISER, supra, note 164, at 115.
859. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 178.
860. Id.
861. Id. at 170.
862. Id. at 170..
863. Id. at 177
864. Id. at 176.
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further than “advis[ing] or procur[ing] an assemblage.”865
Nevertheless, in spite of Marshall’s disclaimers of minimal judicial
expression, he wrote, “[i]t may possibly be the opinion of the
Supreme Court, that those who procure a treason, and do nothing
further, are guilty under the constitution; I only say that opinion
has not yet been given.”866
Marshall returned to the looming issue of executive privilege,
what was perhaps, the subtle bulk below the proverbial iceberg. He
addressed the issue of testimony admitted against Burr by
acknowledging the prosecution’s ability to enter the testimony but
dually characterizing it as irrelevant.867 Marshall wrote, “[i]t is, of
necessity, the peculiar province of the court to judge . . .
admissibility of testimony. If the court admit improper or reject
proper testimony, it is an error of judgment, but it is an error
committed in the direct exercise of their judicial functions.”868
Marshall did not leave the risk of the outcome in the hands of the
jury, however. He undermined the quality of the testimony that had
been admitted, countering that “its nature [is] merely corroborative,
and incompetent to prove the overt act in itself;” furthermore, it “is
irrelevant, until there be proof of the overt act by two witnesses.869
The testimony connecting Burr was “totally irrelevant, and must,
therefore, be rejected.”870 Marshall could not afford to put the
Judiciary in a stalemate position of compelling the Executive to
tender evidence, for (like the risks in Marbury) if Jefferson refused
to comply, the Court had no ability to enforce.871 Marshall knew that
the defense’s motions for evidence and the prosecution’s assertion
of privilege were disingenuous and tactical but nevertheless a
product of duty; he noted, “the zeal with which [each side]
advocate[d] particular opinions” manifested in that they “should . .
. press their arguments too far, should be impatient at any
deliberation in the court, and should suspect or fear the operation
of motives to which alone they can ascribe that deliberation, is

865. Id. at 177.
866. Id.
867. Id. at 113.
868. Id.
869. Id. at 180..
870. Id.
871. See ELLEN GRIGSBY, CENGAGE ADVANTAGE BOOKS: ANALYZING
POLITICS 261 (2014) (writing that Marbury evinced a “realiz[ation] that judicial
review is not an unlimited power. Although the Supreme Court can strike down
laws and actions, the Court depends on other offices of government to apply
Court decisions. In short, the Court lacks the power to enforce its own decision
and needs federal and state politicians to interpret the Court's ruling and carry
out the enforcement”).

2020]

A Pragmatic Political Balancing

897

perhaps, a frailty incident to human nature.”872 Still, Marshall
justified the Court’s power over the Executive Branch by framing it
within the concept of the Court’s unwavering duty to ensure that a
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are upheld in a federal
prosecution.873 Thus, Marshall presented a plain duty using the
fulcrum of the Constitution on which to levy his decision and the
power of the Court as a balance against the Executive Branch.874
While problems on treason indeed remained after Bollman,
Marshall left no stone unturned this second time around. He
directed that the decision “amounts to this and nothing more, that
when war is actually levied, not only those who bear arms, but those
also who are leagued in the conspiracy, and who perform the various
distinct parts which are necessary for the prosecution of war, do, in
the sense of the constitution, levy war.”875 Marshall declared that
the levying of treason was a question of fact to be decided by the
jury from the circumstances of the case. 876 However, before
Marshall concluded the Court’s opinion on the law and left the case
to the jury to judge the facts, he subtly boxed in their decisionmaking, “[i]n conformity with principle and with authority,” Burr
“was neither legally nor actually present at Blennerhassett’s island;
and the court is strongly inclined to the opinion, that, without
proving an actual or legal presence by two witnesses, the overt act
laid in this indictment cannot be proved.”877 Moreover, by limiting
their ability to review the evidence, Marshall ensured an
acquittal.878 He stated, “[i]t is further the opinion of the court, that
there is no testimony whatever which tends to prove that the
accused was actually or constructively present when that
assemblage did take place.”879 Therefore, even if somehow
constructive treason could be said to remain, Marshall removed its
power in this case.
Ultimately, for Marshall and the Court in Burr, “[a]ny force
connected with the intention . . . constitute[s] the crime of levying
of war.”880 That force, in an overt act, must be “prove[d] by two
witnesses, in such manner that the question of fact ought to be left
872. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 180.
873. HOBSON, supra note 90, at 156.
874. MAGRUDER, supra, note 19 at 220.
875. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 177.
876. Id. at 169.
877. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 173; See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 13 (“Marshall
cautiously refrained from deciding whether the assemblage on Blennerhassett’s
Island amounted to an overt act of treason, though he strongly implied that it
did not.”).
878. See Hobson, supra note 30 (writing Marshall’s “ruling excluded most of
the evidence from going to the jury, leaving it no choice but to acquit”).
879. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 177.
880. Id. at 179.
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with the jury” who “will apply that law to the facts, and . . . find a
verdict of guilty or not guilty, as their own consciences may
direct.”881
1. In the wake of In Re Burr
When Marshall concluded the opinion, Hay requested time to
consider the opinion.882 Marshall accommodated, giving Hay a copy
of the opinion.883 Then, on Tuesday, September 1, the Court
reconvened, Hay stated that the case best be left with the jury.884
The jury then retired and returned shortly thereafter with a verdict
read by their foreman, Colonel Carrington.885 Carrington,
coincidentally was Marshall’s brother-in-law.886 Carrington stated,
“We of the jury say that Aaron Burr is not proved to be guilty under
this indictment by any evidence submitted to us. We therefore find
him not guilty.”887 In spite of the acquittal, Burr and his counsel
objected to the verdict “as unusual, informal, and irregular,” in that
the jury did not simply find “guilty” or “not guilty” but added
additional language.888 As such, according to Burr, procedure
necessitated “that wherever a verdict is informal the court will
either send back the jury to alter it, or correct it itself; that they had
no right to depart from the usual form.”889 Burr declaimed. “If you
find [a man] guilty, you are to say so,” and “if you find him not guilty,
you are to say so and no more.”890 Hay stated “the verdict ought to
be recorded as found by the jury, which was substantially a verdict
of acquittal; and that no principle of humanity, policy, or law,
forbade its being received in the very terms used by the jury” and
“form did not affect the substance.”891 Carrington, stated that “it
was said among [the jury] that if the verdict was [perceived as]
informal they would alter it; that it was, in fact,” intended to be “a
verdict of acquittal.”892 Marshall stated that indeed “the verdict
was, in effect, the same as a verdict of acquittal,” and if the jury
desired, it would “stand on the bill as it was” announced.893 Thus,
881. Id. at 180.
882. Id.
883. Id.
884. Id.
885. Id.
886. NEWMYER, supra note 165, at 201.
887. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 180.
888. Id.
889. Id.
890. Id.
891. Id.
892. Id.
893. Id.
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“an entry should be made on the record of ‘not guilty.’”894 Another
juror, Richard E. Parker, stated to Marshall and the Court that he
and his fellow jurors “knew that it was not in the usual form, but it
was more satisfactory to the jury as they had found it; and that he
would not agree to alter it.”895 Hay informed Marshall that
precedent existed under Rex v. Woodfall, a libel case in which the
jury deviated from form, adding words. 896 There the court took the
verdict as was read because “it did not affect the substance.”897
Accordingly, Marshall ruled that the record would enter that Burr
was found “Not Guilty,” but “the verdict should remain as found by
the jury.”898 Marshall discharged and thanked the jury for their
patience “in this long trial.”899 However, Marshall likely suspected
an acquittal that bore a sufficient muddiness would maintain
American posterity for the Court and the greater nation. In fact, he
planted the seed of such a decision to the jury by previously
announcing in his decision that “[t]he guilt of the accused, if there
be any guilt, does not consist in the assemblage, for he was not a
member of it,” thusly asserting that Burr was not inherently
innocent; Burr was just not guilty of treason.900 Therefore,
Marshall’s careful outcome was one in which the Court established
that Burr was legally innocent, but perhaps morally guilty.901
With the jury’s acquittal, Marshall had successfully navigated
Bollman’s liabilities, by whittling his previous language to mean
that the physical assemblance of an army against the government
is an act of treason.902 Marshall did so without the necessity of
forcing Jefferson to tender the documents to the Court over which
he asserted executive privilege.

G. A Political Epilogue: Another Prosecution and
Jefferson’s Reprise
Following Burr’s acquittal, Jefferson did not shy away from
criticizing John Marshall,903 nor did he withhold criticizing the

894. Id.
895. Id.
896. Rex v. Woodfall (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 914 (KB).
897. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 180-81.
898. Id. at 181.
899. Id.
900. Id. at 175.
901. See MAGRUDER, supra note 19, at 226 (writing that there was “no other
conclusion in accordance with the law. Whether Burr was morally guilty was a
question which . . . cannot be regarded as having been settled by the verdict;
but that he was not legally guilty is certain”).
902. UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 203, at 224.
903. SMITH, supra note 222, at 372.
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Marshall Court’s opinion.904 Jefferson did not blame Hay for any
purported fault in prosecuting: nor did he acknowledge the weak
case with which the administration proceeded against Burr.905
Rather, he accused Marshall of interfering from the bench.906
Jefferson, however, sank the prosecution that he so badly wanted
by declaring Burr’s guilt “beyond question,” a conspicuous act that
allowed Burr and his defense to recharacterize an impassioned
federal prosecution into Jefferson’s use of office to eradicate a onceclose rival.907 Moreover, Jefferson’s conduct and the defense tactics
allowed Marshall to guide the outcome via judicial statesmanship.
Still, Jefferson would not retrospectively blame his prosecutor
because Hay served as Jefferson’s quintessential proxy. Marshall’s
first major biographer United States Senator Allan Bowie
Magruder wrote that Jefferson’s “personal animus” towards
Marshall and “active interest” drove the narrative such that
Jefferson became “the real prosecutor of the prisoner . . .
stimulat[ing] the zeal and the eloquence of those who were
conducting the prosecution” on the President’s behalf.908 On
September 9, Hay attempted to try Burr for violating the Neutrality
Act by attempting to provoke war with Spain.909 On September 15,
Marshall ruled that the evidence was insufficient and the jury
acquitted after twenty minutes of deliberation. As a last-ditch
effort, the Jefferson administration attempted to invoke a process
in which the government filed a motion to commit Burr to a trial in
Kentucky or Ohio’s federal court on similar charges before Marshall
and Judge Griffin listening to the same evidence.910 On October 20,
after much testimony, Marshall ruled, declining to commit Burr,
but nevertheless ordering that Burr and Harman Blennerhassett
should stand trial in Ohio on misdemeanor charges of provoking
war with Spain.911 The government finally declined to prosecute
Burr after calling over fifty witnesses in his misdemeanor trial.912
904. See MAGRUDER, supra note 19, at 219 (writing, Jefferson “had the bad
taste and bad temper to denounce the opinion as an offensive trespass on the
executive department of the government”).
905. SMITH, supra note 222, 372.
906. Id.
907. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 22, 29 (writing “[t]he President
unwittingly made it possible for the Burr prosecution to become an indictment
and trial of his own administration,” a tactic conceived by Luther Martin).
908. MAGRUDER, supra note 19, at 220.
909. Zellar, supra note 39, at 233.
910. HOBSON, supra note 8, at 7.
911. Id. at 8, 26.
912. NEWMYER, supra note 165, at 9; see also HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra
note 12, at 288 (After this trial devolved into evidentiary squabbles “more than
fitfty witnesses were called against Burr on the misdemeanor charge, but the
evidence taken as a whole, seems clearly to have shown that Burr’s objective
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Jefferson wrote to Hay after the trial in bitter reflection, stating,
“[t]he event has been what was evidently intended from the
beginning of the trial; that is to say, not only to clear Burr, but to
prevent the evidence from ever going before the world.”913
Historians are unsure as to what evidence Jefferson referred, due
to the presumption that Hay put on the best case that he could with
the most competent evidence that he possessed.914
Jefferson, however, wanted to preserve his political battles
against Burr and Chief Justice Marshall, instructing Hay as to the
evidence withheld, “this latter case must not take place. It is now .
. . indispensable that not a single witness be paid or permitted to
depart until his testimony has been committed to writing.”915 In
approaching Burr, Marshall’s concern for the Court’s posterity was
neither touchy nor excessive because Jefferson intended to
capitalize upon their rivalries. According to Jefferson, the proper
remedy henceforth was to take the witnesses’ recorded words that
“[t]hese whole proceedings . . . be laid before Congress, that they
may decide whether the defect has been in the evidence of guilt, or
in the law, or in the application of the law, and that they may provide
the proper remedy for the past and the future.”916 On September 7,
Jefferson wrote Hay that he wished to continue the treason
prosecution, for if Burr is “defeated, it will heap coals of fire on the
head of [Marshall].”917 The Jefferson Administration sought to
prosecute Burr again; this time, for inciting war with Spain.918 On
September 9, this second prosecution commenced.919 In this trial
Burr and his defense team heavily cross-examined the prosecution’s
witnesses, with Burr contradicting witnesses based on his firsthand
knowledge, effectively providing to Burr the role of an unsworn
witness.920 It lasted for six days with fifty witnesses called.921 Burr
still sought the original Wilkinson letter.922 On September 21, Burr
apologized to Marshall for an objection he levied that it may be
“such apparent opposition to what appears to be the mind of the

was the settlement of the Washita lands, and that the Mexican adventure was
conditioned entirely on the existence of a state of war with Spain.”)
913. ALF J. MAPP, JR., THOMAS JEFFERSON: PASSIONATE PILGRIM 139
(1991).
914. SMITH, supra note 222, at 372.
915. Mapp, supra note 924, at 139.
916. SMITH, supra note 222, at 372.
917. 4 THOMAS JEFFERSON, MEMOIRS, CORRESPONDENCE, AND PRIVATE
PAPERS 105 (Thomas Jefferson Randolph, ed., 1829).
918. SMITH, supra note 222, at 373.
919. Id.
920. DAVID O. STEWART, AMERICAN EMPEROR: AARON BURR'S CHALLENGE
TO JEFFERSON'S AMERICA 264 (2012).
921. SMITH, supra note 222, at 373.
922. Stewart, supra note 931, at 264.
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court.”923 The defense’s attack on Wilkinson’s character and
Wilkinson’s own testimony and had decimated the prosecution’s
faith in him.924 Hay wrote to Jefferson, “my confidence in
[Wilkinson] is shaken if not destroyed. I am sorry for it, on my own
account, in the public account, and because you have expressed
opinions in his favor. But you did not known then what you will soon
know.”925 This letter was a warning from Hay to Jefferson that
impeaching Marshall (like Chase) for interfering with the
prosecution’s evidence was a poor choice based on Wilkinson’s poor
veracity.926 Finally, Hay moved that the jury be discharged and the
case be motion nolle prosequi.927 Marshall declined to grant the
prosecution’s motion to dismiss the jury without the defendant’s
consent; however, Burr demanded a verdict.928 Marshall reviewed
the case in camera and a jury ultimately acquitted Burr, now for the
second time.929
Ultimately, as promised, Jefferson did send the evidence of
Burr’s trial before Congress in October 1807.930 He urged the House
to impeach Marshall, a plausible risk.931 With the evidence that he
sent, the president prefaced, “You will be enabled to judge whether
the defect was in the testimony, in the law, or in the administration
of the law, and wherever it shall be found the Legislature alone can
apply or originate the remedy.”932 Hay bore mixed feelings on the
proposition; similarly, Jefferson’s likely harbored mixed
intentions.933 This may have been: to save face politically; to start a
923. Id.
924. See id. (“By the time Wilkinson was done, even George Hay did not
believe him. Hay urged Jefferson to investigate the general.”).
925. 3 HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 471
(1921).
926. See id. (“The hint was strong. If Wilkinson were discredited, Jefferson
himself was in danger. To attack the Supreme Court on such evidence was to
invite a worse defeat than in the impeachment of [Samuel] Chase.”); see also
HOBSON, supra note 8, at 6 (writing the defense’s “strategy was to discredit
Wilkinson, the prosecution’s star witness, whom they accused of criminal
misconduct in ordering arrests, forcibly seizing and imprisoning potential
witnesses, and then having them transported under military guard.”).
927. SMITH, supra note 222, at 373.
928. Id.
929. Id.
930. HOBSON, supra note 8, at 23.
931. BEVERIDGE, supra note 92, at 530; see also HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra
note 12, at 291 (noting that the House of Representatives was almost completely
Republican and the Senate was very pro-Jefferson; thus, Marshall risked a
successful vote to both impeach and convict him).
932. 10 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON:
CORRESPONDENCE AND PAPERS 1803-1807 at 524 (2009).
933. See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 289 (noting that Hay felt
legislators should know of the full incident but nevertheless warned Jefferson
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judicial impeachment; to spur Congress to pass a constitutional
amendment to the treason clause, or the Judiciary’s power, to see
Marbury Congressionally overridden for once and for all.934
Regardless of Jefferson’s intent in delivering the materials to
Congress, none of the above manifested. Nevertheless, Burr’s
political career never found its phoenix.935 The trial had forever
linked Burr to the indelible stain of treason.936
Some of Jefferson’s desires to damage Marshall’s reputation
were successful.937 In Baltimore, Maryland, a mob burned an effigy
in the Chief Justice’s likeness.938 Coinciding with Jefferson’s
delivery, Republican news outlets denounced Marshall. For
instance, on December 4, the Virginia Argus lambasted Marshall’s
prevention of Burr’s conviction by overturning of Bollman, writing,
“th[e] desirable independence of the Judges is very different from
that which places them above the law . . . legislating on the subject
of treason, and even dispensing with the law which the supreme
court of the United States had previously declared on the same
subject.”939 Moreover, the Republican newspaper hinted at Chase’s
unsuccessful, partisan impeachment in writing that Marshall “was
conscious of being above the reach of punishment,” and “even
though no proof of corrupt motives can be exhibited against him, he
ought to be removed from office.”940 Advocating for “an amendment
. . . [authorizing] and requiring the President to remove any Judge
from office at the request of a majority of both houses of Congress,”
an elected majority that unlike an independent judiciary, it wrote,
“would generally be on the side of justice.”941 Still, on September 30,
of his concerns regarding the political damage such a disclosure could do to the
greater judicial system, a risk that Jefferson was willing to take).
934. BROOKHISER, supra, note 164, at 121; see also HASKINS & JOHNSON,
supra note 12, at 290 (quoting Jefferson’s concerns that there was a “radical
defect in the administration of law”).
935. See NANCY ISENBERG, FALLEN FOUNDER: THE LIFE OF AARON BURR
400-04 (2007) (noting that at seventy-seven years old, Burr married a fiftyeight-year-old wealthy widow, Eliza Jumel, who had reinvented herself from a
young prostitute with a child out of wedlock into a socialite who divorced a dying
Burr three years later after Burr squandered her wealth).
936. HOBSON, supra note 8, at 33 (“Burr escaped conviction as a traitor, but
[prosecutor, William] Wirt forever linked him with the Biblical story of fallen
humanity.”).
937. See HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 291 (noting that thenMassachusetts Senator John Quincy Adams advanced a motion to cast doubts
before Congress on Marshall’s Burr opinion, which was ultimately
unsuccessful).
938. SMITH, supra note 222, at 373.
939. 1 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 155
(Bruce A. Ragsdale, ed., 2013) (italicization in original).
940. Id. (italicization in original).
941. See id. at 156 (“Such an amendment [to remove judges via presidential
power] could not have the effect of producing any improper influence on the
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the United States Gazette reprinted a Federalist party editorial that
defended Marshall and criticized Jefferson’s ongoing attempts “to
run down the Judicial authority and attempt to merge it in that of
the executive.”942 Over six years later, on January 14, 1814, bitterly,
Jefferson wrote to Adams in reflection upon the Burr trial, “I dare
say our cunning Chief Justice [Marshall] would swear to [anything],
and find as many sophisms to twist it out of the general terms of
our Declaration of rights . . . as he did to twist Burr’s neck out of the
halter of treason.”943 In a letter to Adams dated June 15, 1813,
Jefferson had gone so far as to accuse Marshall of “writ[ing]
libels.”944
Roughly a month after the Burr trial had ended, Marshall
wrote to Judge Richard Peters declaring that Burr left him,
“fatigued and occupied [in] the most unpleasant case which has ever
been brought before a Judge in this or perhaps any other country
which affected to be governed by laws.”945 For Marshall and the
Court, the case “was most deplorably serious.”946 Perhaps, he
surmised, “I might . . . have made it less serious to myself by obeying
the public will instead of the public law, and throwing a little more
of the somber upon others.”947 However, for Marshall, supreme to
the political whims of the president or the public, was: the Court’s
reputation, the checks and balances upon the Jefferson
Administration, and the constitutional balances necessitating
fairness for Burr.948

minds of the Judges, or of diminishing their legitimate and useful independence
. . . The opinion of the majority of both houses of Congress would generally be
on the side of justice; and, if it sometimes erred, it is better in a free country
that the will of the people should prevail.”).
942. HOBSON, supra note 8, at 37 (citing Editorial—United States Gazette
(Philadelphia), reprinted in the Virginia Gazette, September 30, 1807).
943. THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS: THE COMPLETE CORRESPONDENCE
BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON & ABIGAIL & JOHN ADAMS 421 (Lester J. Cappon
ed., 1959).
944. Id. at 331-32 (Jefferson and Adams corresponded regarding party
differences between Federalists and Republicans).
945. BEVERIDGE, supra note 92, at 529.
946. Id.
947. Id.at 530.
948. See generally WHITE, supra note 6, at 22 (writing that among Marshall’s
principles of constitutionalism was a concept of “reciprocal obligations” in which
the Branches must function “within the limits of their respective jurisdictions
[with] a duty not to transgress these limits. The laws of the nation were the
source of the power of government officials; and such officials had to obey those
laws”).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Without damaging the Court’s posterity or perceivably
tarnishing Jefferson’s presidency, Marshall rendered the opinion of
In Re Burr and the power of the Judiciary over the Executive
Branch in certain circumstances.949 It is a Marshall Court case with
undervalued significance. Marshall ushered Burr along in a careful
fashion, similar to the manner in which he avoided the underlying
issues of Marbury.950 Moreover, he did it for the same reason: to
prevent the public from plainly seeing the Court’s lack of power to
enforce its judgments.951 Because of this, Burr did not manifest into
the greater issue that was whether President Jefferson, or any
president, may be summoned as a witness and ordered to produce
documents in his possession.952 Senator Beveridge estimated that
the impact and relevance of Burr significantly carried onward
through the Civil War, saving thousands of innocent lives that
would have unconstitutionally fallen victim to “popular passion”
based upon “groundless rumor and personal spite”953 By 1885, it
was characterized as an event that was “the most remarkable and
imposing of any which up to that time had marked judicial annals
of the country.”954 Its relevancy reared again a century and a half
later when Jefferson’s refusal served as precedent for President
Richard M. Nixon’s refusal to comply, claiming executive privilege
with the Burger Court’s order to produce the notorious White House
tapes in United States v. Nixon (1974).955 It even inspired a 2018
949. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 3 (writing that Marshall “maintain[ed]
that the President was not exempt from court orders designed to protect the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants”).
950. See Scott Douglas Gerber, The Supreme Court Before John Marshall,
14 U. ST. THOMAS L.J 27, 35 (2018) (writing that in Marbury, Marshall
“announce[d] that the Jefferson administration was wrong to withhold the
judicial commissions . . . and that courts could issue writs to compel public
officials to do their prescribed duty.” Still, “the Supreme Court had no power to
issue such writs,” and “a showdown with the Jefferson administration was
avoided, but Marshall still was able to ‘reaffirm’ the Court's power of judicial
review”).
951. Id.
952. See HOBSON, supra note 8, at 5 (writing that like Marbury, “[i]n Burr’s
case, too, the threatened confrontation did not occur”); see also UROFSKY &
FINKELMAN, supra note 203, at 224.
953. BEVERIDGE, supra note 92, at 64-65.
954. MAGRUDER, supra note 19, at 199.
955. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 702 (1974) (Chief Justice Warren
Burger writing on behalf of the Court, heavily referenced Nixon’s renaissance
of Jeffersonian claims for Executive privilege in Burr, wrote,
“where a subpoena is directed to a President of the United States,
appellate review, in deference to a coordinate branch of Government,
should be particularly meticulous to ensure that the standards of

906

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[53:705

stage-play adaptation written by award-winning playwright, David
L. Robbins, portraying the drama that Marshall faced when
presiding.956 Most recently, in 2020, Burr was a large focus of Chief
Justice John Roberts’ opinion over the constitutionality of
compelling President Donald J. Trump’s compliance with a
subpoena, in spite of presidential immunity in Trump v. Vance.957
Roberts wrote of Marshall’s responsibility for “200 years of
precedent establishing that Presidents, and their official
communications, are subject to judicial process . . . even when the
President is under investigation.”958
Marshall’s decision-making process was characteristically
hierarchical, insofar as continually he centered his reasoning on the
Rule 17(c) have been correctly applied . . . From our examination of
the materials submitted by the Special Prosecutor to the District
Court in support of his motion for the subpoena, we are persuaded
that the District Court's denial of . . . [President Nixon’s] motion to
quash the subpoena was consistent with Rule 17(c). We also conclude
that the Special Prosecutor has made a sufficient showing to justify a
subpoena for production before trial. Although the courts will afford
the utmost deference to presidential acts in the performance of an
Art. II function . . . . W]hen a claim of presidential privilege as to
materials subpoenaed for use in a criminal trial is based, as it is here,
not on the ground that military or diplomatic secrets are implicated,
but merely on the ground of a generalized interest in confidentiality,
the President’s generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the
demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial
and the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of criminal justice . . . [the Court] conclude[d] that the
legitimate needs of the judicial process may outweigh Presidential
privilege, it is necessary to resolve those competing interests in a
manner that preserves the essential functions of each branch. The
right and indeed the duty to resolve that question does not free the
Judiciary from according high respect to the representations made on
behalf of the President.
Id. at 702, 707. See also, UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 203, at
224.
956. The King of Crimes: The Aaron Burr Treason Trial in John Marshall’s
Court Premieres in January, DOMINION ENERGY CENTER (Jan. 03, 2018),
www.dominionenergycenter.com/news/detail/the-king-of-crimes-the-aaronburr-treason-trial-in-john-marshalls-court-premieres-in-january
[perma.cc/S2BB-ZRS4] (announced by the John Marshall Foundation).
957. See Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2423, 207 L. Ed. 2d 907 (2020)
(Chief Justice Roberts, writing, “In the two centuries since the Burr trial,
successive Presidents have accepted Marshall's ruling that the Chief Executive
is subject to subpoena. In 1818, President Monroe received a subpoena to testify
in a court-martial against one of his appointees.” Id. “In 1875, President Grant
submitted to a three-hour deposition in the criminal prosecution of a political
appointee embroiled in a network of tax-evading whiskey distillers.” Id. at
2423.).
958. Id. at 2427.
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broadest terms conceivable in order to buttress its merit as a
fundamental American principle of law.959 In Burr, Marshall
successfully shifted legal analysis from the large concept of treason,
to analyzing the meaning of levying war, onward to the question of
what constitutes an overt act, finally leaving the question of
whether via constructive treason one could commit such an overt
act.960 Having felled the case at its analytical foundation, Marshall
eradicated the concept of constructive treason in the young
American Republic. “The mind is not to be led to the conclusion that
the individual was present, by a train of conjectures or inferences,
or of reasoning;” the Constitution is clear the fact of physical
presence in the treasonous overt act of levying war “must be proved
by two witnesses.”961 As UIC John Marshall Law School’s Professor
Olken stated of Marbury, “the chief justice deftly carved a set of
legal issues from the political circumstances of the case in order to
assert the importance of the Court in matters of constitutional
interpretation.”962 So too here, Marshall redirected the potential for
Burr’s demise within the political tilt of Jefferson administration.
For Jefferson’s hopes to manifest and pursue a guilty verdict for
Burr also meant that Jefferson’s administration must acquiesce to
the judiciary and Marshall. By miring a treason case in the political
ramifications of executive privilege, Marshall completely frustrated
Jefferson’s goals.
While Marshall carefully crafted Burr to Jefferson’s detriment
in the judicial arena, Jefferson intended to seek the last word in the
political arenas.963 The fate of Burr appeared to be left in the jury’s
hands. However, Marshall was savvier. His showmanship and his
judicial statesmanship had steered the Court and the country safely
onward. Marshall facilitated the Judiciary’s ability to occupy the
thresholds of the political branches. He insulated the Judiciary from
an undoing of criticism by deliberately exhibiting the center of this
careful decision. Moreover, Burr, a case erroneously trivialized as a
959. WHITE, supra note 6, at 20-21.
960. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 144 (“If one constructive treason be admitted, all
may enter.” Id. “The proposition that it could be is a startling one; and yet there
would be no such overt act of levying war as, according to the decisions of the
courts, would seem to be an indispensable element in the crime of treason.” Id.
185.).
961. Id. at 185.
962. Olken, supra note 5, at 399.
963. SMITH, supra note 222, at 372; see also Hobson Interview, supra note
16, at 9 (“Marshall sought to build up respect for the Court . . . [by] separate[ing]
law from politics, with the Court concerning itself with strictly legal matters . .
. not an easy task, particularly during the tumultuous years of Jefferson’s first
administration. Defining what was ‘law’ and what was ‘politics’ remained
controversial, of course, but Marshall to a great extent succeeded in creating a
public perception of the Court as an impartial, disinterested legal institution,
removed from the political arena.”).
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curious moment of history and law amid a lengthy career, rather, is
a fascinating milestone of Marshall’s unique legal, historical, and
constitutional analysis. It serves as an exhibit that the pragmatic
Chief Justice John Marshall was a quintessential judicial
statesman. Marshall’s place in history is profound, so too must be
In Re Burr.

